theory of this class of ideas? And what are the extent and limitations of the faculty of forming them? Ideas which have no real objects are of two kinds; 1. Erroneous judgments; 2. Imaginations which are formed arbitrarily with a knowledge on the part of the imaginer that the objects of his ideas are not real. Let us first inquire how does the mind judge erroneously? And what is the extent and limi. tation of this power? On examination it will be found, that erroneous judgments consist entirely of erroneous generalizations. We judge that a thing is, when it is not; that it is a cause, when it is an effect; that it is one, when it is many; or that it is possible, when it is impossible. How then is it possible for the mind to make those mistakes? And what are the conditions and extent of these liabilities? I answer, the mind makes these mistakes, by drawing its inferences hastily, and from partial views of the objects of its conceptions. For example, a judgment is to be passed on a house, whether it is good or bad; or on an action, whether it is good or bad. If the mind obtains a complete and perfect conception of the house, in respect to all the particulars which constitute its goodness, and a perfect conception of the goodness which is predicated of house, it must judge correctly. It cannot, with adequate conceptions of both these objects, deliberately decide contrary to the fact. So if it obtains a perfect conception of the action to be judged, and of the goodness to be affirmed or denied of it, and judges deliberately after having obtained these ideas, it must judge correctly respecting the action. In the case of the house, good the genus, is compared with house, to see whether house possesses its appropriate generic qualities, and can be classed under it; and in the case of the action, good the genus, is compared with a particular action, to see whether the action possesses the appropriate generic properties. In these cases, objects are compared by means of conceptions relating to those objects. If the conceptions are perfect, the judgment will be true; if the conceptions are imperfect, the judgment will be liable to be false. Judgments cannot be wrong with perfect conceptions of the subject and predicate, if they are sufficiently deliberate. Conceptions which we reason from, are themselves a class of previous judgments traceable in the last term of the progression to sensations and consciousness. The essential and ultimate condition of erroneous judgments, therefore,

is inattention to the legitimate grounds of judgment, and an omission of some element, either from our conception of the subject, or our conception of the predicate. Having misjudged once, that false judgment is liable to vitiate all other judgments derived from it, and to plunge us into endless labyrinths of error. Analytical judgments may be exercised in two ways. One is, by having a subject and predicate formally presented for our consideration and decision; and the other is, by having simply the subject, and disengaging the predicate from it, by analysis. Both amount to the same thing.

Synthetical judgments sustain the same relations to their appropriate conditions which analytical judgments do to

theirs.

§ 100. The formation of conceptions which are known at the time to have unreal objects, or objects which are not altogether real, remains to be accounted for. Since it is the main design of the faculty of ideas to give us ideas of objects corresponding to those objects, how is it that we form arbitrary conceptions at will, not corresponding to any known objects? What is the origin of such conceptions? And what are the limitations of the faculty of forming them? The origin of imaginations is similar to that of judgments, and the formation of them is a function of the same general faculty. In valid judgments we form ideas of things as they are, inferring their existence from appropriate conditions; in imagining, we form ideas of supposed things, founding our suppositions on valid judgments, but modifying them to answer the purposes we have in view.

Suppose for example, we wish to illustrate the exercise of love to our neighbor, and exhibit it to the admiration of men; to accomplish this, we reason from the effect which we wish to produce, to appropriate representations and conceptions for producing it. The idea of love, and of the manifestation and exercise of love, by acts of kindness and humanity, suggests the idea of a sufferer and a benefactor. To accomplish our object, we conceive of particular forms of suffering adapted to excite commiseration, and connect them with our supposed subject. Having formed the outline of the picture, we fill it up with parts adapted to that outline, and suggested by it; and add appropriate incidents suggested by previous parts of the picture, or by the object which we wish to accomplish. The whole is a

fabric of imagination. There were no such men, no such incidents, no such combinations of circumstances and events, as we conceived, though every element of thought contained in the whole, might be such as was to be found in a thousand real objects. The whole exercise by which we formed the imaginary scene was an exercise of judgment, reasoning from a proposed object to well-adapted means for accomplishing that object. The same is true in all analogous cases, showing that imagination is but a department of reason, and imaginations a species of judgments having relation to objects as possible, but not altogether real. The power to conceive of objects as possible, is one of the elementary powers of reason, and is more or less exercised with relation to all contingent objects. We conceive of the world as existing, and conceive of its non-existence as possible. We judge affirmatively that it does exist; we judge hypothetically that it might not exist. In judging that it might not exist, we form conceptions of it as not existing, so that our hypothetical judgment has an imagination as one of its elements. Conceptions having no objective validity, may be deduced from all our judgments, both by adding some element to the conclusion which is not conditioned on the premises, or subtracting some element from it which is conditioned on the premises. Conceptions often occur as logical inferences, having respect to objects considered as possible, desirable, or agreeable, before they become judgments concerning things as real or unreal. Thus I see a distant object, and infer that it may be a man or animal, before I infer that it is actually such. I infer that particular men may be innocent or guilty, rich or poor, wise or unwise, before I infer or judge that they really are so.

We often judge objects to be desirable, undesirable, or possible, considered with respect to certain objects of judgment or knowledge, at the same time that we consider them as having no reality; or without considering or judging whether they are real or unreal.

All the limitations, therefore, of the power of forming conceptions are similar to those of forming legitimate judgments, and depend on similar principles.

CHAPTER VII.

NATURE AND LAWS OF EVIDENCE.

§ 101. It is characteristic of judgments to be inferred from certain premises, and to be adopted on the ground of evidence. Thus we judge a particular distant object to be a man or animal, on account of some resemblance which it bears to a man or animal, as an object of sight; and judge a man to be innocent or guilty, rich or poor, wise or unwise, on account of some indications of innocence or guilt, wealth or poverty, wisdom or folly.

The immediate grounds of judgments are previous exercises, such as sensations, ideas, and emotions; their remote grounds the objects of ideas. The former are subjective, and the latter objective. Objective grounds of judgment become effective only by means of the subjective ones which they produce.

The objective grounds of synthetic.judgments are frequent matters of consideration and discussion, under the title of evidence. Evidence denotes objects and events, considered simply as the objective ground of judgments.

As far as we have decisive evidence, we can pursue our judgments and extend our knowledge no farther. Where evidence fails entirely, or is in any degree indecisive, judgment is limited in an equal degree. When we push our conclusions beyond what is required by evidence, they cease to be valid, and become conjectures, hypotheses, and

errors.

§ 102. Evidence is either direct or indirect. Direct evidence tends directly to produce judgments without any intervening judgments.

Indirect evidence tends to produce judgments by means of other intermediate judgments. In every chain of consecutive reasoning, the premises and conclusions which are in immediate proximity, are connected in the relations of direct evidence and truths evidenced; whereas, remote premises are indirect evidences of remote conclusions, deduced from them by intermediate direct ones.

Objects may serve as single and associated direct evidences of various judgments, and as single and associated indirect

evidences of various others, depending remotely on them. Single evidences may serve as the basis of a certain number of judgments, depending immediately on each of them alone. Considered together, different evidences give rise to several additional direct judgments, which could not be deduced from either of them separately, and in this way become associated evidences of truth, which they do not reveal unassociated.

It as necessary to evidence to produce judgments as it is to sensible objects to produce sensations, or to exhibit sensation-producing phenomena. That which is incapable of being, in any way, an object and producing cause of sensa tions, is not a sensible object, and that which is incapable of producing judgments is not an evidence. Particular objects are evidences considered with respect only to the judgments which they are capable of producing.

§ 103. Some of the inferences to be deduced from evidence are obvious, and occur immediately to all. Persons can hardly avoid drawing them correctly.

Other inferences, which are equally legitimate, are not equally obvious, but require more protracted and vigorous attention, in order to their being drawn. Such escape the notice of superficial inquirers, and are often keenly disputed by them. They still, however, depend on evidence, and are capable of being proved to the satisfaction of the human mind, and of becoming objects of as much certainty as more obvious judgments. Least obvious judgments may be as certain as those which are most obvious but are less general. They are attained slowly and with labor, and only by the few; whereas, the most obvious judgments which arise from the consideration of evidence, are the property of the many.

There is a remarkable uniformity in the judgments of different persons, and of the same persons at different times, corresponding to the uniform nature of the human mind, and of the evidences by which human judgments are determined. There is also a manifest disconformity in the judgments of different persons, and in those of the same persons at different times, corresponding to the more or less improved state, and the more or less protracted and vigorous exercise of their minds, and to the number of evidences made use of.