in the truest sense of the word. I understand that the problem has been suggested to the various speakers as not a matter of mere debate. I am sure that no man of us here, with his pressure of ordinary duties, would pause to take a day therefrom for the mere luxury of an academic debate. It is because we believe that there is real need for this conference that we are here. And in all seriousness and earnestness, with the determination, I am sure, that from out of this conference there shall come some sort of practical suggestion to the state universities, first of all, and to other universities as well, we are gathered here to listen to one another and to join with each other in the exposition of what we think to be practical wisdom.

WHAT RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MAY THE STATE UNIVERSITY PROPERLY UNDERTAKE?

WILLIAM OXLEY THOMPSON, D.D.

President, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

The question upon which I have been asked to present this paper opens a difficult but fruitful topic for discussion.

The American people by conviction are thoroughly religious and believe in religion as vitally concerned in the development of all true education. The fact that the church was the pioneer in higher education, together with the fact that religion and education have always been united in their interests, has given emphasis to the importance of religion in education. When, however, the common school interest grew up, there was a disinclination to insist upon the presence of religious exercises in the school on the ground of alleged interference with the rights of conscience. Associated with this was the political theory, as commonly existed in this country, that the state and church should be separate. This doctrine of separation of the church and state is even more strongly intrenched in popular belief. Under the influence of such a theory, professedly Christian people felt that it was an unchristian attitude for them to insist upon conformity on the part of those who were non-christian. The very principles which they espoused, prohibited them from forcing these principles upon others. The constitutional doctrine on this subject of education, in the first amendment to the constitution of the United States, declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This amendment virtually turns the whole matter to the separate states with the assurance that Congress will not legislate upon the subject. This provides for the free exercise of religion and guarantees that it shall not be established by the government. The state constitutions have followed this general principle with somewhat more extended statements as to the rights of

conscience and with certain protection so far as the support of religion by taxation is concerned.

In the earlier years, no distinction was made in legislation between the church and religion. Christianity has sometimes been declared to be a part of the common law of England and America, but the confusion that arises from identifying religion with the church still continues in the minds of many. The fact that religion was presumably the chief concern of many, whatever the different religious bodies, and the fact that the Bible was the book from which all these bodies took authority, lead many to assume that controversy was necessary and agreement impossible. In line with this belief, a court decision, "That the Bible was a sectarian book," was developed and the conclusion reached that it could not be constitutionally or legally used in schools supported by taxation.

Recent tendencies have revealed a new phase of this problem. A new, or at least an enlarged, view of the state has been developed. We are agreed to the theory that the state is something more than a policeman with a large club; we are proceeding upon the theory that it is the duty of the state to engage in philanthropic and benevolent work and that the church is not the only agency interested in religion. Indeed the people have come to demand that the state engage in what may be termed developmental agencies that are quite beyond any of the older theories. This is the most fundamental and important argument for state education. This broader view of the state reveals the fact that religion is a subject of common interest. The famous phase in the ordinance of 1787, namely, "religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged," has received a new emphasis and the popular judgment has gained credence that religion is fundamental to good government. If education is, therefore, to prepare men not only to live under good government but to maintain it, the argument for the maintenance of religion would seem to have the best of support. Attention has been called in important legal decisions to the fact that the ordinance itself is clear on this matter. This decision emphasized the position by suggesting that it was not at all true that good government was necessary to religion, but that the dependence was, as stated in the article, and that religion was necessary to good government. It seems clear, therefore, that the state will never support the institutions of religion such as the church. On the other hand it seems equally clear that the abiding interest of the state in religion will be more and more manifest. Whether the state will manifest this interest by encouraging the support of religious education is the theme under consideration.

In order that we may discuss this subject candidly, I propose to review some of the court decisions upon the general question of the

Bible, religion, and the public schools, in order to discover the status of the question before us and then to offer some remarks indicating the conclusion.

(1.) THE STATUS OF STATE UNIVERSITIES

These institutions are brought into existence by the state through provision in the constitution, as in Colorado, (one of the newer states), or by act of the legislature, as in Ohio and most states where statehood was a fact prior to the organization of the university. These institutions, therefore, enjoy whatever rights are prescribed by statutes, or are accorded by common consent because not contrary to law or constitution. The state university is therefore, limited by its legal and its constitutional rights. Anything contrary to either law or constitution would be denied. It is worth while to note that in nearly every case, custom has grown up in these institutions somewhat in harmony with popular sentiment. In many of the state universities the ordinary customs prevalent at denominational colleges prevail. This, however, is purely a matter of custom and not a matter of legal right. Many of these customs, including some religious exercises, would probably cease if the question were raised in a legal or technical way. Our discussion must not, therefore, assume that existing practices are always matters of right. The right of the state to engage in education is established beyond successful dispute; whether there are any limits to the state's right to engage in education, is sometimes debated; whether it may undertake education in religion, resolves itself, therefore, into a question as to the limits to be placed upon the state's right to educate. Upon this question constitutions, laws, and court decisions are instructive in that they represent the popular will on this issue.

(2.) SOME COURT DECISIONS

Among the earlier decisions on the question of the Bible in public schools, I have read one from New England, (which, unfortunately, is not at hand) in which the court decided that the reading of the Bible was not an infringement upon the rights of conscience. The decision went further and declared that for a small minority of people to object to certain religious exercises would overturn popular government, inasmuch as any one person would be able under such ruling, to thwart the purpose and desire of a practically unanimous community.

The case of the Board of Education of the city of Cincinnati, versus John D. Minor, et al., is reported at length in volume twentythree of the Ohio Reports. This case rose out of two resolutions, namely: "Resolved, That religious instruction and the reading of religious books, including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the common schools of Cincinnati, it being the true object and intent of this rule to allow the children of the parents of all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, to enjoy alike the benefit of the common school fund.

Second, "Resolved, That so much of the regulations on the course of study and the text-books in the intermediate and district schools (page 213, annual report), as reads af follows, 'The opening exercises in every department shall commence by reading a portion of the Bible by or under the direction of the teacher, and appropriate singing by the pupils,' be repealed." Upon hearing, the Superior Court of Cincinnati gave judgment for the plaintiff and granted a perpetual injunction against the enforcement of the resolutions, or either of them. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the judgment reversed and original petition dismissed. This case was argued with great ability, and covered completely the question of the Bible and religious instruction in the public schools of Ohio. In the wide range of discussion the court saw fit to express its conviction that there was a total abstinence of the legislature looking to the enforcement of the religious instruction or the reading of religious books in the public schools. It further commented upon the term, "religion," to the effect that it must mean the religion of man and not the religion of any class of men, in proof of which the Court affirmed when the constitution spoke of all men having certain rights, it could not mean merely all Christian men, and called attention to the fact that some of the men who framed the constitution were not Christian men.

(2.) Another important decision was in the Board of Education in the city of Detroit. Section thirty-nine of the constitution of Michigan provides "That the legislature shall pass no law to prevent any person from worshiping Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or compel any person to attend, erect, or to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates, for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion." This case was brought to compel the board to discontinue the use of a certain book known as "Readings from the Bible" in the public schools of Detroit. The decision of the Court finally was to the effect that reading of such extract was not in violation of any constitutional provision. Some argument was there made to show that historically the teacher of religion was synonymous with the minister of the gospel. It is a matter of doubt, however, whether that decision would be sustained by the court now if the question were presented involving the demand of state funds for the person whose duty would be to teach religion.

(3.) The case involving the city of Edgerton, Wisconsin, has attracted wide attention. This decision involved the following items:

First, that the use of the Bible as a text book, and that stated reading thereof, in the public schools, is sectarian instruction, within the meaning of the constitution of Wisconsin which ordains that no such instruction shall be allowed schools. The fact that children were not compelled to remain did not, in the judgment of the court, remove the cause for complaint.

Second, that Bible reading, in common schools, as a text book, is religious worship and constitutes the school house, for the time being a place of worship, and said reading during school hours against the consent of the tax-payer compels him to support a place of worship.

Third, all Bible reading in common schools as a text book, is sectarian instruction, and the money drawn from the state treasury for the support of such schools is “For the benefit of a religious seminary" within the meaning of section eighteen, article one of the constitution of Wisconsin, prohibiting such appropriation of the state funds.

Taking these few decisions as a basis, and probably a fair precedent for any other cases that might arise, I offer the following remarks:

First, there is a distinct statement in the constitution of Michigan that no person can be compelled to attend, erect or support, against his will, any place of religious worship, or pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel, or teacher of religion. Under that provision, I do not believe it would be possible to use any of the public finances of the state of Michigan for the purpose of carrying forward religious education in the University of Michigan. If it were done it would be by concession and custom, and not by authority and right of law.

Second, the decision in the Wisconsin case makes it clear that the constitution there would prohibit religious education in any school supported by the state. If the reading of the Bible is to be construed as sectarian instruction, I can hardly conceive that any instruction in religion could be provided that could not be subject to the same criticism. The principle on which the reading of the Bible was declared an act of worship, would apply equally to other instruction upon the subject of religion.

Third, the decision in Ohio, while not covering exactly the points in the two cases named above, is not in conflict with section seven, article one, of the constitution which declares that no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or maintai any form of worship, against his consent. The constitution further provides that no religious, or other sect or sects, is ever to have any exclusive right to, or control of, the school fund of this state. Under this clause no religious education could be undertaken that would be sufficiently broad or indefinite to evade the charge of being sectarian.

Fourth, I have not had opportunity to make an examination of the constitutional provisions or of the court decisions of all the states in which state universities are located, but it may be fair, in addition to the above, to presume that all state universities are subject to substantially the same limitations. This being true, the conclusion is obvious that formal religious education can never have a legal status in a state university.