makes them honour'd and belov'd by their neighbours, and invites mankind to cultivate a correfpondence with them.

But further thefe virtues are useful, not only to the perfons who practife them, but alfo to thofe with whom they converfe. The fuccefs of men's undertakings oftentimes depends upon a right information of circumftances. When we are made acquainted with the truth of things, we have fome foundation to build upon, and fhall moft probably take fuch measures as will prevent any threatning evil, or procure any defired good. But when men diffemble and play the hypocrite with us, and endeavour to make us believe that which they know to be falfe; we fhall be apt to direct our conduct according to thofe falfe notions which we receive from hem; and fo fhall be led into wrong meafures of action, which will hinder our attaining the good we defire, or bring down upon us the evil which we dread. One great advantage of fociety, is the communicating to one another the knowledge of thofe things which tend to our welfare, and affifting each other by our counfel. But if I

can

cannot believe a man, I am not like to receive any benefit from his fociety; because I fhall have no regard to what he faith, but fhall reject his counfel, how good foever it may be, from á fufpicion of his infincerity.

Again: fidelity is a very ufeful virtue in fociety. Whofoever fulfils his promises, and performs his contracts, thereby becomes useful to the perfons to whom those promises and contracts were made. The end of a promife is to fecure to another the enjoyment of fome good, or protection from fome evil; and the defign of contracts is the mutual benefit and advantage of the contracting parties. Therefore he who fulfils his promife is ufeful to his neighbour, by putting him into the poffeffion of the promised good, or protecting him from that evil which he promised to protect him from. And when men perform their contracts with one another, they do one another all that good, whatever it be, which was propofed in the contracts made betwixt them.

"To what hath been faid concerning the usefulness of thefe virtues in fociety we may add further, that they are ab

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folutely

folutely neceffary to the fupport of it. "Tis impoffible that fociety fhould be maintained without mutual faith. All the commerce which is among men is founded upon the mutual confidence which they have in one another, and their perfuafion of each other's fincerity: and when once thefe foundations of commerce are deftroyed, the commerce itself will be deftroyed alfo. If we fufpect a man's veracity, and know not how to believe what he fays, we fhall fhun his converfation; for no character is more odious than that of a liar. We fhall decline all manner of dealings with thofe whom we cannot truft, and avoid entering into any contracts with fuch as allow themselves in breach of promife.

A great part of what hath been faid concerning the virtues of truth and fidelity, may with equal juftice be applied to the virtue of gratitude to our benefactors. There is a natural fitness and decency in it; it is acting in conformity to truth, the righteousness of which hath been already fhewn. When men are thankful for benefits confer'd upon them, they confefs the truth, viz. that they have received benefits; and

treat

treat their benefactors as being what they are, viz. kind and beneficent to them. On the contrary, when men are unthankful for favours received, they do in effect deny the receipt of any fuch favours, and thofe to be benefactors who really have been fo. I put gratitude under the head of justice, because it feems to me to be one eminent branch of it for if juftice confifts in rendering to every one what is his due, then gratitude to a benefactor is a part of juftice, because it is rendering to him what is his due: for a thankful acknowledgment, and even a requital, if it lies in his power, is a debt due from him who receives a kindness, to him who bestows it. And no man ought to accept of a kindnefs from another, who would not, if it were in his power, fhew the fame kindness to him when he ftands in need of it: for by accepting a kindness, a man lays himself under an obligation to the perfon who bestowed it, and makes himself indebted to him; and no man ought to contract a debt, who is not determin'd, as foon as he is able, to pay it. That man hath no right to a kind usage from others, who hath no difpofition to fhew the like towards them;

for

for whatsoever we would that men fhould do to us, we ought to do the fame to them; according to the rule prefcribed by our Saviour, Mat. VII. 12.

The mention of this rule furnishes us with another good argument whereby to prove the righteoufness of all the virtues I have been difcourfing of. Every man is defirous that others should be just in their dealings with him, that they should pay for what they have bought, restore what they have borrow'd, and fuffer him peaceably to enjoy that which is his own. Every one is defirous that others should fulfil their promises to and contracts with him, and be faithful to any truft which he hath repofed in them and every one is defirous that o thers fhould exprefs a grateful fenfe of the benefits which they have received from him. It is therefore moft righteous that he should practife the fame things with regard to others for the fame reafons which oblige others to obferve thefe rules in their conduct towards him, oblige him to obferve them in his conduct towards others. These things may fuffice to fhew the righteousness of thofe precepts which enjoin juftice, which makes fo confiderable a part of the duty we owe to our neighbour.

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