was perfect, and, in the absence of a corkscrew, presented a problem. He said, "All right, you hold the candle." He held the bottle in his left hand, and with his sword in the right struck the neck of it so skilfully as to cut it off smoothly. The problem was solved. Further details are unnecessary. I understood the art of making drinking-cups by cutting a bottle in two with a strong string, but this feat of Buford's was new to me.' John Buford died of disease, December 16, 1863, a MajorGeneral of Volunteers. He had won great renown as an able, fighting soldier. Lee was not to be allowed to rest in his chosen winter quarters. On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved to the fords on the Rappahannock, and preparation was made to pass them, although they were strongly defended by the enemy. The Third Corps massed at Kelly's Ford, some five miles below Rappahannock Station. This corps forced a crossing about 5 P.M., and massed in battle order on the bluffs near the river. My command did no fighting this day. The Third Brigade, with some assistance from the Second brigade of the First Division of the Sixth Corps, at dusk, under the leadership of the accomplished General David A. Russell, gallantly assaulted and carried the strongly fortified tête-de-pont on the north of the river at Rappahannock Station. The principal parts of Hoke's and Hay's brigades of Early's division of Ewell's corps were captured, numbering, including killed and wounded, 1630. Russell's loss in this affair, all told, was 327. He captured seven battle flags and Green's battery of four rifled guns.' Lee had intended to hold this position as a centre, and then fall, alternately, on the divided portions of the Army of the Potomac after they crossed the river above and below it.' Its loss forced him to retire from A string drawn tightly around a bottle where the cut is desired to be made, and then rapidly drawn back and forth until the friction heats the glass, renders it easy to be separated by a sharp jar against the hand or some hard substance. 8 Three of these had belonged to Randolph's battery, lost at Winchester.- War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 626. 'Ibid., pp. 613-616. the river and take position in front of Culpepper Court-House, with his right resting on Mount Pony. The next day the principal part of Meade's army, having succeeded in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle. Late in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill (Miller's) about two miles in front of Brandy Station. The place was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry. This was Lee's most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of observation. My command was disposed for the attack in the following order: The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the 122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support. The 110th Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad, with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy; the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance to the right. There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was ordered at once. The formation was made in plain view of the enemy. The distance to the hill was about one half mile. The 138th drew the enemy's artillery fire, but continued its advance. The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration, and in person I led the 10th to the real work. Not a gun was fired by my men as they advanced to the charge. I made every exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the foot of the hill the enemy's artillery was withdrawn, and his infantry made a precipitate retreat. I was the first to gain the crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops not two hundred feet away. A Confederate was reported wounded with a pistol ball at this place. This is the nearest I can come to having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle. We pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries of artillery, which compelled us to halt. Night came on, and the day's work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station. Captain Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed, and my loss was otherwise light. We made the charge with the commanding General-Meade-and much of his army looking on. It was Meade's belief that behind the heights assaulted would be found Lee's army arrayed for battle. Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in front of Culpepper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the Rapidan,' and, by the morning of the 9th of November, his army was south of this historic stream. The Army of Northern Virginia never again crossed the Rapidan or Rappahannock. Henceforth it was to be confined to a narrower theatre of operations, and a closer defence of the capital of the Confederate States, but this defence was still to be most memorable and boody, even in comparison with what had gone before. 1 War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 611, 616 (Lee's Report). MINE RUN CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF ORANGE GROVE, NOVEMBER, 1863-WINTER CANTONMENT (1863-64) OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT CULPEPPER COURT-HOUSE, AND ITS REORGANIZATION-GRANT ASSIGNED TO COMMAND THE UNION ARMIES, AND PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR TH HOUGH the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed, yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpepper, the public cry was heard-" On to Richmond!" Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff that should have been "called " by Meade while the Army of Northern Virginia was north of the Rappahannock. Meade, however, acted persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in the light of the best knowledge he could obtain. He would not stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and sometimes-said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia-was unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards superiors and inferiors. Notwithstanding this, he never lost his equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere appearances to move him. Nor could his superiors induce him to act against his judgment as to a particular military situation. It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the Potomac after Gettysburg. He was urged to bring on a battle before the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detach ments. The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck: "If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails. "Yours truly, This note was forwarded to Meade. "A. LINCOLN." To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his doing so sooner. But the pressure continued. Halleck, the 18th, wired Meade: "Lee is unquestionably bullying you. If you cannot ascertain his movements, I certainly cannot. think you will find out where he is. If you pursue and fight him, I This was too much for Meade's temper. He responded: If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they have not been asked for. I |