cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle ?

The principal peculiarities of the engagement were: (1) That an ably commanded army was surprised in its camp, and, in considerable part, driven from it at the opening of the battle; (2) that notwithstanding this, it won, at the close of the day, the most signal and complete field-victory of the war, with the possible exception of those won at Nashville and Sailor's Creek; (3) the Confederate Army was destroyed, so there was no battle for the morrow. In most instances during the Rebellion, it transpired that the defeated army sullenly retired only a short way in condition to renew the fight.

Cedar Creek, in some respects, bears a striking analogy to Marengo. Both were dual in character, each two battles in one day; the victors of the morning being the defeated and routed of the evening. Sheridan's victory over Early, like that of Napoleon over Marshal Melas, left no further fighting for the victors the next day. In one other respect, also, the comparison holds good. The commander of each of the finally routed armies sent a message about the middle of the day of battle announcing to his government a great victory, to be followed at sunset with the news of a most signal disaster.

In other respects, how dissimilar? Napoleon was, from the opening to the close of the battle of Marengo, on the field, commanding in person, sharing the defeat, then the victory. Sheridan was absent and did not participate in the discomfiture of his army, but was present at the final success. Napoleon, after his repulse, was reinforced by Desaix with 6000 men; but the Army of the Shenandoah, after the disaster of the morning, was reinforced only by its proper commanderSheridan.

There was not a great disparity of numbers in the opposing armies at Cedar Creek. Probably 20,000 men of all arms were engaged on each side. Relative position and situation of troops must be taken into account, as well as numbers, in determining the strength of one army over another. Early has tried to excuse his defeat by claiming he had the smaller army.

In response to this, Sheridan and his Provost-Marshal, Crowninshield, have tried to show that Early lost in captured more men than he claimed he had present for duty.' After Opequon and Fisher's Hill Early was reinforced by Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, Cutshaw's three batteries, and Rosser's division of cavalry with light artillery, together with many smaller detachments, all of which participated in Cedar Creek. Sheridan received no reinforcements, and Edwards' brigade of the First Division of the Sixth, Currie's of the Nineteenth, and Curtis' of the Eighth Corps were each detached, after Opequon, on other duties, and were not at Cedar Creek. The surprise and breaking up in the morning of the greater parts of Crook's and Emory's corps eliminated them, in large part, from the day's battle, and left the Sixth Corps and the cavalry to wage an unequal contest.

The war closed on the bloody battle-ground of the Shenandoah Valley, so far as important operations were concerned, with Cedar Creek.

President Lincoln appointed me a Brigadier-General by brevet, November 30, 1864; the commission reciting the appointment was "for gallant and meritorious services in the battles of Opequon, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek, Virginia,' and I was assigned to duty by him as Brigadier-General, December 29, 1864.

Sheridan's army retired to Kearnstown and went into winter quarters. The Sixth Corps was, however, soon transferred by rail and steamboat, via Harper's Ferry and Washington, to City Point, rejoining the Army of the Potomac, December 5, 1864.

1 Battles and Leaders, etc., vol. iv., p. 532.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS-LEE'S SUGGESTION TO JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1862-FERNANDO WOOD'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN, 1862-MR. STEPHENS AT FORTRESS MONROE, 1863-HORACE GREELEY-NIAGARA FALLS CONFERENCE, 1864-JACQUESS - GILMORE VISITS TO RICHMOND, 1863-4-F. P. BLAIR, SEN., CONFERENCES WITH MR. DAVIS, 1865-HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE, MR. LINCOLN AND SEWARD AND STEPHENS AND OTHERS, 1865-ORD-LONGSTREET, LEE AND GRANT CORRESPONDENCE, 1865, AND LEW WALLACE AND GENERAL SLAUGHTER, POINT ISABEL CONFERENCE, 1865

TH

HE war had now lasted nearly four years, with varied success in all the military departments, and the people North and South had long been satiated with its dire calamities. There had, from the start, been an anti-war party in the North, and in certain localities South there were large numbers of loyal men, many of whom joined the Union Army. The South was becoming exhausted in men and means. The blockade had become so efficient as to render it almost impossible for the Confederate authorities to get foreign supplies. It seemed to unprejudiced observers that the Confederacy must soon collapse. Sherman in his march from "Atlanta to the Sea" had cut the Confederacy in twain. It was without gold or silver, and its paper issues were valueless and passed only by compulsion within the Confederate lines. Provisions were obtainable only by a system of military seizure. The Confederacy had no credit at home or abroad; and there was

a growing discontent with President Davis and his advisers. There also came to be a feeling in the South that slavery, in any event, was doomed. Lastly, the" cradle and the grave were robbed to fill up the army: this by a relentless draft. The Confederate Congress passed an act authorizing the incorporation into the army of colored men-slaves. This was not well received, though General Lee approved of the policy, suggesting, however, that it would be necessary to give those who became soldiers, freedom.'

Notwithstanding the desperate straits into which the Confederacy had fallen it still had in the field not less than 300,000 wellequipped soldiers, generally well commanded, and, although forced to act on the defensive, they were very formidable.

The officers and soldiers of the Union Army longest in the field, though confident of final and complete success, desired very much to see the war speedily terminated—to return to their families and to peaceful pursuits. This desire did not show itself so much in discontent as in a restless disposition towards those in authority, who, it might be supposed, could in some way secure a peace. The credit of the United States remained good; its bonds commanded ready sale at home and abroad, yet an enormous debt was piling up at the rate of $4,000,000 daily, and its paper currency was depreciated to about thirty-five per cent. of its face value. These and many other causes led to a general desire for peace. On both sides, those in supreme authority were unjustly charged with a disposition to continue the war for ulterior purposes when it had been demonstrated that it was no longer justifiable.

This retrospect seems necessary before giving a summary of the various efforts to negotiate a peace. About the first open suggestion to that end came from General Robert E. Lee in a letter to President Davis written at Fredericktown, Maryland, September 8, 1862. This was just after the Second Bull Run, during the first Confederate invasion of Maryland and in the hey-day of the Confederacy. Davis was requested to join Lee's army, and, from its head, propose to the United States a 1 1 Life of R. E. Lee, White (Putnam's), pp. 416-17.

recognition of the independence of the Confederate States. Lee in this letter showed himself something of a politician. He urged that a rejection of such a proposition would throw the responsibility of a continuance of the war on the Union authorities and thus aid, at the elections, the party in the country opposed to the war.' Nothing, however, came of this suggestion of Lee.

Fernando Wood, who had kept himself in some sort of relations with President Lincoln, though at all times suspected by the latter, pretended in a letter to him, dated December 8, 1862, to have" reliable and truthful authority" for saying the Southern States would send representatives to Congress provided a general amnesty would permit them to do so. The President was asked to give immediate attention to the matter, and Wood suggested "that gentlemen whose former social and political relations with the leaders of the Southern revolt may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence with them on this subject."

Mr. Lincoln, whose power to discern a sham, or a false pretense, exceeded that of any other man of his time, promptly responded: "I strongly suspect your information will prove groundless; nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me." He said further to Mr. Wood that if" the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if, within a reasonable time, a full and general amnesty were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld." The President declined to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation." He expressed a desire for any exact information " Mr. Wood might have, saying it" might be more valuable before than after January 1, 1863," referring, doubtless, to the promised Emancipation Proclamation. Wood's scheme, evidently having no substantial basis, aborted.'

46

1 Manassas to Appomattox, p. 204.

Lincoln (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vii., pp. 367-8.