SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS OF WAR CHAPTER I GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON ANTIETAM, FREDERICKSBURG, AT WINCHESTER TH AND CHANCELLORSVILLE-BATTLES UNDER GENERAL MILROY-HIS DEFEAT AND RETREAT HE Confederate Army, under Lee, invaded Maryland in 1862, and after the drawn battle of Antietam, September 17th, it retired through the Shenandoah Valley and the mountain gaps behind the Rappahannock. McClellan had failed to take Richmond, and although his army had fought hard battles on the Chickahominy and at Malvern Hill, it won no victories that bore fruits save in lists of dead and wounded, and his army, on being withdrawn from the James in August, 1862, did not effectively sustain General John Pope at the Second Bull Run. On being given command of the combined Union forces at and about Washington, McClellan again had a large and splendidly equipped army under him. He at first exhibited some energy in moving it into Maryland after Lee, but by his extreme caution and delays suffered Harper's Ferry to be taken (September 15, 1862), with 10,000 men and an immense supply of arms and stores, and finally, when fortune smiled on his army at Antietam, he allowed it to lay quietly on its arms a whole day and long VOL. II.-I. I enough to enable Lee to retreat across the Potomac, where he was permitted to leisurely withdraw, practically unmolested, southward. The critical student of the battle of Antietam will learn of much desperate fighting on both sides, with no clearly defined general plan of conducting the battle on either side. As Lee fought on the defensive, he could content himself with conforming the movements of his forces to those of the Union Army. Stonewall Jackson, after maintaining a short, spirited battle against Hooker's corps, withdrew his corps from the engagement at seven o'clock in the morning and did not return. to the field until 4 P.M.' Generally the Union Army was fought by divisions, and seldom more than two were engaged at the same time, often only one. In this way some of the divisions, for want of proper supports, were cut to pieces, and others were not engaged at all. Acting on interior lines, Lee was enabled to concentrate against the Union attacks and finally to repulse them. Notwithstanding this mode of conducting the battle, the Confederate Army was roughly handled and lost heavily. General Ambrose E. Burnside late in the day succeeded in crossing Antietam Creek at the Stone Bridge and planting himself well on the Confederate right flank. McClellan also had, at night, many fresh troops ready and eager for the next day's battle. A considerable part of his army had not been engaged, and reinforcements came. The two armies confronted each other all day on the 18th, being partly engaged in burying the dead, as though a truce existed, and at night Lee withdrew his army into Virginia.' 93 Indecisive as this battle was, it is ever to be memorable as, on its issue, President Lincoln kept a promise to "himself and his Maker. On September 22, 1862, five days later, he issued a preliminary proclamation announcing his purpose to promulgate, January 1, 1863, a war measure, declaring free the slaves in all States or parts of States remaining at that 1 Manassas to Appomattox (Longstreet), pp. 242, 257, 401. 2 Ibid., 263. 3 Abraham Lincoln (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vi., p. 159. time in rebellion. He had long before the battle of Antietam contemplated taking this action, and hence had prepared this proclamation, and promised himself to issue it on the Union Army winning a victory. The driving of Lee's army out of Maryland, and thus relieving Washington from further menace, was accepted by him as a fulfilment of the self-imposed condition. McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac while at Orleans, Virginia, November 7, 1862, and Burnside became his successor. McClellan never again held any command. Burnside moved the army to Falmouth, Virginia, opposite Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock. Though only urged to prepare for the offensive, he precipitated an attack on the Confederate Army, then strongly intrenched on the heights of Fredericksburg. He suffered a disastrous repulse (December 14, 1862), and next day withdrew his army across the Rappahannock to his camps. Burnside was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac January 25, 1863, and Major-General Joseph Hooker succeeded him. The battle of Chancellorsville was fought, May 1 to 5, 1863, in the Wilderness country, south of the Rapidan, and resulted in the defeat of the Union Army and its falling back to its former position at Falmouth. The defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville led to a general belief that another invasion of the North would be made by Lee's army. Such an invasion involved Milroy's command at Winchester, then in the Middle Department, commanded by Major-General Robert C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore. This much in retrospect seems necessary to give a better understanding of the events soon to be mentioned. Soon after Chancellorsville, the Confederate forces in the upper Shenandoah Valley became more active, and frequent indecisive conflicts between them and our scouting parties took place. Our regular scouts, who generally travelled by night in Confederate dress, brought in rumors almost every day of an intended attack on Winchester by troops from Lee's army. In May I was given special charge of these scouts. So uniform were their reports as to the proposed attacks that I gave credence to them, and advised Milroy that unless he was soon to be largely reinforced it would be well to retire from his exposed position. He refused to believe that anything more than a cavalry raid into the Valley or against him would be made, and he felt strong enough to defeat it. He argued that Lee would not dare to detach any part of his infantry force from the front of the Army of the Potomac. But in addition to the reports referred to, I learned as early as the 1st of June, through correspondence secretly brought within our lines from an officer of Lee's army to which I gained access, that Lee contemplated a grand movement North, and that his army would reach Winchester on June 10, 1863. The Secessionists of Winchester generally believed we would be attacked on that day. I gave this information to Milroy, but he still persisted in believing the whole story was gotten up to cause him to disgracefully abandon the Valley.' The 10th of June came, and the Confederate Army failed to appear. This confirmed Milroy in his disbelief in a contemplated attack with a strong force, and my credulity was ridiculed. As early, however, as June 8th, Milroy wired Schenck at Baltimore that he had information that Lee had mounted an infantry division to join Stuart's cavalry at Culpepper; that the cavalry force there was "probably more than twice 12,000," and that there was doubtless a mighty raid on foot." Colonel Donn Piatt, Schenck's chief of staff, visited and inspected the post at Winchester on the 10th and 11th, and when he reached Martinsburg, Va., on his return on the 11th, he dispatched Milroy to immediately take steps to remove his command to Harper's Ferry, leaving at Winchester 'In letters, dated in May, 1863, to Col. Wm. S. Furay (then a correspondent (Y. S.) of the Cincinnati Gazette with Rosecrans' army in Tennessee), I detailed the general plan of Lee's advance northward, and gave the date when the movement would commence. 2 War Records, vol. xxvii., Part III., p. 36. only a lookout which could readily fall back to Harper's Ferry.' This order was sent in the light of what Piatt deemed the proper construction of a dispatch of that date from Halleck to Schenck, and from the latter to him. Milroy at once wired Schenck of the receipt of the Piatt dispatch, saying: "I have sufficient force to hold the place safely, but if any force is withdrawn the balance will be captured in twenty-four hours. All should go, or none." This brought, June 12th, a dispatch from Schenck to Milroy in this language: "Lt.-Col. Piatt has misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the meantime." On the 12th Milroy reported skirmishes with Confederate cavalry on the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, adding: "I am perfectly certain of my ability to hold this place. Nothing but cavalry appears yet. Let them come." As late as the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Schenck, in answer to an inquiry, that he had no reliable information as to rebel infantry being in the Valley, and the same day Schenck wired his chief of staff at Harper's Ferry to "Instruct General Milroy to use great caution, risking nothing unnecessarily, and be prepared for falling back in good order if overmatched." Milroy advised Schenck of fighting at Winchester on the 13th, and from General Kelly, on the same day, Schenck learned for the first time that General Lee was on his way to drive Milroy out of Winchester. Schenck at once attempted to telegraph Milroy to" fall back, fighting, if necessary, and to keep the road to Harper's Ferry." Halleck wired Schenck on the 14th: "It is reported that 1 War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 125. Piatt, June 11th, wired Schenck from Winchester, after inspecting the place, that Milroy "can whip anything the rebels can fetch here."-Ibid., p. 161. |