what makes, in like manner, a moral fitness, is that which is calculated to advance our happiness, and secure our well-being.

Let the question be considered in every possible light, we will always find, that the notion of virtue must consist in something more than in mere fitness of application. But let us take, for example, those duties of a moral kind, which a man owes to himself. Here fitness of application is nothing more than fitness of action; because a man must necessarily act in conformity to his nature and constitution, when he uses his powers and faculties in a proper manner; and nothing can here constitute an unfitness of application but a disagreement between the action and the nature, or circumstances of him who does it. We disapprove of the conduct of the sensualist, and pronounce his conduct contrary to the order or fitness of things; because we say it is contrary to the character of man. But we may again ask, how is that character to be estimated, and by what moral standard is it to be tried? If from the man himself, then he plainly acts up to it; and if we look to the notions which the generality of mankind entertain on such conduct as his, we may be led to see, that the standard here is variable and unsatisfactory.

Why do we dislike and reprobate the man of pleasure? Because his course of life diverts his attention from that which is calculated to promote the welfare of his fellow-creatures, and leads him into a path of life destructive to his own, as well as to others' happiness. Why do we condemn the drunkard? Is it merely because his intemperate habits invariably shorten his days, and render his life miserable? Certainly not; these are some of the reasons why we pronounce his conduct to be immoral, but not the sole and only ones. For, if this were the case, if the mere relation which is established in the nature and constitution of things between intemperance in drinking and destruction of domestic comfort and life were to be the standard of virtue, then it would clearly follow, that the men whose health and life were sacrificed to some useful occupation, and the soldier, who rushed into the battle for the good of his country, would also be acting a vicious part. What makes all the difference between the drunkard and the two last cases is, that the workmen and the soldier suffer for the real and lasting good of mankind; while the sot can advance no such plea of justification, for his whole life is one continued outrage to decency and propriety; and, instead of doing good, he is perpetually engaged in

transactions which have a certain and direct tendency to efface from human nature every vestige of morality. It is entirely upon this principle that we reason and judge in such cases as we have here supposed. The benefit or injury is always taken into account; and our praise or blame is always meted out in strict accordance with the amount of happiness or misery which is the result of any particular line of moral conduct.

It may possibly be objected, that this is not a satisfactory method of showing what virtue really is; for it is not only necessary that that kind of behaviour which has the name of virtue be pointed out, but it is requisite to show what has the nature or essence of virtue; not what is termed, but what is really virtue in the abstract. The reality of moral distinctions is as amply and firmly secured upon the theory of utility as upon any other hypothesis. The general terms virtue and vice are given to two dif ferent kinds of actions, and are made to stand for the two different qualities, by which these qualities are characterised; and nothing more is required to make us well acquainted with what virtue and vice are in their own nature, than to know the qualities attached to these two separate sets of actions. It is perfectly true, that the mere words virtue and

vice are purely arbitrary and conventional terms; but we are not to infer from this, that the ideas they represent are uncertain and variable; on the contrary, we see clearly that the Author of Nature, who has made things as they really are, has constituted one kind of behaviour different from another, and has made some moral actions fitted to produce good or happiness, and others to produce evil and misery. If murder or drunkenness do harm, calling either by the name of virtue will not make them less harmless, because giving the name does not invest either action with the quality or attribute of virtue. And, in like manner, if chastity is found to be useful and beneficial to mankind; and if all mankind were, by common consent, to agree that it was no virtue, they could only strip it of its title; they could not change its beneficial qualities.

Many of the disputes in moral philosophy may be traced to the variable meanings which are given to the words moral good, moral agent, and moral obligation. The whole of moral science is only that branch of philosophy which lays down rules for the regulation of our conduct; and the nature and utility of this science do not rest upon what may be termed demonstration, but upon probable evidence and analogical reasoning. We are

pure

induced to follow certain kinds of behaviour from probable evidence alone; we eat and drink without being able demonstratively to prove that we will be refreshed and strengthened by this act; we engage in all our business affairs, with a hope that they will turn out to our expectations, but without being directed by the same path of demonstration. These few remarks will enable us to determine what is meant by several phrases in common use, both with the learned and the unlearned. Moral good generally signifies that which is of use or advantage to others. This is its familiar meaning. Thus we say, that an estate is a good estate, if the owner receives considerable benefit from it; and a house is said to be a good house, when its structure and conveniences administer to the happiness and comfort of its occupant. These are properly called natural good. By moral good, we mean precisely the same thing so far as the end is concerned; we only differ in the sense of the phrase as far as the means are employed. That which by necessity of its nature, or without will, intelligence, or design, produces good, is called natural good; but that good which is produced by an active agent possessing will and understanding, is said to be moral good. This is the reason why an action is called a