The writings of Bishop Butler, which can, with propriety, be called moral, are but brief and scanty; but they are still worthy of considerable notice, both from their intrinsic merit, and the peculiar views he entertained on the nature of moral obligation. His moral speculations are contained in his sermons, and in a dissertation prefixed to his analogy of natural and revealed religion.

The manner in which the bishop has treated of morals is precisely the same in point of principle, as the way in which he has treated of natural and revealed religion. He observes in his sixth sermon, that "there is much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world, than we are apt to take notice of;" and this remark may be said to embody the principle from which the whole of his thoughts on morals proceed. The inward frame of man exactly corresponds to his bodily wants and condition in life; and the various passions, feelings, and emotions of our moral nature are in a peculiar manner adapted to the varied circumstances of our existence. And this single remark opens a wide and spacious field for discussion. By carefully examining the external condition of man, with his bodily structure, and his relative situation with the various objects around him,

we are led to form many important conclusions as to the nature of the different principles which make up our general constitution, and see what is our duty to perform, and from what we ought to refrain, as well as the divers motives which should induce us to attend to the one, and be deterred from the other.

Now, in order to obtain a correct and accurate knowledge of what the inward or moral constitution of man is, we must submit this constitution to examination, and notice all the facts carefully which experience establishes from a close attention to our own consciousness, from a consideration of our external senses, and the conduct and testimony of our fellow-men. It is no province of ours to consider what might have been the constitution of our frames, or of the world at large, if it had so pleased the Almighty to have made either or both different from what we find them to be. The only thing we have to do is, to attend to what is made, and to examine and ascertain those connexions and relations which exist between our moral constitutions and physical objects, so as to enable us to follow such a course of conduct as the circumstances of our condition demand, and to unfold those general rules and principles which are necessary for enforcing

a similar conduct on those around us. Looking, therefore, at our bodily frames, we perceive ourselves endowed with several distinct senses, with organs and instruments every way suited to their natures; we know the eye is made to see, the palate to taste, and the nose to smell,-and as we extend our inquiry into our moral constitution, we perceive certain universal feelings or perceptions, which we, on analogical principles of reasoning, consider as bearing a very strong resemblance in their nature and operation to our bodily senses. Thus the feeling of shame is to prevent us from doing things of a shameful or indecent nature; pity or commiseration for the evils and afflictions of others, induces us to render them assistance; and the passions of anger and revenge are implanted in our nature to repel those violences and insults which we may receive from others. And were we to extend our inquiries to the other passions and feelings of our constitution, we would readily perceive, that the final causes they are respectively calculated to produce, are those of promoting our well-being, and inducing us to follow a virtuous course of action, in order to secure the highest degree of happiness our situation here will admit of.

Bishop Butler is desirous to impress upon the at

tention of his readers, that human nature is not to be considered as a simple or uniform thing, but as made up of a multitude of different parts or principles, which are made to blend and harmonize together for a definite end or purpose; and in order to form right conceptions of our nature, and to draw correct conclusions respecting our conduct and happiness, we should make ourselves well and thoroughly acquainted with these various parts or principles, and the many ways in which they are related together. We consider our bodies not as individual or simple members, but as composed of many different senses, organs, and functions; and pursuing the analogy, we come to a like conclusion, that our moral and intellectual natures are composed or made up of a great number of instincts, passions, appetites, and propensities. And considering our constitution in a general point of view, it resembles, in many of its prominent outlines, the constitutions of several orders of the inferior creation. But, besides these things enjoyed in common; besides the senses, passions, feelings, and propensities which animals possess like ourselves; there is one thing which constitutes a very distinctive mark or feature in human nature, that which makes us in fact different beings altogether; and this

power or faculty is sometimes called conscience, sometimes moral sense, and occasionally by the term reflection, and other similar epithets. This faculty or principle, (for by whatever name it may be designated is a matter of little moment, provided we understand the thing signified) exercises a controlling or judicial power, so to speak, over the whole of our passions and feelings, and renders them subservient to its own suggestions and wishes. This is a universal principle, pervading human nature under every clime, and in every condition; no possible concurrence of circumstance being ever able totally to suspend its exercise, or to usurp its authority. The degrees of its influence may vary, and may with difficulty be defined with accuracy and precision; its sphere of action may be greatly circumscribed at one place, and considerably extended at another; but its still small voice is heard throughout the earth, whether we tread in the dreary wilderness, or confine our abode to the polished city. The various powers and faculties of our nature may be compared to different communities or principalities enjoying their own internal laws and modes of government, but cemented together under one general federal head, and all bowing the knee to, and acknowledging the su