other hand, neither the president nor his ministers can be members of either House of Congress. The president, indeed, under a representative constitution, can hardly be conceived as being a member of either branch of the legislature. He can communicate with Congress only by formal messages and speeches like a king; he cannot take his place as a member and join in a debate. But the exclusion of the president's ministers is a mere point of detail in the American Constitution, which might quite well have been otherwise ordered. There is not indeed the same necessity for the president's ministers to be members of the legislature as there is in a constitutional monarchy; but there seems no inherent difficulty in their being so if it should so happen. Accordingly the constitution of the Confederate States has somewhat relaxed the restriction. By that constitution no office-holder can be a member of Congress, but Congress is empowered to grant by law to certain great officers a seat in either House, with the right of discussing measures affecting his own department. And in one class of republics it is clear that neither the president nor any officer of the state can be excluded from the legislative body. In a pure democracy, transacting its affairs in a primary assembly, the magistrates, as citizens of the commonwealth, can be no more excluded from the assembly than other citizens. Thus in the purely democratic cantons of Switzerland, the chief magistrate, the Landammann, is president alike of the executive council and of the Landesgemeinde or general assembly of all citizens of full age. So in the Achaian League, the General, being an Achaian citizen, was necessarily a member of the Federal Assembly, and being a member of the Assembly, and moreover not being its president, he naturally took a place in it exactly answering to that of our leader of the House. In fact, the constitution of the Achaian Assembly, as a primary assembly, allowed the Achaian General to hold a position much more nearly answering to that of an English first minister than the representative constitution of the American Congress allows to the American President. A Roman Consul, again, as being a Roman citizen, was necessarily a member of the Roman popular assembly, which he could convoke and preside in at pleasure. And this same rule equally applies to aristocratic commonwealths possessing a primary assembly, one, that is, in which every member of the privileged order has a seat by right of birth without any election. Thus the Duke of Venice could not be excluded from the Great Council, nor the Spartan Kings from the assembly of the Spartan citizens. It follows therefore that this peculiarity of the American Constitution, by which all executive officers are excluded from the legislature,

is by no means inherent in the nature of presidential government. Still less is the mode of election, or any other detail of the American Constitution. The one real and essential difference between a president and a first minister is that given already, that a president holds a legal position for a definite time, a first minister holds a conventional position for such a time as the legislature, or one branch of it, may tacitly think fit.

And now for a few words as to the practical working of presidential government, especially in its American form, as compared with the working of constitutional monarchy as it is understood among ourselves. In making this comparison we must take care to confine it to the points really entering into the comparison, for there are many points of difference between the British and American constitutions which arise from quite other causes, and which have nothing to do with the difference in the form of the executive. Thus both Houses of Congress are elective, while one House of our Parliament is hereditary. But, in other constitutional monarchies, the body answering to our House of Lords is often elective or nominated, and an hereditary chamber in a republic, though not all likely, is perfectly possible. So again, the peculiar constitution of the American Senate arises from the fact that the American constitution is a Federal constitution, but it has nothing to do with the special form of the American executive. The same constitution of the senate is equally consistent with an executive council; it would be equally consistent with a Federal monarchy, a form of government as yet untried, but perfectly possible in idea. But some of the special functions of the senate, the necessity of its confirmation to certain acts of the president, are, in the nature of the case, derived from the fact that there is a president, and could hardly exist in a state governed by a first minister. Again, that the constitution of the American House of Representatives is much more democratic than that of the English House of Commons, has nothing whatever to do with the form of the American Executive. A House of Commons chosen by universal suffrage is perfectly consistent with hereditary kingship, and a House chosen by as narrow a body of electors as may be thought good is perfectly consistent with presidential government.

* One can conceive the acts of an hereditary king needing the confirmation of one branch of his legislature, just like the acts of the president. Such an arrangement would be quite possible in a monarchy where the king, as in Sweden and Norway, acts for himself within the legal limits of his authority; but it can hardly be conceived as existing, or at least as practically efficient, in a monarchy where the king is in the hands of a ministry.

In fact, it is a mere mistake to look upon the American Constitution as one inherently democratic. The American Federal constitution is in itself neither aristocratic nor democratic, but it is capable of being either, or any mixture of the two, according to the nature of the State constitutions.* None of these points have any immediate connection with the fact that the head of the American commonwealth is neither a king nor a council, but a president. They may influence the practical working of the executive, but they have nothing to do with determining its form. We have now to look only at those differences which arise immediately from the special form of the American executive, again distinguishing those which are inherent in all presidential government, and those which arise from special provisions in the American Constitution.

The main differences between the two systems, the main weaknesses, as Englishmen are apt to think them, of the American system, are obvious enough, and have been set forth by many writers. But most English writers, writing, as they commonly do, with some immediate party aim, have not taken the needful pains to distinguish what is essential in either system from what is incidental; and they have too often used the whole controversy merely as a means of pointing declamations against federalism or democracy or republican government in general. The first difference which immediately flows from presidential government, as distinguished from cabinet government, has been already stated. It is this, that the president's office comes to an end at a fixed time, till which time he cannot, save in very exceptional cases, be removed, while the first minister may be got rid of at once or continued indefinitely. What we call "a ministerial crisis" is, under the Presidential system, necessarily brought on at some time fixed beforehand. In England such a "crisis" occurs whenever the ministry is not in harmony with a majority of the House of Commons, and it can hardly occur at any other time. When it does occur, the minister either resigns or dissolves. The

*Speaking roughly, we may say that both the House of Representatives and the electors of the president-that is, practically, the president himself-are now chosen by universal suffrage; but the constitution in no way orders such a mode of election; it is consistent with it, but it is equally consistent with modes of election highly aristocratic. The House of Representatives is to be chosen by those persons who have votes for the most numerous branch of the legislature of their own state, a provision perfectly consistent with an aristocratic, or even with an oligarchic, constitution of the state government; and it is well known, that though no state could ever be strictly called aristocratic, yet most of the states originally required a higher or lower property qualification in the electors. Again, the electors of the president in each state are appointed as the legislature of each state may determine, by no means necessarily by a popular vote. The legislature of South Carolina has always kept the nomination of the electors in its own hands.

ministry and the parliament are thus brought into harmony, either by the formation of a new ministry in harmony with the parliament, or by the election of a new parliament in harmony with the ministry. But in America, if the president and the congress do not agree, neither party has any means of getting rid of the other. The president cannot dissolve congress, and he is in no way called on to resign his own office. Thus it is quite possible that the executive and legislative branches may be in state of discord for four years. On the other hand, a president of whom congress thoroughly approves, of whom the country thoroughly approves, may come to the end of his term of office when nothing calls for any change of men or of measures, and, though he may be re-elected, yet his continuance in office is at least jeoparded, and the country is obliged to go through whatever amount of excitement and turmoil is involved in a presidential election. This disadvantage seems inherent in any sort of presidential government. The Confederate constitution gives the president six years instead of four, and makes him ineligible for re-election. The difficulty is in no way escaped by this change. It indeed enables a good president to be kept in office for a longer time, but it also requires a bad president to be endured for a longer time. By forbidding re-election, it escapes certain evils which have been produced by the possibility of re-election, but it does so only at the risk of introducing at least an equal evil. It is possible, and indeed probable, that the Confederate provision may deprive the commonwealth of the services of its best citizen just when they are most wanted. In truth the evil is one inherent in the form of government; it may, by judicious provisions, be made less baneful, but it cannot be got rid of altogether. It is the weak point of presidential government, to be fairly balanced against its strong points, and against the weak points of other systems.

This weak point, however, would not have been so obvious, or here be so much dwelt upon as it has been, if it had not been aggravated rather than diminished by certain provisions in the American Constitution. If the president were elected by congress, or by some body chosen by or out of congress, if his ministers were allowed to be members of congress, or to appear and speak in congress, the evils of the system would be greatly diminished, while the essential principles of presidential government would remain untouched. The system of election actually employed, one most certainly not contemplated by the founders of the Union, carries the evils of a great party struggle to their extreme point. The founders of the Union doubtless hoped that the election of electors would be a reality, that the primary electors would choose those men to

whom they could best confide so great a trust, and that the electors thus chosen would elect independently and fearlessly. There was nothing absurd in the face of such an expectation. In some states of society the election of electors seems a perfectly reasonable system. It is the system adopted in the election of the legislature under the highly democratic constitution of Norway. But in Norway there are no political parties answering to those of England or America. In such a country the matters brought before the Storthing must be mainly of two kinds. There may be, first, questions touching the national independence, about which there is only one opinion in the country; and secondly, questions of practical improvement, not implying political differences, but requiring practical knowledge or acuteness for their decision. A parliament which has to discharge such functions as these, to decide questions where the only difference is as to means and not as to ends, will probably be better chosen by an intermediate body of electors. But such an intermediate body becomes a farce in any country where there are strongly marked political parties. Whether it be a parliament or a president which has to be elected, the only question asked of the primary candidate will be, "For whom will you vote?" It is clear that when it comes to this, the popular vote had much better be given directly. The intermediate electors exercise no real choice; their interposition does but serve to prolong the crisis of the election, and the consequent period of unsettlement and no-government. The presidential election, as now conducted, is simply a party struggle on the most gigantic scale. The founders of the constitution doubtless hoped that the local question in each state or district would lie, not between this or that candidate for the president, but between this or that candidate for the electorship of the president. But experience has shown this to be impossible when the elector is simply chosen to elect, and has no other duties. As it is, the election of president is a trial of strength between national parties, intensified because the same personal question, the same choice between two or three candidates, is presented to a whole nation. It is a national election by universal suffrage, in which, after all, the candidate elected may not have a numerical majority of the nation. This last possibility, whether it be reckoned as a gain or a loss, is the only way in which the existence of an intermediate body has any practical effect on the result of the election.

*If the majority of the presidential electors are chosen by small majorities in their several states, while the minority are chosen by large majorities, it may well happen that the person chosen president may not have a numerical majority on the popular vote.