men of different ages and characteristics apprehended and wrapped it for conveyance to others-the perishable garments of imperishable truth, confounded by the unthinking, only because they have not eyes to discern the spiritual amid the the grossness of an objective world; and cannot emancipate themselves from the tyranny of a traditionalism which interest and association equally maintain.

ART. IV. THE RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE
CRIMEAN WAR.

Défense de Sébastopol. Ouvrage Rédigé sous la Direction du Lieutenant-Général E. de Todleben, Aide-de-camp de S.M. l'Empereur. Tome I., Première Partie; Tome II., Deuxième Partie. Saint Petersbourg: Imprimerie N. Thieblin et Cie., 1863.

THE nations which took part in the first great European war, caused by the still unsettled Eastern question, seem resolved not to allow the world to be kept in ignorance of their exploits in that gigantic contest. Independently of the literature, if the term be permitted, which was produced by active brains and rapid pens during the continuance of the strife, a literature to which free England has contributed the larger share, the two imperial governments engaged, have each caused to be written official accounts of the war. The French Government was so eager to have the first word that the Emperor Napoleon commissioned M. de Bazancourt to collect materials for his compilation in the Crimea itself, and published it at once. Then came the magnificent Atlas Historique et Topographique, and General Neil's Journal of the Operations of the French Engineers; together with other works of lesser note. All this time the Russian Government gave no sign. Colonel Anitchkoff published an indifferent narrative, and General Dannenberg, it is understood, wrote a certain striking pamphlet on the battle of Inkerman. We, on our side, sent forth our sole official account, the Journal of the Engineers' Operations before Sebastopol, a dry colourless book, with due complement of statistics and plans. Our only ambitious book on the war is the unfinished production of Mr. Kinglake, which is very far from being official. All our other books, excellent as some of them are, come within the category of mémoires pour servir; and, indeed, Mr. Kinglake has imprinted such a peculiar character

on his work, that this also is regarded in some quarters as one among the many sources whence a judicially minded historian may draw materials for a sound and exhaustive history. It is at this stage that the famous engineer brings out his ample stores of extensive information. General Todleben's Defence of Sebastopol comes in opportunely, we will not say to complete the body of evidence, but certainly to increase its bulk and add to its intrinsic value. When Mr. Kinglake has finished his labours, it will be almost possible, except for a writer fastidious on the subject of evidence, to compose an impartial narrative of this protracted and violent encounter between Russia and the Western Powers. There are, we are aware, most important documents in existence, which have not fallen into the hands of Mr. Kinglake; but these also, we may reasonably assume, will some day see the light.

The origin of General Todleben's book is fully and clearly detailed in his preface. It is necessary to explain it, in order to possess the reader of its scope and character.

The very circumstances of his position placed General Todleben in possession of much valuable information relating to the siege itself, and in 1856, with the aid of a comrade he arranged this in the form of a journal. Illness supervened and he travelled abroad, amusing his leisure by looking over his collected notes. He saw how technical and restricted was the work, and feeling that "the glory of the defence had become the property of the Russian people" he resolved to enlarge the plan, and to make it embrace the whole history of the war. This resolve obliged him to seek assistance from other officers. He therefore laid a draft of his plan before the Grand Duke Nicholas, and through his interest, General Todleben obtained permission to select his co-labourers, and to have free access to state documents. In 1859, he formed what he calls a commission of officers, and allotted to each his task; and thus they became for the time, a sort of state historical department under the presidency of General Todleben. On examining the plans published in England and France he found that they were defective and erroneous, and that the Russian plans were in a similar state. Whereupon he had the ground surveyed afresh, and verified the drawings by personal inspection. It must be admitted that this is a truly imperial fashion of compiling and composing history. The reader will remark for himself that it is strictly official: and bear the fact in mind. Finally, when half the work was done, in order to put the seal of its official character upon it, the aide-de-camp, General Milioutine, Minister of War, and "enlightened protector of military literature," obtained from the Emperor Alexander the

means necessary for its publication-not only in Russian, but in French and German-with an atlas on that large scale so. loved by military men. So much for the origin of the book.

Its scope is almost indicated in that description. But to give the reader an ampler idea of that scope, we may add that the book, opening with a brief survey of the causes of the war, and a brief glance at the operations on the Danube, proceeds to sketch the military condition and position of Russia, her frontiers and her armaments, follows it up by an account of the forces of the allies, and then, after a lucid description of the Crimea, proceeds to give a detailed account of Sebastopol, up to the 13th of September; there the narrative of the campaign itself begins, and, in these published volumes, carries the splendid story forward to the middle of February 1855. Thus, it will be seen, the foundations are laid broad and deep to sustain the lofty edifice which Todleben is building up as a monument to his own renown, as well as that of the Russian army.

Touching the character of the book, we have already said the most important word in styling it official. General Todleben, no doubt with the most complete sincerity, declares that his great object has been to produce a solid, truthful, impartial book, and tells us that he has spared no pains to verify his facts. Although he has not always succeeded, every page testifies, at least, to the assiduous labours of himself and his friends, and to the honest spirit in which they have wrought. He may appear indeed to have gone somewhat out of his way, when he assures his readers that he has trusted entirely to his own judgment, and has not given in to any extraneous influence, but the careful observer will see how natural such an assurance is, from one who, in the composition and the publication of his work, had been so largely dependent upon official aid. The literary qualities of this history are respectable; the narrative is clear, methodical, compact, and forcible; and thus, in spite of its errors, the book takes rank at once among the books essential to the student of the campaign.

General Todleben's account of the origin of the war is not one which can meet with acceptance in this country. In effect, it has a strong resemblance, in one point at least, to the theory with which the name of Mr. Kinglake is identified, with this difference, that whereas Mr. Kinglake attributes the war mainly to the necessities of the Emperor of the French, General Todleben insists that the war was forced on Russia by both the Western Powers. But we remark that, while the Russian historian plainly sets forth the motives of England, he has

nothing to say of the motives of France beyond this, that France was directly interested in the question of the Holy Places; a question which he justly observes was, after all, only a pretext used to dissemble the real motives of the conflict." This avoidance of any attempt to show why France helped to provoke and force on the war, implies that General Todleben did not feel at liberty to state the reason. His reticence, indeed, may be an oversight, but we are scarcely entitled to put that charitable construction upon it, in the face of the direct and repeated reference to the motives of England. The Russian version is this: Russia has a double policy. She is bound to extend her influence in the East, she is bound to consolidate the political importance which she has acquired in the great family of European states. This double duty is a consequence of her conquests in Turkey and Persia, and her spoliation of Poland. Her victories over the Turks by land and sea enabled her to take ground as the natural protector of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and to push her influence in his Asiatic as well as his European provinces. The power she obtained as the fruit of the part she took in the wars with Napoleon, made her the head of the Holy Alliance, and the protectors of conservative principles in Europe-an absolutist policy which, it is confessed, was often detrimental to her own interests. Russia being in this proud position-protector of Christians in Turkey, upholder of despotism in Europe-she could not fail to irritate public opinion and incur its anger, by her exertions in the latter cause; and to arouse the jealousy of England by the exercise of that influence in the East of which the protectorate over the Christians was the outward sign. In Europe she put the finishing stroke to her unpopularity by lending Austria an army wherewith to crush the Hungarians— (politique de repression qui souleva définitivement contre les Russes l'opinion publique en Europe). The progress of British influence in Turkey, says our author, was first shown in the refusal of the Porte to deliver up the Hungarian and Polish refugees. Then the Western Powers began to meddle with the question of the protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, "a question, up to that moment, reserved exclusively for Russia!" Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, President of the French Republic, raised, in 1851, the question of the holy places. There were negociations; the Porte tried to satisfy both parties, and ended by injuring the interests of the Greek Church. "It was then that the Emperor Nicholas, believing that he could count on the support of the sovereigns engaged in the Holy Alliance, and principally on Austria-to whom he had lent such efficient assistance for the repression of the

Hungarian revolt, decided to send Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople," to demand, in a separate (and we may add secret) treaty the confirmation of the rights (falsely alleged by Russia to have been) secured by previous compacts. The demands of Prince Menschikoff were refused because (which is true) the Western Powers counselled resistance. Then the cabinet of St. Petersburg sent an ultimatum to the Porte, and "the refusal of that ultimatum led to the occupation of the principalities." But then, says General Todleben, Russia only took them as a deposit; a material guarantee for that separate protectorate over twelve millions of the Sultan's subjects which Russia had "a right to exact." Europe was indignant (not only at the insolence of the Muscovite demand, be it remembered, but at the tortuous and double character of Russian diplomacy), and this seems to shock General Todleben. "The Western Powers," he writes, "profiting by the irritation of the public mind, and the passions in arms against Russia, sought, by exciting them still more, to drag Russia on until she committed herself in the eyes of Europe;" their object being to exhaust her while they prepared for war, and framed plans for assailing her in her weakest point. Russia did commit herself; the allied fleets were off Tenedos before the soldiers of Nicholas, in fulfilment of his threats, had crossed the Pruth; Austria tried to negociate, but the Porte refused to sign a note which had met with the approval of the four neutral Powers and of Russia, and audaciously introduced modifications (a piece of insolence which General Todleben does not tell us the subsequent angry admissions of Count Nesselrode on behalf of his master amply justified). This made it plain that England and France desired to light up the flames of war. Austria and Prussia might have frustrated them; but, alas, they too fell under the yoke of public opinion, and, at the last moment, Austria amazed the Czar by passing beyond the bounds of neutrality, and uttering threats (a most painful experience for the Emperor of all the Russias, who, when he secretly asked England to divide with him the effects of the "sick man," said "when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what suits one suits the other; our interests as regards Turkey are identical.") But why need we go further with this account of the origin of the war? Its object, as the reader will see, is simply to represent Russia as engaged in a perfectly laudable, honourable, and just endeavour to make good her influence in Turkey; and to paint her as suddenly beset by the Western Powers and Public Opinion, and most shamefully hustled and goaded into the perpetration of acts which served as the pretexts for a war desired secretly by the