THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

ART. I.-1. The Overthrow of the German Confederation by Prussia in 1866. By Sir Alexander Malet, Bart., K.C.B. London, 1870.

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2. The Times,' 'Standard,' and 'Daily News' Newspapers. July to October, 1870.

A GREAT poet has said that the history of the world is the

judgment of the world; and in such a judgment the public opinion of Europe has been taking part for the last three months in the quarrel between Germany and France. Here in England some of us may be Germans at heart; some may feel the wounds inflicted on France as though they were our own; but we are all interested to ascertain the rights of the dispute which has laid Imperial France prostrate at the feet of Germany, and we are all in some measure bound to lay the guilt of this bloody struggle on the nation which really provoked it. It would be idle, however, to look for the cause of the war to the provocation afforded to France by the proposal of a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne. That was only the last grain that broke the camel's back: the real reason must be sought in far remoter times. Let us begin, therefore, with the beginning, and see what Prussia has really been from the first hour of her existence. We say 'Prussia' advisedly, because throughout this contest it is as important to bear in mind the distinction between Prussia and Germany as it is that between the Emperor Napoleon and France. What, then, has Prussia always been, even in the time of the Thirty Years' War, but a self-seeking State, of dubious policy, which has often drawn down on itself the indignation and the chastisement of its neighbours. So it was with Christian William and the great Gustavus; so with the great Elector, and after him with the great Frederick, the man who said if he were King of France he would not allow a cannon-shot to be fired in Europe without his leave;' so it was with Frederick William the Third, the father of the present King, whose dubious policy towards his Allies, and especially to the King of Vol. 129.-No. 258,

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England,

England, when he seized the Electorate of Hanover as his own in 1805, left him alone to contend against Napoleon in 1806, when after the Battle of Jena- -a defeat almost as disastrous as any suffered by the French in the present war-Berlin and the whole kingdom lay at the mercy of the French Emperor, who entered his enemy's capital within a month from the declaration of war. From October, 1806, till 1813, the Prussians, in their moment of victory, will do well to remember, Prussia was completely at the mercy of the conqueror. Then it was, in those days of difficulty and distress, that the present military system of Prussia was founded by Stein and Hardenberg. On the downfall of Napoleon's system, after the retreat from Moscow, Prussia was full of materials for a large army, which, under Blücher and Gneisenau, most materially contributed to the success of the Allies. But even in the hour of common triumph, the aggressive instincts of Prussia were shown in the discussions which took place at the Congress of Vienna. The secret history of that great diplomatic gathering, as shown in Klüber's Acten des Wiener Congresses,' proves that the dubious policy of Prussianow siding with one faction in the Congress and now with another had resulted in so many secret conventions and engagements among the contracting powers, that its deliberations would have ended in open quarrels had not Napoleon, most opportunely for the good repute of the Congress, burst out from his prison at Elba, and made all the Powers, and Prussia first of all, bosom friends again, by reminding them of their common danger, and reappearing on the scene of action as their common enemy.

When Paris had been a second time occupied by the Alliesand of these allies be it remembered that Prussia always stood forth as the deadliest and bitterest enemy of France, there was peace in Europe for a while, and the various nations had time to set their internal affairs in order. In France there were the old incapable Bourbons, with a Constitutional system. In Germany there was the Germanic Confederation, or, as they call it themselves, Der Deutsche Bund. Of the history of that august body we have not much to say, except to show how it was used by Prussia to serve her purposes, and then crushed by Prussia when it could be no longer useful. In all its dealings the Germanic Confederation was but the embodiment of that dualism which had existed in Germany since the rise of Prussia as a great power. In other words, it represented the permanent jealousy between Austria and Prussia. It was exceedingly strong-on paper, and excessively weak in action. The only event in which it might have been of service-a foreign invasion-never happened during its existence. In the internal dissensions, which followed

followed the French Revolution of 1848, the Bund utterly collapsed, and order was only restored in one part of the Confederation by the indefatigable energy of Felix Schwartzenberg, who might be called the Bismarck of Austria, and in the other by the military operations of Prussia against the Red Republicans in Würtemberg and Baden.

Hitherto we have only spoken of Germany as composed of Austria and Prussia, with their satellites the Minor States. We have now to speak of Germany for itself-of Germany not as a mere congeries of States often at deadly hostility with each other, but as homogeneous Germany-as Germany united in policy and in principle, of Germany in fact one and indivisible. This idea, which even up to the present time has not entirely made its way to universal acceptance in Germany, has been the offspring of the existing generation. We do not say that it never flitted before the minds of German patriots half a century ago. But it was only among German patriots like the enthusiastic Arndt, and not among German statesmen of that generation, that the notion prevailed that the Fatherland was one day destined to become one and indivisible. Warned by the sufferings which almost every State of Germany had undergone at the hands of France, they dreamt, and sang, and prophesied that the day would come when there would be an United Germany which might in arms defy the world. It is evident, if this idea were ever triumphant, if ever Germany were one and indivisible, she, besides being a delight and comfort to all true Germans, would be an object of infinite terror to other European nations, who might have just cause to fear lest the balance of power in Europe might be shaken and overthrown by this terrible apparition. But let us only for the present suggest this, and pass on. Strange to say this idea of the first days of the present century has taken shape and form out of an obscure quarrel between Germany and a non-German State. The King of Denmark, like the King of Holland, was a member of the Germanic Confederation by his hereditary right to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Here let none of our readers tremble; we are not about to drive any of them into a lunatic asylum by entering at any length into the question of Schleswig-Holstein. We only say that it was in that outlying district of Germany that the idea of German unity first took such firm root, that statesmen were forced to accept the poetic notion as a reality, and to admit it into the arena of politics. First of all the Bund took it up, and endless protocols and notes were the result. But as the Bund could not possibly take the question up without the cognizance of Austria and Prussia, both these Powers, detesting each other x 2 with

with equal jealousy, and thus representing the idea of German separation, were forced to admit this idea of German unity into their councils. At last, as they went on from bad to worse, the death of the King of Denmark, in Nov. 1863, forced all parties to look this question of German unity fairly in the face. Austria and Prussia entered the Duchies as a joint army of execution at the command of the Bund, nominally to uphold the rights of the Duke of Augustenberg, but in reality to occupy what was held to be German soil, and therefore indivisible from the rest of the Fatherland, on the principle of an United Germany. It was the mutual jealousy of these two great Powers which insisted on a joint execution and occupation, for though both had been forced to accept the new idea, neither of them would yield to the other the supremacy in a possible United Germany. The victory of an idea means the destruction and extinction of existing rights. All claims and appeals are silenced before it. The old order perishes, and the new succeeds in its place. So it was in the Duchies. Nothing could be clearer than the hereditary rights of the old Danish dynasty to the Duchies. When the old dynasty failed, a treaty title had been given to the present King of Denmark, the result of infinite negotiations after the battle of Idstedt, in which Lord Palmerston took a great part. Even if the right of the present King of Denmark were abandoned, there was the Duke of Augustenberg, the Pretender favoured by the universal voice of Germany. And yet what was the result in the Duchies? The idea of unity indeed was triumphant, backed by the bayonets of Austria and the Prussian needle-gun, but all other rights were trampled under foot, the King of Denmark and the Duke of Augustenberg alike went to the wall. German unity had won the Duchies by the armies of Austria and Prussia, but she had won and held them for herself.

It was about this time that Europe began to hear of Bismarck and his policy. He had been, and indeed still is, an adherent of the old aristocratic party in Prussia, of what is called in fact the Junkerparthei, the exponent of whose policy is the, Kreutz Zeitung. He was no friend of constitutions or popular representations, though he has never scrupled or objected to use them when it suited his purpose. That purpose has been to raise Prussia from the degradation to which the policy of Prince Schwartzenberg had reduced her in German affairs, and he was clear-sighted enough to see that Prussia must be triumphant if she proclaimed herself the champion of German unity. We say this as not denying the great merit of the man, or the enormous difficulties which he has surmounted and has yet to surmount,

but

but we assert that the aggrandizement of Prussia, and not the triumph of German unity, except so far as Prussia triumphed too, has been throughout the keystone of his policy. In 1864, therefore, Austria and Prussia were to outward appearance the best friends in the world, the one holding Holstein and the other Schleswig for the Bund. Those obligations were rendered still more sacred by the Treaty of Gastein, which provided for the occupation as stated, and for the actual transfer of Lauenburg to the King of Prussia as his private property, in consideration for which his enormous private means enabled him to pay Austria a large pecuniary compensation. But those halcyon days were not to last; the great allies began to quarrel; there was a warm interchange of notes; then Prussia complained of Austria to the Bund, and Austria of Prussia. In 1866 the Bund, in an evil moment for itself, sided with Austria, whose perpetual presidency gave it an advantage over her rival in the deliberations of the Confederation. Then came an order from the Bund calling on those members of the Confederation which remained faithful to take up arms against Prussia. Count Bismarck replied by calling out that unsuspected military strength, which Prussia had been so long preparing for this final struggle. The campaign which ended in the battle of Sadowa and the overthrow of Austria was the result, and Prussia, as the champion of German unity, became the head of the North German Confederation, while the Bund itself at Frankfort was extinguished by General Manteuffel much as Cromwell snuffed out the Long Parliament. Here, again, as in the cases of the King of Denmark and the Duke of Augustenberg, existing rights went down before the might of Prussia and the victory of the idea. Austria, the ally of Prussia, was cajoled, defeated, and robbed of Venetia ; the rights of Hanover, Saxony, Hesse Cassel, and other minor States were ignored, and their sovereigns dispossessed. It was all for the good of Prussia and German unity, but the guilt was the guilt of Bismarck, who directed that strong arm to dash down throne after throne, and his only excuse, if excuse it can be allowed to be, was that he had violated all these rights in order that Germany might be united, one, and indivisible.

All this time, it may well be asked what France was doing. She was amazed, like the rest of Europe, at the wonderful successes of the Prussian army in 1866; for up to that time, even after the experience of the Danish War, Europe at large was no believer in the efficiency of the Prussian military system. It had failed once, not so long before, when Felix Schwartzenberg challenged Prussia and she did not answer to the call to arms, and it might fail again. But besides being amazed, France

had