Maréchal, on n'est plus heureux à notre âge.' This was one of the occasions in which the descendant of St. Louis contrasts most favourably with the parvenu Emperor.

Nothing could be finer or bolder than the plan of operations which led to the battle of Oudenarde. It included the crossing of the Scheldt after a toilsome march of fifteen miles, and the immediate attack of an army superior in numbers with every advantage of ground. It consequently involved great risks, which were fortunately averted by the divided counsels of the adversaries. The Commander-in-Chief of the French-Bavarian army was the Duke of Burgundy, the grandson of Louis, a young prince unacquainted with war, who was expected to submit to the guidance of the Duc de Vendôme, one of the ablest generals of the age. Unluckily they differed in everything, and cordially disliked each other, so that whatever Vendôme proposed, was either disregarded or reluctantly and ineffectively carried out. The allies, coming up by detachments, were placed for a time in much the same condition as the English at Quatre Bras, and Vendôme proposed to attack their van-guard before the arrival of the main body. He was overruled, and when he sent an order to charge the allied left before it was joined by the rear-guard, the order was countermanded by his superior, under the pretence that there was a non-existent morass to pass. "Your Majesty,' wrote Vendôme in his report, will be so good as to observe that this place, which was called impassable, was passed by the enemy without hindrance, and had not upon it either a thicket or a ditch.' Again, as at Blenheim and Ramillies, a large part of the French army was not brought into action at all; and a high French authority, Feuquières, says: "This battle is of the second kind of great actions, since there was in it but a front of our army, which necessarily attacked a front stronger and more extended than ours.' Vendôme wished to renew the battle the next morning, and reluctantly consented to the retreat.

Gleig prefaces an animated and detailed account of the battle of Malplaquet, by remarking, that, since the commencement of the war, two such armies had never been brought into the field, adding, that all the chivalry of Europe seemed to have taken part on one side or the other.* According to Lord Stanhope, they were nearly equal in numbers, each more than 90,000 strong— Gleig thinks 100,000. The French assert that they were outnumbered by at least 10,000 and inferior in artillery, but they

*Lives of the Most Eminent British Military Commanders.' By the Rev. G R. Gleig (the Chaplain-General). In 'Lardner's Cabinet Encyclopædia.'

were

were strongly entrenched behind field-works and abbatis of trees, so strongly that the allied troops were heard to murmur, 'So we have still to make war upon moles.' Marlborough and Eugene were opposed to Villars and Boufflers. Their plan was to turn the left and break through the centre. They succeeded, after a prolonged struggle, and remained masters of the field; but their loss very much exceeded that of their adversaries, being computed at not less than 20,000 killed and wounded against 12,000 on the side of the French. Villars, whose extravagant computation was 30,000 to 6000, wrote to Louis: If God vouchsafes us the grace of losing another such battle, your Majesty may reckon on your enemies being destroyed.' Boufflers wrote more modestly that never had misfortune been accompanied with more glory: It is blood usefully shed; it should count for much to have re-established the national honour.' Bolingbroke's remark in his 'Letters on History' is: 'A deluge of blood was spilt to dislodge them, for we did no more at Malplaquet.'

We hardly know whether we ought to smile or feel sad at finding the condition of mind to which the great Commander had been reduced by his termagant wife when he fought this battle. He wrote to her the day before:

'I can take pleasure in nothing so long as you continue uneasy and think me unkind. I do assure you, upon my honour and salvation, that the only reason why I did not write was that I am very sure it would have had no other effect than that of being shown to Mrs. Masham. . . . In the mean time I cannot hinder saying to you that though the fate of Europe, if these armies engage, may depend upon the good or bad success, yet your uneasiness gives me much greater trouble.'

On the evening of the battle he added by way of postscript:

'I am so tired that I have but strength enough to tell you that we have had this day a very bloody battle; the first part of the day we beat their foot and afterwards their horse. God Almighty be praised it is now in our power to have what peace we please, and I may be pretty well assured of never being in another battle, but that, nor nothing in the world, can make me happy if you are not kind.'

The English captain of the age who came next to Marlborough was Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough. Indeed, in military genius, originality of conception, fertility of resource, and chivalrous intrepidity, this eccentric personage has been rarely equalled, never excelled. A striking parallel might be drawn between him and the late Earl of Dundonald, better known

as Lord Cochrane, the hero of Basque Roads, of whom it was said that he performed greater actions, with smaller means, than any other captain or commander recorded in history. Take, for example, the capture of a Spanish frigate (the Gamos') of thirty-two heavy guns and 319 men, with the 'Speedy' of 158 tons, fourteen 4-pounders, and a crew of forty-seven, officers and boys included. The frigate was carried by boarding, a portion of the boarders being directed to blacken their faces and board by the head. The greater part of the Spaniards' crew (he reports) was prepared to repel boarders, but stood for a few moments, as it were, transfixed to the deck by the apparition of so many diabolical-looking figures emerging from the white smoke of the bow-guns; whilst our other men, who boarded from the waist, rushed on them from behind before they could recover from their surprise at the unexpected phenomenon.'

In this and other successes against odds, I have no hesitation in saying that success in no slight degree depended on out-of-theway devices, which the enemy not suspecting, were in some measure thrown off their guard.'

Lord Peterborough proceeded on the same principle and obtained the most surprising successes by setting overwhelming odds at defiance, by deliberately encountering apparently desperate but really well-considered and carefully calculated risks. In dealing with Spaniards he was as ready as Cochrane to turn their national peculiarities to good account. Their super

stitious credulity was such, that, a few hours before the French army entered Zaragossa, in 1707, and was actually in sight, the people were persuaded by the governor that it was a mere apparition raised by magic, and the priests in procession performed the office of exorcism from the walls according to the most approved forms.

Peterborough's stunning surprises and make-believe tactics never failed. With twelve hundred men he undertook to raise the siege of a place, San Mateo, besieged by 7000. He sent two spies, one of whom was to be captured with a letter to the commander of the garrison announcing his approach at the head of a very large army; the other to go over to the enemy and carry the same intelligence under the guise of treachery. He could rely on their obedience, for, says Dr. Freind, my lord never made use of any Spaniards without getting the whole family in his possession to be answerable for them he employed.' The Spaniard fell into the trap, and, on seeing English outposts advancing on the summits of the hills above his camp as he was led to expect by the spies, he at once raised the siege in con

fusion after spiking his guns; and thus (says Lord Stanhope) did Peterborough's twelve hundred men, driving seven thousand before them, enter in triumph the walls of San Mateo. He followed in pursuit till he had only 200 cavalry in a condition to proceed; with these, after cutting a detachment to pieces, he appeared before Nules, a strongly walled town garrisoned by a thousand armed citizens. He rode up to the gate, after running the gauntlet of a fire of musketry, and demanded to speak with the chief magistrate or a priest. On some priests appearing, he told them that he would allow only six minutes, and that unless he was admitted within that time he would bring up his artillery (having none), batter down the gate, and put the whole population to the sword. The town was instantly surrendered without a blow.

The capture of Barcelona was his masterpiece. His army consisted of 7000 men; and ten times that number was required to invest so large a place in form. The hopelessness of the undertaking was almost self-evident, when it struck him that the strong fort or citadel of Montjuich, which commands the city, might prove accessible to a surprise; the more so that it was deemed impregnable if assailed first. He accordingly reembarked all his heavy guns, and both publicly and privately announced his intention of raising the siege. One night when the inhabitants of Barcelona were celebrating their expected release with festivities, he suddenly presented himself at the quarters of his colleague, the Prince of Darmstadt (with whom he was not on speaking terms) at the head of 1200 foot and 200 horse, and told his Serene Highness that he was on his way to make an attempt upon the enemy. You may now, if you please, be a judge of our behaviour, and see whether my officers and soldiers really deserve the bad character which you of late have so readily imputed to them.' The Prince immediately called for his horse and joined the party, which arrived by a circuitous route unperceived before the fort. As it was still two hours before daylight, a night attack was taken for granted by both officers and men, when Peterborough explained to them that his plan required daylight, as its only chance of success depended on the Spaniards being tempted into the outward ditch, when his soldiers might leap in upon them, drive them back, and enter the works along with them. All fell out as he anticipated; the first attack made him master of the bastion; and following up his success by a marvellous exertion of coolness, readiness, and personal ascendancy, he speedily became master of the fort. Barcelona held out till intelligence reached him that he would be supported by an insurrectionary

rectionary party within the walls. He instantly mounted his horse, rode up to one of the gates attended by some officers, and demanded admittance. The guard, frightened or surprised, admitted him, and he came just in time to rescue a beautiful lady, the Duchess of Popoli, whom he met flying with dishevelled hair from the populace. The formal surrender of the city followed.

Instance upon instance might be accumulated of this extraordinary man's genius, energy, versatility, and magnanimity; but he marred all by an insatiable vanity and an ungovernable temper. He offended and repelled all whom he should have conciliated and attracted; the intensity of his own self-love made him utterly careless about wounding the self-love of others; and he was so little a respecter of persons that the very king he came to serve, and did serve so effectually, could hardly endure the sight of him, and thwarted instead of forwarding his plans. He had no greater difficulties in the shape of jealousy, or dilatory and divided counsels, to encounter than Marlborough; and with a tithe of Marlborough's temper and tact he might have performed really great, as well as startling and brilliant, actions in Spain; but he persevered in being impracticable till he abandoned the field of his exploits in a pet; writing on his way home, 'I have overcome all my enemies but lies, and these I have papers enough with me to defeat.' To return with a grievance, instead of the clustering honours of a conqueror confirmed by royal gratitude, was a lame and impotent conclusion at the best. If he and General Stanhope had co-operated like Marlborough and Eugene-and it was not Stanhope's fault that they did not-the war of the Succession might have proved as unfavourable to France as the campaigns in Germany and the Low Countries.*

The political and parliamentary history of the period, with its bearings on the military and constitutional history, is accurately sketched and curiously illustrated by Lord Stanhope. reference to the events of November, 1710, he writes:

In

Thus fell the great Whig administration of Queen Anne. Considering its high fame in history it is remarkable for how short a period it endured. The changes in Godolphin's government bringing it round from Tory to Whig took place, as we have seen, by slow degrees; but the latter party can scarcely be thought to have gained an entire ascendancy until the resignation of Harley in the spring of 1708. According then to this computation the Whigs were dominant

* The exploits of Lord Peterborough are attested by Captain George Carleton and Dr. Freind, personally present.

for