structing pontoons, throwing up batteries, and gathering together boats and small craft; and though events showed that they were too circumspect we can scarcely blame them for excess of caution. At the same time there is no denying that the slowness of the invaders' advance gave the Turks an occasion they might have made use of. More than eight weeks passed from the declaration of war before the Russian army was upon the Danube; and during this interval an active enemy might have seriously impeded the columns on their march, by making raids into the Roumanian plains and by multiplying obstacles to the passage of troops. If the Turks, too, could not have accomplished this, they might at least have largely increased the flotilla with which they held the line of the Danube; they might have greatly strengthened the Bulgarian strongholds; and, above all, they could have removed to the north of the Balkans a part of the numerous forces which they had in Albania and Montenegro. The Turks, however, did none of these things, or did them in an imperfect fashion. The march of the Russians was not molested; the Ottoman flotilla received no additions, and, was, indeed, paralyzed by the fear of torpedoes; and though something was done to improve the works of Rustchuk, Silistria, and other places, scarcely a Turk- · ish soldier was despatched to the aid of the army formed in the Bulgarian plains.

12. We dwell on these points, for, in our judgment, sufficient attention has not been given to them. If, as professional experts say, the strategy of the Russians in this part of the war was halting, timid, and wasteful of time, that of the Turks was far more characterized by sluggishness, feebleness, and want of purpose. By the middle of June the preparations to cross the Danube seem to have been nearly complete, but, as the river was still big with flood, a further delay of some days was needed. At this time the invading army was in occupation of the Roumanian bank of the river for nearly two hundred miles; but it was formed for the most part into two masses, one to the left, holding the country between Galatz, Bucharest, and Kalarash, the other holding the tracts extending from Giurgevo to the banks of the Vede, - and it was already evident that it had become impossible for the Turks seriously to dispute the passage. The first crossing took place at Galatz, and was executed not without skill and judgment. A feint was made to bridge the stream near Ibraila, by bringing materials for pontoons together, and this seems to have de

ceived the Turks, who sent a detachment near the spot, at Matchin. On the morning, however, of the 22d of June, a few hundred Russians put off in boats from the shore at Galatz upon the Danube, and, successive reinforcements coming to their aid, a footing was made at last on the Bulgarian bank, notwithstanding a fierce and gallant resistance. Bridges were thrown across at Galatz and Ibraila, and in a few days a whole Russian corps was in full march through the Dobrudscha waste, leaving the Danube completely in its power in the rear. The second crossing was effected on the 27th of June, at a point much higher up the river, and it presented features of a similar kind, though it was on a larger scale, and more sternly contested. As in the preceding instance, preparations were feigned to pass near Nicopolis and other points, but Simnitza was the real place selected; and a Russian detachment issuing from this spot was launched in rafts and barges across the river. The movement was sustained by a heavy fire of batteries from the Roumanian bank, and by the embarkation of troops in succession, but it was perceived at once by a Turkish detachment, and it was encountered with the most determined courage. At last, however, after several hundreds of the assailants had been drowned and had fallen, the Russians succeeded in forcing the passage, and Sistova, on the Bulgarian shore, was occupied. The Danube was afterwards easily bridged, the defenders having given way at all points, and before a week was over the invading army was spreading on all sides into Bulgarian territory.

13. This passage of the Danube, so rapid and easy, was ominous of the fate of the Ottoman power, and was the cause of excitement and wonder in Europe. It was certainly a brilliant military feat, designed with care and carried out ably; but it was executed under conditions of a kind which lessen our surprise at its complete success. As we have seen, the Turks made scarcely an attempt to prevent or retard the march of the enemy, or even to interfere with his preparations to cross; the flotilla, from which they had hoped so much, did simply nothing to check the Russians; and, though their fortresses barred some points of passage, they were made all but useless, not being supported by armies in the field to manœuvre between them. The Turks, in fact, had contented themselves with stationing detachments on the Bulgarian shore at the places where they expected the crossing; and as the invader approached the Danube they drew the mass of their movable.

forces — not less, perhaps, than one hundred and forty thousand men-into their strongholds, where they remained cooped up. In these circumstances the Russians were able to effect the passage almost as they pleased; the weak cordons of troops

that lay in their front were swept away at the first real pressure, and it was a matter of certainty that the Bulgarian bank would be readily mastered, and with little loss. In a military point of view the line of the Danube was, in short, given up by the Turks at once; their show of defending it was worse than idle;

and though the elaborate arrangements of the Russian commanders to secure the crossing show forethought and sense, the enterprise itself was not wonderful. As for their enemy, thè inability of the Turks to avail themselves of this great barrier, by the manœuvres usual in instances of the kind, proves how ignorant they were of the art of war, and how incapable were their troops in the field.

14. The Russian army had scarcely obtained a hold on the southern bank of the Danube when intelligence arrived that successive disasters had befallen the cause of the czar in Asia. Ardahan having fallen after the middle of May, Loris Melikoff had proceeded with the siege of Kars, had opened fire on the north-eastern part of the fortress, and had made an attempt to invest it closely. The strength and the extent of the place, however, were too great for the force of the enemy, and the works of the siege, it has been asserted, were ill designed, and by no means efficient. After delaying for several weeks on the spot the Russian commander resolved to turn the siege into a mere blockade; and, leaving some troops to observe the garrison, made ready to march, with the rest of his army, against Muktar Pasha, for some time safe, as we have seen, in the Soganlook defiles. By this time the corps of Turgakassoff had advanced far on the way to Erzeroum; it was drawing near the valley of the Aras, and it would soon be in a position to threaten the flank of Muktar, and perhaps even to turn it. Melikoff, accordingly, seems to have planned a combined attack on the Turkish army by his own and Turgakassoff's forces; and if, as he supposed, success was certain, he anticipated that the Soganlook would be forced, that he would advance rapidly with the united columns, and that he would be ere long at the gates of the capital. The project was bold, and even ingenious; but it was ill-adapted to existing facts, and it was executed without skill or judgment.

15. By this time Mukhtar had collected and entrenched in the Soganlook Passes an army at least thirty thousand strong, and formidable in a defensive position. The two Russian generals, though nearing each other, were separated by mountain chains and defiles, and therefore Melikoff, to ensure success, ought to have had a force sufficient to defeat Mukhtar and ought to have made his junction with his colleague certain. That general, however, broke up from Kars with forces which, it is said, were not more than twenty thousand men, and he was never able really to combine his movements with those of

his lieutenant on the left. The result was a series of Russian defeats, and bad generalship was made worse by faulty tactics. Turgakassoff, advancing into the Aras valley, defeated Mukhtar in an affair of outposts, but was defeated in turn on the 22d of June; and three days afterwards Melikoff assailed the main Turkish army in the Soganlook defiles, but was utterly routed with enormous loss, his enemies being superior in numbers, and his attack on their entrenched position being reckless and wild in the highest degree. This battle, called, from the place, Zewin, completely baffled the Russian projects. The question now was not of attacking Erzeroum, but of retreating as fast as possible; and, in fact, the campaign was for the time ended. The Russian army fell back on all points; the siege of Kars was raised by the middle of July; Turgakassoff scarcely effected his escape, and by the first of August the repelled invaders had retired almost to their own frontier.

16. In spite, however, of this reverse in Asia, the Russians continued to advance in Europe. During the week that followed the 27th of June new bridges were thrown across the Danube, and by the first days of July not less probably than one hundred and thirty thousand Russians were on their way towards the line of the Balkans. Two causes seem to have induced their leaders to press forward with energy and speed, and to have given their movement a different character from that which marked their operations at first. One class of generals in the Grand Duke's camp is said to have been convinced that the Turks would not venture to make a serious resistance ; that the campaign would be a mere showy march; and these counsellors, who now appeared in the right, urged their chief to advance at any risk, and to carry the war beyond the Balkans, with little regard to military rule. Then, again, the attitude of the Turks themselves seemed to encourage a dashing and bold offensive, and even to make it the wisest strategy, As we have seen, even before the Danube was crossed, the Ottoman chiefs had withdrawn the mass of the forces into the Bulgarian fortresses; they had scarcely attempted to dispute the passage; they remained stationary, although their enemy was now encamped on Bulgarian soil. Was it not possible, therefore, nay, true generalship, to advance into the heart of the empire, merely holding in check the hostile levies which seemed unable to leave their strongholds? The Russians accordingly, at this juncture, precipitated the invasion with almost reckless energy, and neglected precautions of the simplest kind very