CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE TURKO-RUSSIAN WAR.

THE RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE TWO POWERS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR-PROGRESS IN THE FIELD THE CONTEST-FALL OF TURKEY.

The

1. It is no slight task to write or compile a consecutive history of the great Turko-Russian war of 1877-8. sources of information are ample, but equally as conflicting, and much that has found its way into print is unreliable. We must content ourselves with tracing briefly the diplomatic struggles which preceded the war, or the causes producing the war, the war itself, and the diplomatic contest which followed the treaty of San Stefano. Thus we have our subject divided into three parts. First, then, let us glance at diplomatic measures previous to the war, and see if, in our observations, we may not happen on the immediate causes of the appeal to arms. This Eastern question is a very old one, and, although old as European nations, has not slept sufficiently long at any one time to have been forgotten by a single generation. The English, French, German, and Prussian statesmen have found their greatest abilities most heavily taxed when grappling with the designs of Russia. The attitude of this Eastern question is ever changing, and it is this constant changing which has rendered the problem so difficult and so much of a puzzle to the popular mind. What is of the greatest importance this week sinks into utter significance next, and thus the scene is ever changing and repeating. But it is these varying phases which have led to every crisis, and to every war in which the armies of Russia have fought; and it was this peculiar nature of the case which led to the desperate war of 1877-8, which has prostrated Turkey at the proud feet of Russia, and necessitated a reconstruction of those provinces of the Balkan peninsula recently in some measure dependent upon the Ottoman government. By glancing at the most prominent phases of the Eastern question, we may easily discern the ground of disputes between the two late contending powers, and understand what are the "English interests" touching the populations which inhabit the countries extending from the

southern frontiers of Austria and Russia to the northern frontier of Greece.

2. The phase of the question which agitated the powers at the close of 1875 was to deal with the rebellion in Bosnia and

THE GRAND DUKE ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVITCH, HEIR-APPARENT TO THE THRONE OF RUSSIA

the Herzegovina. The troubles in the latter had their origin in the corrupt administration of the provinces. As we are well aware, the great powers of Europe dealt with it by merely giving advice, but carefully avoiding action. The rebellion, however, only increased, and received strong encouragement

from the Slave populations of Austria, Servia, and Montenegro. At last the governments of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary decided that a bolder course of action was imperative, and in May, 1876, they drew up the Berlin memorandum, with the object, as the document declares, "to support their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might be demanded, in the interests of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development." On the 15th of May the governments of France and Italy signified their approval or acquiescence; but the government of Great Britain refused. At this time the foreign minister of Italy openly avowed his regret at the action of England, and stated that he considered "united action between all the powers was the surest means of securing peace; and that, in associating themselves with the policy of the three imperial cabinets in the present instance, the Western Powers would be in a better position to exercise an influence over subsequent proceedings should the measure now proposed fail to realize the hoped-for pacification. These were the motives which had determined the Italian government to accept the new proposals." Such was the gentle manner in which Italy remonstrated with England, while at the same time the foreign minister of France expressed to England's representative at Paris "his surprise and regret, and spoke at length, and in a peculiarly earnest language of the result which he dreaded if, by the non-consent of all the powers, an armistice became impossible, and thus the present struggle were kept up. He implored her majesty's government to reconsider their decision. He trusted that they would at least consent to recommend an armistice, however short, in order that an attempt might be made to find some ground for the establishment of a common concert between the six powers; and he declared that, for his part, he could but consider that, if England stood aloof at this momentous crisis, it would be a public calamity for Europe." But England yielded not, and for good reasons. But this was by no means all the pressure brought to bear against the government of England. Prince Bismarck said "he would willingly entertain modifications or improvements which the English government might propose; but he greatly regretted that her majesty's government had not ble to give a general support to the principle of the p powers, and agreed to by France a

withdraw from the cordial unders

between the six great powers in regard to the pacification of the Herzegovina." On the other hand, Prince Gortchakow, of Russia, "deeply regretted the resolution taken by the London cabinet;" and

became more than ever determined to disregard the advice of the powers, no longer unanimous. John W. Probyn, in an able article on the Eastern Question, seems to find cause, though not in our estimation justifiable, for complaint against England. He says, "A policy advocated by Austria, whose neighboring Slave populations necessarily and naturally sympathized with the Slaves of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, was assuredly one that should have commanded the assent of English statesmen. They would have done well to reflect that if Austrian statesmen (dreading that the continuation of the revolt against the Porte would lead Servia and Montenegro to aid the insurgents) thought it time to supplement their diplomatic action by the

Compiled from sketch in "British Quarterly Review," and from articles in London "News" and "Times."

sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might be demanded in the interests of general peace to check the evil and prevent its development,' England would have done well to agree to those 'efficacious measures.' It is difficult to see what danger Great Britain could have run by assenting to a policy agreed to by Austria. It was by the adoption of 'efficacious measures,' and not by a refusal to join in them, that Lord Palmerston put an end to misrule, strife, and massacre in the Lebanon, in 1860. He did not hesitate to join France in coercing Turkey, and obliging her, by means of a French army and an English fleet, to punish her offending officers. Order thus being restored by the arms of the Western powers, they proceeded, in concert with the other powers and Turkey, to establish a government in the Lebanon which has since ruled fairly well its various races and creeds. But this remarkable precedent was of no account apparently in the counsels of Lord Beaconfield's cabinet, not even when Austria herself had sanctioned an agreement with a view to efficacious measures.' Let those who desired the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, as settled by the treaty of 1856, ask themselves whether the results of England's agreeing to the efficacious measures' implied in the Berlin memorandum could possibly have been as disastrous to the Porté as have been the results of that policy of refusal to join in 'efficacious measures' so persistently pursued by the English cabinet. The enemies of Turkey may indeed congratulate themselves that no efficacious measures' were taken by the powers of Europe to put an end to misrule and rebellion in Bosnia and the Herzegovina; but the avowed friends and supporters of the Ottoman government have assuredly not the same cause for rejoicing in this year of grace 1878."

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4. The rejection of the Berlin memorandum was soon followed by Servia and Montenegro declaring war against the Porte. Thus the conflagration spread, and the danger to the peace of Europe was thereby sensibly increased. The massacres in Bulgaria, which occurred in May, 1876, turned the tide of feeling throughout Europe strongly against Turkey. After Mr. Baring's carefully prepared official report upon these massacres, Lord Derby wrote in September, 1876, his famous despatch on the subject to the Porte. In it the foreign secretary of England directed her ambassador at Constantinople to demand a formal audience with the sultan, to communicate the result of Mr. Baring's inquiries into the Bulgarian atrocities, and,