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The future Reward of the faithful Minister.

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regard to the spirit and manner in which we have been doing our work. "Will it then be," says one, "will it then be a matter of indifference to him who distributes the crowns and allots the thrones of heaven, whether you have been among the most faithful and diligent, or the most slothful and negligent of his servants?" It is an interesting thought that they who have been companions and fellow laborers in these churches for Jesus' sake, are to know and love each other in heaven. They should therefore "let brotherly love continue;" endeavor to see eye to eye in everything; and, until they can do this, cherish kind feelings towards each other, and by their continued union, their increasing respectability as professional men, their devotedness to their work, advance the interests of their common faith. While we do not neglect ancient and modern literature, and theological science, let us read more frequently such books as Baxter's Reformed Pastor, and Doddridge's Essay on the Evil and Danger of neglecting souls. Our pulpits and our pastoral walks are not only determining our influence in the world, but they are to be the objects of vivid recollections in eternity. "My pulpit!" what words are these to every pastor! what associations will cluster round the remembrance of that place in my mind forever and ever! A minister is standing in eternity by the side of some king who is looking back on his earthly throne, a king on whose realms the sun never set, and the minister is looking back to his pulpit. On the king's realms the sun has at last set forever, but on the subjects of a successful ministry the sun of righteousness arises forever with healing on his wings. That king can never bless God for his kingdom and throne with the feelings with which a minister will say, "And I thank Christ Jesus my Lord in that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry." "My pulpit!" The character and history of its ministrations, will determine my future crown and throne.

ARTICLE VI.

THE TRINITY.

[Translated by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass., from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twesten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. Continued from No. XI. p. 539.]

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

[There are several reasons which might be urged, for presenting in the pages of this Review such a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity as is contained in this article. In the first place, the article is of interest in connection with the present condition of German theology. Since the times when a negative Rationalism prevailed in that country, it is the first elaborate attempt to uphold this doctrine in its orthodox form. These lectures of Dr. Twesten awakened a new interest in this subject among the Germans; and in the more recent discussions, they are uniformly referred to with respect, and as an authority. In the second place, it is of value for the historical materials with which it is filled. While it does not profess to contain a history of the doctrine, it shows on every page the thorough study which the author has bestowed upon the works of the ablest theologians. The subsequent sections are especially valuable, as exhibiting the force and pertinency of many of the distinctions of the Scholastics. No treatise by English or American theologians with which we are acquainted, contains so much of valuable material from like sources. It might be urged, again, that every thorough and fair-minded disquisition upon a doctrine of so much importance, should be received with candor, and may be read with profit, because it may disclose some new aspects and relations of an inexhaustible truth. No doctrine presents itself to every mind in the same relations; and the more important the doctrine, and the more thorough the study of it, the greater variety will there be in the modes of its application and illustration. The more we love a doctrine, the more shall we think about it; and the more we think about it, the more shall we see its connection with other truths; and every one who reverences and loves and thinks about the truth, may aid us in our own studies, even though we do not think all his speculations sound. In the fourth place, in respect to this particular doctrine, it is well known, that the most ortho

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The Notion of Person as applied to the Godhead. 761

dox divines, while assenting to the fundamental formula, have differed in the way in which they have explained and defended it; and this fact should keep us from arguing that an exposition which is new to us, is therefore an unwarrantable speculation and a hazardous tampering with the faith. The doctrine is contained in the Bible, and it rests upon the authority of the Bible; and this is what Dr. Twesten maintains. But the formula is not in the Bible; and the business of the theologian who embraces this formula is, to show that it best expresses the true sense of the Scriptures, and to defend it against philosophical and other objections. We who hold the same formula, may perhaps be interested in seeing how a German explains it; and we, who encounter the same objections, might at least be willing to read how they are met and answered elsewhere; even though we may not think that the exposition and the defence are as good as our own. And as to philosophising-without some degree of it, we can hardly see how the formula can be fully explained; and when a philosophical objection is made to our statement of a doctrine, it is surely not unworthy of a Christian to attempt to answer it philosophically.

The whole development of this doctrine in the following pages, rests upon the assumption, that the distinction of the first and second persons of the Trinity as Father and Son, is immanent in the Godhead. This position the author has not fortified by arguments, for in Germany it is generally taken for granted. Those who wish to see it more fully discussed, may find it in the Letters of Professor Stuart, and in an Article on the Sonship of Christ, reprinted in a volume of selections from the Princeton Repertory. Some account of the author of these Lectures may be found in the Bib. Sac., Vol. I. p. 768.-TR.]

§ 5. One Nature and Three Persons.

THE fundamental formula for the doctrine of the Trinity as de. fined by the church is, that in one divine essence or nature there are three Persons, distinguished from each other by certain characteristics, and indivisibly participating in that one nature. To get at the meaning of this formula, the first thing of which we naturally think, is a comparison with several human individuals, who have the same human nature; only we ought not, at the same time, to forget the entire difference between any such relation and that of the three divine persons. When we speak of VOL. III. No. 12.

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finite things, by their nature or essence, we usually understand only the genus to which they belong, and the unity which we ascribe to different individuals under this genus, is an abstract unity, existing only in our conceptions. But the divine essence (considered as comprehending all the divine perfections), is no mere notion, but includes in itself actual being, and its unity is a real, numerical unity. Hence, as the Athanasian creed has it, we may not speak of three Gods, as we do of three men. Since unity belongs to the divine essence, the use of the plural in this case would involve a contradiction; there are three who have divinity, but these three are one God, and their consubstantiality (óμoovaia) does not consist in their having a common nature, but in a real unity of nature. From this view the notion of person, as we ascribe it to the Godhead, is to be determined. We cannot take for granted that this notion is correctly given elsewhere; nor should we allow ourselves, as not seldom happens even in scientific treatises, to be too much guided by the current signifi cation of the word. When we speak of the Three Persons in the Godhead, and of three human persons, we cannot by any possibility mean just the same thing; although there must still be a certain analogy to justify the use of the same expression. As we ordinarily use the word person, the assumption of three divine persons will call up tritheistic conceptions in most minds. But the objection which the Oriental church made to this word, that it seemed to favor a modalistic view of the Trinity, shows us how remote any such views were from the originators of this terminology. Augustin puts us in the right point of view where he says:1 "In truth, since the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit, who is also called the gift of God, can neither be the Father nor the Son, there are at any rate three; yet, when it is asked, what three? straightway great pov. erty weighs upon human speech; yet we say, three persons, not because that is what should be said, but that we may not keep silence, (non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur).”

The point from which we started, and which we have hitherto sought to establish, is this: that as we find it necessary to make a distinction in the divine Being between different attributes be longing to the same subject, so it is necessary to distinguish dif ferent subjects or persons, having the same attributes, or the same essence. When we then think of Father, Son and Spirit, as divine persons, we think of them as subjects having divine at1 Aug. de Trin. v. 9.

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The Definition of a divine Person.

763 tributes. If we define this notion further, by adding that we are to conceive of them as subjects (persons), who are really and essentially such, that is, who cannot again be taken as predicates, (as can the notions of qualities, or those generic and specific notions, which after Aristotle are called substantiae secundae1); and, since here no mere subjective, but a real objective distinction is intended, if we choose instead of a logical a more metaphysical expression-instead of subject, the word suppositum or substance; if we add to this, that, since the Godhead is to be conceived of as essentially indivisible and as intelligence, that such a subject or suppositum can neither consist of parts nor be a part of any other, and that the attribute of intelligence must necessarily be long to it; if we take these points together, we have got the definition of a divine Person usually given in the schools: Suppositum intelligens, or Substantia individua intelligens, quae non est pars aut qualitas in alio, sed proprie subsistit. Thus far the same definition will pass also for human personality. But the propria subsistentia makes a difficulty; in relation to man, since he does not subsist absolutely for himself, nor independent even of other finite beings, much less of the infinite being; and, in relation to God, of whom we here speak, since it seems to be limited by the re

Aristot. Categor. cp. v. (Casaub.) The notion man, e. g., is indeed the subject of the attributes belonging to man, but it can again be used as a predicate; but the notion of a human individual, or the notion I, can only take the place of the subject, excepting in tautological sentences. Just so is God the subject of the divine attributes, but can at the same time be used as predicate for the Father, Son and Spirit, while these latter can only be used as subjects. Since, now, to exist only as subject, is the logical sign of substance (conf. among others Kant, Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, S. 149), we may on this account hold ourselves justified in applying to them the notion of vñóσтacıç, of subsistence, and that in the sense in which e. g. Quenstedt describes person,—as substantia individua intelligens, per se ultimato et immediate subsistens, so that it may be distinguished a substantiis secundis, quae per se subsistunt, sed mediate et in substantiis primis s. individuis; we understand-as in itself a last subject, beyond which we cannot go, seeking a subject for certain predicates.

To this definition two points are usually added, viz.incommunicabilis, and, non sustentata ab alio. But the second of these would seem to be less essential, when we consider the humanity of Christ, which, in virtue of the άvνñоσтασia, [impersonalitas, i. e. wanting in proper subsistence; others give it as ¿vvπOσTaσía, meaning the subsistence of the human person in the divine nature of the Logos,] ascribed to it, did not exist by itself, but was borne by his divinity; or, in union with the divine nature, formed one person. These points, also, are only a repetition of what is contained in the others; for the first means, that the notion of person cannot, like that of nature, be the predicate of another subject; and the second is nothing more than a repetition of proper subsistence.

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