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others result from convictions which are false and feelings which are wrong, and the opposition of both to the design of the orator is real. In the former case, the orator should show that the convictions and feelings which are correct, do not in the least militate with his design, but they rather favor it. Some of the most eloquent passages of Cicero and Demosthenes, are those in which the objections of the adversary are converted into arguments for the speaker's own assertions. In the latter case where the convictions or feelings are wrong, the orator must devote himself to the proof, either that they are reprehensible, and ought not to be retained; or else that they do not in reality oppose his design, and ought not to be considered as objections to his address. The ancient secular orators would often show, that the theoretical or practical errors of their audience were not really adverse to the object recommended in the oration, and at the same time would not characterize these errors as such, and might even seem to justify them. But the sacred orator, looking beyond the merely temporary influence of his address, is called upon to express his disapprobation of all opinions or inclinations which are adverse to the spirit of the Gospel. He may indeed hesitate to assail long established errors which are not inconsistent with the temper of Christianity, and which are supposed to be intimately combined with evangelical faith, but he has no right to spare such faults as conflict with essential truth. He must always express his condemnation of them, although he need not always stop the current of his discourse for the sake of proving his condemnation to be just. After his naked disavowal of all sympathy with them, he may be justified in confining him. self to the proof that their opposition to the immediate design of his sermon is not real, but only apparent. When, however, the preacher finds that the speculative errors or the wrong inclinations of his audience are actually operating against the specific purpose of his address, he must not content himself with a simple disavowal of those incorrect opinions or emotions; he must make a special effort to eradicate them from the mind of every hearer whom they influence. Sometimes he may resist them indirectly, by demonstrating the truth of his own doctrines, or by exciting the right moral feelings; for a true faith and right affections expel their opposites from the soul. At other times, he may directly assail the false notions or evil desires which oppose him. He may show the consequences which result from them, and the sources from which they arise, and may thus diminish

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The Orator's Concealment of his Design.

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the overweening confidence of his hearers in principles which lead to such disastrous results, or originate from such ignoble causes. By showing men the origin of their mistake, he often makes the way easy for them to renounce it. He proves it to be reprehensible, by giving the history of its inception and subsequent retention. He should ever aim not merely to convince his hearers of their previous error, but to enlist them in favor of the truth; not merely to secure their confidence but to engage their warm interest in the correct principles of faith and practice. He may often induce them to work their own way out of their mistake, by proposing to them a logical dilemma, such as our Saviour employed in Matt. 12: 25-28.

Ancient rhetoricians have recommended the practice of an orator's concealing when necessity requires it, his real design in a speech, or part of a speech, and appearing to be engaged in a very different project from that which he is actually attempting. This artifice is called the oxua, and orations composed in this style are termed λóyoi tornuarioμévoi, orationes figuratae. In the first centuries of the Christian era, the rhetoricians labored in the classification, and also in the multiplication of the various forms of this artifice, with great perspicacity and inventiveness of genius. See especially the Τέχνη Ρητορική ascribed to Dionysius Halicarnassus, c. 8. 9. Demetrius Phalerius de Elocutione § 305 sq. Hermogenes de Inventione 1. 4. Quinctilian Inst. Orat. 1. 9. c. 2. et al. The orators, particularly Isocrates and Cicero, frequently employed this artifice; see Isocrates, Panathenaicus, c. 95. 96, and Cic. pro Milone. c. 1. 24. It consisted either in announcing one theme and actually speaking on another; or in discussing the proposed subject with an entirely different design from that which was at first apparent, or in aiming at a distinct class of individuals from that which the speaker seemed to address. The circumstances of the ancient orators, haranguing assemblies who were so liable to be overawed by the civil power, or to be swayed by popular faction, tempted them frequently to adopt these circuitous methods of reaching the hearts of their auditors. A more direct appeal might have exposed them to the indignation of a ruler, or to the wrath of a mob. But the sacred orator, who addres. ses a calmer assembly and in a more tranquil style; who dwells in the light and discountenances works of darkness, is seldom necessitated to use the λόγοι ἐσχηματισμένοι. He may, however, be driven to an imitation of some of them, at certain conjunctures, in particular parts of a discourse; for it is sometimes need

ful for him to utter truths with a design of affecting some individuals whom he would not appear to aim at, and of suggesting some inferences which it would not be prudent for him openly to

announce.

14. Cautions to be observed in exciting the Feelings of an Audience. Man, being of a compound nature, and being impelled to action by a great variety of principles, should be addressed with an appropriate and corresponding variety of style. The diversified themes which are presented to his consideration in the pulpit, appeal to his different susceptibilities in such a manner, as to secure their full and harmonious development. We need not fear to address the lower, innocent desires of an auditor, if their influence be always kept subordinate to that of his more dignified principles of action. We may stimulate his constitutional love of self, if we can hasten thereby his progress in virtue. Our Creator intended that all our appetites and passions should be made to facilitate our religious advancement; and while we never disturb the fit proportions between the desires of a man for his own good, and his interest in the general welfare, we may excite those desires to such a degree as to secure their prompting and encouraging activity in favor of holiness. The more degraded

the people whom we address, so much the more must we strive to call out their lower propensities into the service of the higher, and to set over against each other, in the proper balance, the previously disordered parts of their constitution. The more refined our audience, so much the more successful may we be in a direct appeal to their more elevated principles of action. The majority of the ancient orators devoted their highest energies to the excitement of the feelings of their hearers, and often awakened such an interest in merely personal relations, as was predominant over the zeal for the public good. But the character of sacred eloquence does not allow such passionate appeals, as were made by the political orators of antiquity. The preacher should attempt to excite no emotion which will disturb the symmetry of the soul; no merely animal feeling, which he does not intend to make subsidiary to spiritual improvement; no sensuous desire which, harmless in itself, may lead, without suitable direction, to a moral evil; no emotion which may be called pathological, and is distinguished from the contemplative by its originating blindly, impulsively, without a definite idea of truth previously in the

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The Department of Topics.

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mind, without any rational cause in the preceding meditations. An excitement which has no spiritual ground, will result in no religious good; and true eloquence, especially that of the pulpit, is the eloquence of the soul, the entire soul, and not only emanates from clear views of truth but also conduces to some beneficent end. Hence the preacher should never inflame any feelings of his audience so far, as to repress the activity of the moral judgment. Conscience must always be allowed the supreme dominion over the soul, and no passion, however innocent in itself, should usurp the place of the governing faculty. The rule is, then, that a preacher should instruct his audience, before he aim to arouse them. Ideas must call forth their emotions, and stringent proof must justify feeling. He should endeavor to secure a complete harmony between the intellectual and the moral nature, between the appetites, emotions and affections of his audience. This harmony, however, by no means forbids, but rather requires the excitement of the hearers' zeal in the discharge of duty, their joy in the contemplation of virtue, their desire to emulate the deeds of good men, their indignation against moral evil, their enthusiasm in the religious life. It is no objection to the awakening of these feelings that they diminish, for the time being, somewhat of the vigor with which the intellect applies itself to abstract truth. The intellect is not the whole of the spirit. Abstract investigation should not engross the soul. The affections are not diseased operations of the mind. They are noble parts of our nature, and lead to the most exalted achievements. Without their appropriate cultivation, the reason does not act healthily. They should, therefore, be excited by the orator, but never to that degree which may be called an irregularity in the spiritual system.

15. The Department of Topics (Topica).

The whole subject of Invention is treated by the ancient rhetoricians with great copiousness and discrimination. See Aristotle, Tézvη oncogin L. 1; Auctor ad Herennium, L. 1, 2, 3; Cicero, De Inventione, L. 1, 2; De Oratore, L. 2; Orator, c. 14, 15; Topica, and Partitiones Oratoriae, c. 1, 2, 3, 9-15. Quinctilian, Institutiones Oratoriae, L. 5. Hermogenes, IIegi evoέoeor. All the means of persuasion were reduced by the ancients to three; docere, conciliare, permovere. They were also arranged into two great divisions; first, the argumenta areɣva, inartificialia, quae foris veniunt, such as are VOL. III. No. 11.

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presented by witnesses, laws, decrees, and other external authorities; second, the argumenta evreyva, artificialia, ex ipsa re atque arte oratoria sumpta. This second class of the means of persuasion, as they derived their origin from the speaker himself, constituted, of course, the main object of rhetorical Invention. They were subdivided into three orders: first, those which were designed to prove the truth of a proposition, argumenta άñodɛizzixá, niores in the narrow sense of that word; secondly, those which were designed to conciliate the favor of the hearers toward the person of the orator and the subject of which he treated, and which were termed on, mores; and thirdly, those which made known the feelings of the speaker and excited the same affections in the hearers, and which were called náon, affectus. The argumenta αποδεικτικά were separated into the ἐπαγωγή, inductio, exemplum oratorium, and the ivvúμqua, ratiocinatio oratoria. The last was again distinguished into the argument ex verisimilibus (exoot), and the argument, e signis (onusíois); and the last-named proof from sign was subdivided into the Texμnoor, which proved the certainty of a proposition, and the oqueiov, in the narrower sense of that term, which proved the bare probability of the thing asserted.

After these arguments and motives had been classified with great preciseness, in the treatises on Invention, the sources from which the means of persuasion were derived, began to receive attention and to be arranged in a scientific order. The name Topics, was given to the methodical collection of the general ideas which might be of use in suggesting the particular arguments and motives to be employed by an orator. Topics were subdivided into, first, the loci argumentorum, the zónou "dio, which are defined by Cicero to be quasi regiones aut sedes, ex quibus argumenta promuntur, fontes argumentorum; and, secondly, the loci communes, the rónoι xooi, which were collections of such subjects of remark as were applicable to entire genera, and were derived from the loci argumentorum, the latter being immediately applicable not to the genus, but rather to particular individuals included under it. In modern writings, the word Topics has a signification still more extensive. It denotes either a connected statement of the various points of view under which every theme or class of themes may be discussed; or else a scientific statement of the general relations in which the theme stands, and of the rules pertaining to those relations and facilitating the full development of them. It is true that the preacher may be led in the

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