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1846.]

Oratorical and philosophical Explanation.

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is also used with a narrow import, to express a perception or conception of an individual object of sense, and with a wider import, to express a general notion which is proximate to, and which immediately suggests the individual object of perception or conception. Now an abstract notion is elucidated by one less abstract, or by one which is concrete in the narrow sense. It may be made palpable by mentioning some individual of the genus which it denotes. An idea of the reason may be also rendered palpable by mentioning some individual objects resembling it, especially objects within the scope of the hearers' own observation. A general proposition may be made clear by examples, as is finely illustrated in the 7th ch. of Romans, and in Catech. 6. c. 4. of Cyril of Jerusalem. A great degree of liveliness and power over the feelings, is imparted to our style by thus presenting our generalizations in sensible forms. Definite and precise statements are also important for the elucidating of general propositions. These statements are made sometimes by means of the definition, which specifies the essential characteristics of the object defined, as in Heb. 11: 1; sometimes by the exposition, which brings to light the essential, but more obscure and less prominent characteristics of the object, as in 1 Cor. 13: 4 seq.; sometimes by the distinction, which points out the differences between the object explained and other objects which are similar to it in some respects, and are often confounded with it; sometimes by the partition, which is an analysis of the object into its essential component parts; sometimes by the minute division, which technically denotes the analysis of the object into such of its subordinate parts as are important in some of its relations. There are many cases in which we may elucidate a general or abstract notion, both by one less general and abstract, and at the same time by a sensible representation. We may also explain a simple idea by stating the ideas opposed to it. This method of contrast excites attention, affixes precise limits to the ideas considered, and by clearly defining the negative, casts additional light over the positive.

In elucidating the theme of his discourse, the orator should adopt a style different from that of the philosopher. He should avoid scholastic technical phrases, and all such trains of thought as prove the decided preponderance of the intellect above the imagination, the feelings and the will. He should be easy and free in his explanatory remarks, and should select such definitions as are fitted for the special relations of his subject to the design

of his discourse, rather than such as are adapted to the general and logical relations of his subject. He should elucidate his theme in those special relations, with great copiousness, vividness and variety, yet should avoid excessive length. He should remember that he and his hearers are conducting a dialogue on a specific theme, and he should not interrupt their responses, draw their attention away from the main object of their interest, and thus retard the progress of the colloquy by thrusting cold, formal and abstruse distinctions between himself and them. Therefore, his whole soul, his imagination, feelings and will should be absorbed in his subject.

He should, in general, prefer the synthetic to the analytic method of explaining his theme. The former method descends from particulars to generals; the latter descends from generals to particulars. The former method is therefore more free, more agreeable to the natural habits of the learner's mind than the latter. The synthetic method leads the hearer from one step to another, until he forms his own idea of the whole subject; the analytic method begins with a dry definition, and thus suggests at the outset the essential truth to be developed, allays curiosity, and compels the mind to sink down from the more to the less important considerations. The former method encourages the mind to exercise its own powers, to advance from the known to the unknown; and thus both excites and prolongs the hearers' interest. It prevents confusion of thought by leading the mind from the simple to the more complex, from the contiguous to the more remote. Rising from the less to the more important, it comes nearer and nearer to the essential truth to be discussed, imparts to the hearer a feeling of rapid progress, gratifies him with continued change and novelty, and is thus peculiarly appropriate to the character of an oration, considered as a regularly advancing dialogue between the speaker and his silent yet ever active audience. Still the synthetic method, being more interesting and peculiar, is also more diffuse than the analytic, and therefore the latter is to be preferred, whenever conciseness is required. Some writers, also, are better qualified by nature and practice for the analytic method than for the synthetic, and they should not be compelled to resist the native tendencies of their minds.

It is far more necessary for the sermon than the essay, that it be written in the vividly descriptive style, that one truth be compared and contrasted with another, that the spiritual be eluci

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Conditions of the Preacher's Success.

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dated by the sensible, the inward by the outward. It is also true that external phenomena may be often advantageously illustrated by internal, events in the material world by those in the mental. There is one law pervading matter and mind, and each furnishes many symbols of the other. The will is moved by vivid ideas of the good to be attained, and therefore, especially in addressing the common people, the minister should give such visible and tangible representations of moral good, as the nature of his theme demands. In order to increase the liveliness of the description it is sometimes useful to adopt the form of a dialogue, and especially of a soliloquy. Cramer and Harms have introduced this element into their description, and thereby brought many distant scenes near to the eyes and ears of their audience. The use of the parable is also important for bringing an object into the ideal presence of hearers. Some of the allegorical illustrations in the sermons of Ephraëm Syrus (see his Paraenes. II. 21.) are very lucid, as also some in the discourses of Tzschirner and Stiller. Instead of originating a parable, it is sometimes useful to make a new application of some literal or allegorical narrative already found in the Scriptures. See eloquent applications of this kind in Gregory of Nazianzen, Opp. T. 1. p. 620. Ed. Col., Schleiermacher's Predigten, Vol. 3. S. 51 sq.

11. Various Kinds and Sources of Arguments and Motives employed in a Discourse.

The conditions of success in the pulpit are, first, that the preacher select a subject which is fitted to excite the susceptibilities of his hearers; secondly, that he unfold his subject with distinctness and precision; thirdly, that he prove the truth of his statements, and convince his hearers of the intimate connection between the duty which he enjoins and their own highest happiness; and fourthly, that he convince them of their ability to do what he requires of them. Hence it is requisite that the preacher resort to argument as well as explanation, that he demonstrate the propriety and the feasibility of the work to which he would incite the will of his hearers.1

1 Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the attempt to persuade a man to do what he believes to be impossible. Hence, the preacher should endeavor to evince the practicability of every work to which he exhorts his hearers. He may effect this object, first, by dilating on the natural capabilities of the soul created in God's image, and on the aids of the Divine Spirit which are

He must adopt some mode of convincing his audience, that the proposition of his discourse is true. The conviction of this truth may be of two kinds. It is distinct from mere opinion and conjecture, and must be either knowledge or faith. Our knowledge may be either direct or indirect. The former is the knowledge of that which we perceive by our external senses, or of which we are conscious, or which is necessarily involved in, or inseparable from our sensation or consciousness, or which we are compelled to admit immediately by the demands of our spiritual nature. Indirect knowledge is that which we acquire not immediately in sensation or consciousness, but through the intervention of some truth which is known to us intuitively, and from which we infer the truth thus indirectly learned. Faith differs from knowledge, in its relating to an object which we do not or cannot perceive by our senses or consciousness, and which is not essentially involved in the truths which we do perceive in sensation, or of which we are conscious. Faith is that belief in truths which is derived from testimony, or from the harmony of those truths with our higher nature. Thus the existence of God is a doctrine of which we have no knowledge, for it is without the sphere of our sensation and consciousness, but we have a faith in it, and have sufficient reasons for our firm unwavering confidence. Faith is called historical, when it is founded on testimony, and religious when founded on the harmony between the truth believed and vouchsafed to the good; secondly, by describing the special means and facilities which may be in the hearers' power for the specific work to which they are exhorted; by detailing the particular method in which the work may be effected; thirdly, by referring to examples which demonstrate the possibility of performing the required operation. In the celebrated Пavnyvpikóç of Isocrates, the orator attempts, first to show how dishonorable it is for the Greeks to allow the Persians to subjugate them; secondly, to prove that it is possible for the Greeks to conquer the Persians; thirdly, to arouse a feeling of indignation against the Persians; fourthly, to prove that the present circumstances of the Greeks are favorable to a combined undertaking against their aggressors; fifthly, to show that without such an undertaking, it is impossible to ameliorate the present deplorable situation of the Greeks; sixthly, to quicken the feeling of shame in the bosoms of his countrymen, that they continue to live under a treaty so unfavorable to their interests as that which by their ambassador Antalcidas they formed with the Persians; seventhly, to excite the hope that if Athens and Sparta will commence a coalition against Persia, all the other Grecian States will unite themselves in the same. Thus we see that the second, fourth and seventh, divisions of this Panegyric are occupied in setting forth the capabilities and facilities of the Greeks for making a successful resistance to the Persians. See also the first of Demosthenes' Phillipics, for a similar illustration.

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Arguments and Motives.

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the laws of our moral nature. Faith presupposes, therefore, the cultivation of all our powers and susceptibilities, moral as well as intellectual; knowledge implies the activity of the intellect alone. Our free will has far more influence on our faith than on our knowledge.

The arguments by which we are convinced of any truth are either subjective, or objective. Of the former kind are the arguments for the divine existence, which are derived from the harmony of that truth with our moral feelings. To the latter class belong the arguments for the same truth, which are derived from the contrivances of nature. Arguments may be also divided into the mathematical, which relate to the laws of number and quantity; the philosophical, which are the foundation of our direct knowledge; empirical, which are the foundation of our indirect knowledge and of our faith; the historical, which are properly a branch of the empirical, and include those arguments which are derived from testimony. The empirical reasonings comprise all the processes of induction. They also, in their widest extent, embrace those weaker arguments from analogy which often make an opinion more probable than its opposite, although they fail to give us any real knowledge of its truth.

Arguments are again divided into theoretical and practical. The former are addressed exclusively to the intellect, and are designed to produce a mere conviction in favor of the truth; the latter are addressed to the heart as well as the judgment, and are designed to secure some particular course of action. The latter are more properly termed motives, or persuasive, as distinct from convincing arguments; and as every discourse is intended for practical effect, its characteristic aim should be to present inducements to the will, more than reasons to the intellect. The great end of preaching the gospel is, to bring man into a state of harmony with himself and with the universe. Therefore should the sacred orator, if he would be successful, persuade his hearers to labor for their own highest physical, intellectual and moral good, and to discharge all their religious duties; for these secure the welfare of the body, mind and heart, and thus promote the harmonious operation of the powers which are combined in the human system. He should also persuade his hearers to labor for the corporeal, mental and religious good of their fellow-men, and to secure the symmetrical development of all their faculties and susceptibilities; and thus will every hearer be brought into a state of harmony not only with himself but with his race, and

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