several Tannahs, or police establishments, along the frontier; but no sooner was the military force removed than the Goorkhas advanced a body of their troops, attacked and killed several of the Tannahs, and by this means succeeded in re-occupying the disputed lands. It was now evident that from negotiation no satisfactory consequences could be expected, but that it was the purpose of the Goorkhas to retain by force, what they had acquired by injustice. In this posture of affairs the Governor-general lord Hastings, after a strong remonstrance, to which no attention was paid, formally declared war against the kingdom of Nepaul. To bring the war to a speedy and decisive issue, his first object was to penetrate into the mountains; and, with this view, he divided his army into four columns: that to the eastward, consisting of the troops from Dinapore, under major-general Marley, was destined to enter the hills opposite Catmandoo, and march upon that capital. At some distance to the westward, the Benares division, under major-general Sullivan Wood, was instructed to occupy Bootwal, and to co-operate from that side with major-general Marley. Upon the banks of the Suttledge, the western extremity of the British line of operations, the division under major-general Ochtrelony was opposed to the Goorkha army under Amer Sing, their principal general. Major-general Gillespie was ordered to enter the Doon, and to possess himself of Kalunga; to secure the passes of the rivers in that district, and prevent the retreat of Amer Sing when pressed by major-general Ochterlony. The effect of this extensive plan of operations was to weaken the enemy's line in every part by compelling him to occupy a most extensive front, and to render him uncertain of the precise point where the passes of the mountains would be forced; while the success of any one of the columns penetrating into the mountains, by turning the enemy's defences, would insure the issue of the whole campaign. The plan, therefore, was well contrived to bring the war to a prompt decision; but its commencement was not signalized by immediate success. The columns under generals Marley and Wood, which were destined to act against Catmandoo, experienced some difficulties in their march under the hills, which delayed their operations; nevertheless, by drawing large bodies of the enemy to that quarter, they weakened the defences in other parts. The division under major-general Gi le pie entered the hills as had been designed, and attacked the fortress of Kalunga, which he attempted to storm; but the determined resistance of the enemy, and it is supposed some misconception of orders, baffled the efforts of the troops, and, after an obstinate conflict, they were repulsed with considerable loss. The major-general, in a renewed effort to carry the place, headed himself the storming party, and, while cheering on his men to the attack, fell at the foot of the breach, covered with wounds, and lamented by the whole army. The assault failed in consequence, and the troops were withdrawn. But here as in the case of generals Wood and Marley, although the operations were not successful, yet by the diversion which they caused, they essentially contributed to the result which was preparing in the west. In that quarter major-general Ochterlony was advancing, and, to aid his exertions more effectually, lord Hastings, who was himself at this time in the northern parts of Hindostan, directed another column to be formed, of which he gave the command to colonel Nicholls, with orders to enter the province of Kemaon, one of the western districts of the Goorkhas, which his lordship conceived might be occupied while the attention of the enemy was engaged in opposing the other divisions. Colonel Nicholls passed through the mountains without loss, engaged the

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Goorkha army under Husti Dhal, one of the Rajah's uncles, and completely defeated it, Husti Dhal himself being killed in the action. He next at tacked the advanced positions of the Goorkhas before Almora, and carried them by assault. He then opened his batteries upon the fort of Almora, which capitulated; and in the course of ten days the province of Kemaon was completely reduced, and occupied by the British troops. This operation was decisive of the campaign; for Amer Sing, commanding the principal corps of the enemy on the Suttledge, being repulsed in some attempts which he made upon major-general Ochterlony, and severely pressed by the movements of that officer, found his retreat intercepted by Colonel Nicholls' occupation of Kemaon, and in consequence proposed the surrender of his army to major-general Ochterlony, upon terms which were acceded to.

Thus the whole of the Goorkha country, from the banks of the Suttledge to the Gogra, was occupied by the British army; and the positions from which it was now enabled to prosecute the war rendered the conquest of the remaining part of the country certain. Under these circumstances the Rajah of Nepaul sent deputies to offer his submission, and to solicit peace. A treaty was accordingly framed, the terms of which, while they left the Rajah an independent sovereign, effectually secured the British against any future danger from that quarter. By these terms the whole of the Terraya, which had been the source of so much dispute and the immediate cause of the war, was to be ceded to the British government, with the exception of the district of Morung, which was humanely left to the Goorkhas, on account of the urgent want of some lowland pasture for their cattle. The province of Kemaon was to be given up, and united in perpetuity to the company's dominions, and the country upon the Jumna, to the west of Kemaon, to be restored to the several chiefs from whom it had been conquered by the Goorkhas. The fortress of Nagri, and a certain extent of territory to the eastward, were to be assigned to the Rajah of Sikhim, the chief of a nation partly Hindoos and partly Tartars. This treaty was signed by the Rajah's deputies, and the ratifications were to be exchanged within a certain period; but the Rajah, with the ordinary policy of Indian courts, interposed delays, and finally refused to sign the ratification, in the hope that the approach of the rains would oblige the British to desist from their operations. This act of perfidy rendered another campaign necessary. Accordingly, during the interval of the rains, preparations were made for the conquest of the country; and as the British had retained military possession of Kemaon and all the western provinces, as far as to the Suttledge, the scale of operations was now reduced within narrow limits, and the success certain. The chief command of the army in this second campaign was given to Sir David Ochterlony, who was to advance by Muckwanpore to the capital, Catmandoo. As soon as the season admitted, Sir David commenced his operations, and encountered the enemy at Muckwanpore. At this place they made a vigorous stand, and fought with great courage, but, after a sharp contest, they were completely defeated with considerable loss, and a march to the capital was secured. Deputies now arrived for the second time from the Rajah, supplicating any terms of peace that would leave him but a sovereign. It was in the power of the British to have acquired the country for themselves, or to have disposed of it in any other way that they might have thought expedient. But the governor-general was satisfied with the terms of the former treaty, as fully answering all the objects for which he had gone to war, which the Rajah now gladly and speedily ratified.

Γ

Pindarry War.] The next important political measure which employed the attention of lord Hastings, was the extermination of a roving band of marauders, who, under the denomination of Pindarries, ravaged Central India and the adjoining British provinces. They consisted of about 30,000 cavalry, subject to no regular discipline, and having, in fact, no national existence. Their origin and existence as a body is ascribed to the Mahrattas, to whom they were convenient auxiliaries, and upon whose chiefs they considered themselves dependent. To conduct a war against a class of marauders like these, according to the conventional system established among civilized nations, would have been ineffectual. Their rapid motions, and loose organization, mocked the operations of ordinary warfare; but their dispersion was indispensable to the general welfare of Hindostan. From the very looseness of their composition, they became a nucleus to attract whatever was floating and unattached in the community, and always presented a mass of materials, which an able and popular leader might convert either to the destruction of others, or to his own aggrandizement. The insolence of the Pindarries, proceeding from causes which will pre sently appear, grew to such a height in 1816, that they invaded the British territories in the presidency of Madras, laid waste the country, and burned some villages. The British army, in the course of the year, came in contact with the marauding parties of Cheettoo, the principal Pindarry chieftain, who had fixed his cantonments amid the rugged hills and wild forests which lie between the northern bank of the Nerbuddah and the Vindhya range. He quitted these fastnesses, and the following year, when the British armies entered Central India, he was closely pursued to Aggur and Mewar. On the approach of a British detachment he fled, and returned by a wide circuit to his old strong-post. Here he had no resting-place. His main body was attacked and routed, and his divided followers were pursued by detachments of British troops, until their spirit was so broken, that they became the prey of the petty Rajpoot chiefs and village-officers, who eagerly retaliated the treatment they had so long endured from these ruthless plunderers. The other Pindarry chiefs and their followers were pursued with equal diligence by detachments of the British army. Surrounded, and driven, as if into a net, by the converging forces of the British presidencies, repelled from the frontiers of Sindea and Holkar by the events of the Mahratta war, and cut off from their accustomed retreat across the Nerbuddah into the territories of the Peishwa, or the Bhoosla, one of their main bodies at length fell in with a British corps near Gungraur, and were so completely routed, that they implored the nabob of Bhopal to become their intercessor with the British government. Thus terminated the Pindarry war; and we have described it separately (so far as it was expedient to describe a war carried on against independent bands, and by distinct detachments), although it was implicated with a contest of far greater magnitude and importance.

Mahratta War.] When the outrages before referred to provoked the governor-general to prepare for the course he pursued, information reached him that any hostile measures against the Pindarries would involve him in a war with certain great powers, especially with Sindea and Holkar, the most powerful chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy. This induced him to open a negotiation with these two powers; and a treaty of alliance was accordingly signed in November, 1817, by which Sindea engaged to combine his efforts with those of the British government in suppressing the predatory system, and restoring the general tranquillity of the country.

A similar policy was employed with respect to Ameer Rhan, a Patan adventurer, who, profiting by the distractions of the country, obtained a territory, and established himself as an independent chief. His band of plunderers was dispersed; and their chief received a liberal provision, when Sir David Ochterlony advanced into Rajpootana, to co-operate in the general suppression of the predatory system. The treaty was signed at Delhi, the 9th November. The adverse factions which in the year 1816 existed at the court of the Bhoosla dynasty of the Mahrattas, afforded a favourable opportunity for negotiating a treaty with the rajah of Nagpore, which was finally executed on the 27th May, between the British government and Moodhagee Bhoosla (Appa Saheb), who exercised the functions of the government in behalf of the Maha Raja, Pursajee Bhoosla. The accomplishment of this measure, it was expected, would not only afford great advantages in the Pindarry war, but have the effect of detaching the Bhoosla for ever from the other members of the Mahratta confederation. The hostile demonstrations which had been manifested by Bajeerow, the Peishwa, and especially his evident connivance at the conduct of one of his commanders, named Trimbukjee, who openly resisted the British, and committed many acts of violence, gave rise to certain precautionary measures, which produced, in June, 1817, after a long and troublesome negotiation, a treaty, recognizing, on the part of that prince, some important concessions, by one of which Bajeerow divested himself of the character of supreme head of the Mahratta empire. It also provided for the settlement of all those points which had been the subject of acrimonious disputes at the Poonah durbar, and for defence, as far as possible, against the continuance of the prince's treachery.

Whilst these various arrangements were completing, or in progress towards completion, lord Hastings prepared his general plan of operations for the campaign, avowedly directed against the Pindarries, but so arranged as to meet the exigencies of any unexpected emergency. This plan embraced the whole circle of the reserved possessions of Sindea and Holkar, including, likewise, a great part of Rajpootana. Within these limits, it was the intention of his lordship, if possible, wholly to confine the campaign, by surrounding them with a cordon of efficient corps, which should converge simultaneously towards a common centre. The points at which the several corps were ordered to collect, were Kalingur, in Bundlecund, some point on the Jumna, midway between Calpee and Etawa, Agra, and Rewaree. The two corps of observation were to be stationed, one about Rewa, to the S. of Mirzapore and Benares, and the other further eastward, in the southern extremity of Bahar. On the side of the Deccan, his lordship expected to have in the field at least four substantive corps and a reserve, each of strength enough to act independently. In Guzerat, a corps was also to be formed, to penetrate in a north-easterly direction, and complete the cordon of the intended area of operations. It was the design of marquis Hastings to assume the personal direction of the different movements, and to fix his head-quarters with the centre division of the Bengal army, appointed to rendezvous between Calpee and Etawa; and it was deemed necessary, with a view to ensure a due consistency of action on the side of the Deccan, to request the commander-in-chief of the Madras presidency (Sir Thomas Hislop,) to take the personal command of the troops between the Nerbuddah and the Kishna, and to regulate the disposition of the forces to be there collected, so as to fall in with his lordship's projects on the side of Hindostan.

Under the mask of treaties, assurances of friendship, and apparent cooperation towards the scheme which then chiefly engaged the governorgeneral's attention, the Mahratta powers concerted a deep-laid conspiracy for overthrowing the British dominion in India. The scheme was first

revealed at Poonah, on the 5th November, 1817, the very day on which the treaty with Sindea was signed. The peishwa having commenced hostilities against the subsidiary force stationed in his capital, seized upon two Englishmen, peaceably travelling with a small escort, and hanged them. The rajah of Nagpore governed himself according to the behaviour of his prince, now making preparations for war, now assuming an appearance of cordial friendship towards the British, as the peishwa's designs became more or less apparent; until the news of the insurrection at Poonah, and the arrival of a khilat (or dress of honour), from Bajeerow, determined him upon that course which, if either his honour or his interest had been consulted, would have been avoided by him. An attack was commenced upon the Residency, and, after a severe engagement, the Nagpore troops were defeated. The movements of Holkar's army, and the character and circumstances of the court of Indore, left little doubt that this branch of the Mahratta power would shortly discover a participation in the general plot. Ameer-Khan, though he had treated, had not ratified his engagements; waiting artfully until he could calculate the result of the approaching conflict. The neutrality of Sindea was insecure, and exposed to a thousand risks, from the continual solicitations and taunts with which that

prince was assailed. In fact, the only one of the Mahratta allies who strictly preserved his fidelity with the British government was the Guickwar. A war was now commenced upon a scale before which the dimensions of a European campaign shrink in comparison. The punishment of a petty band of freebooters had convulsed the continent, and every native power was upon the watch to profit by any miscarriage or misfortune of the British army, which had moreover to protect a frontier of not less than 2,500 miles in extent. That the fortitude both of the troops and their noble commander might be subjected to every possible test, the army was visited at this momentous juncture by an epidemic disorder, denominated cholera morbus, but resembling that malady only in some of its principal features. It had been first observed about the middle of the rainy season of 1817, at Jessore, in the Delta of the Ganges, along whose banks and those of its tributary streams it spread its fatal course, comprehending the city of Calcutta in its ravages. For about ten days the camp was converted into an hospital; the deaths amounting to a tenth of the number collected. Europeans were attacked less frequently, but more dangerously, than natives. As the army advanced, in hopes of reaching a purer air, each day's route was strewed with dead and dying. Those who fell down on the road could not be removed, through the impossibility of finding adequate means of transport. The malady had happily expended its virulence, when the movement of the Pindarries towards Gwalior, at the end of the month, threatened to demand the active exertions of the marquis and his division in the field. The fate of Bajeerow was soon brought to a crisis. The march of the fourth division of the army, in less than a fortnight, drove that chief from Poonah, placed the British standard upon the peishwa's palace, and brought the resources of a populous city into action for the furtherance of the campaign against him.

The defection of the Bhoosla did not remain long unpunished. Troops poured into Nagpore from all quarters; and although no country could be