to this superstitious inhumanity, fresh rigours were inflicted upon the unfortunate prisoners.

At length the great Bandoolah commenced his march towards Rangoon. He fixed his camp at Denoobew, where he concentrated his forces, and added daily to their numbers. On the 4th of October, a brigade of sepoys, with some native infantry, and field-pieces, assailed several of the enemy's breastworks which they obliged their occupants to evacuate. The prisoners informed the English commander, Colonel Smith, that a fortified pagoda at Kykloo, had recently been garrisoned by the Chud Woon and the Rayhoon of Rangoon. He accordingly hastened thither, and made an attempt to storm the place; but the sepoys, not being accompanied by European troops, showed themselves irresolute, and remained stationary, under a heavy fire from the garrison.

Finding that his attempt had miscarried, Colonel Smith ordered a retreat, about a hundred men being numbered among the killed and wounded. This slight advantage elated the Burmese beyond measure, and the intelligence of what they termed their victory being transmitted to Ummerapoora, the authorities ordered that a salute of cannon should celebrate the successes

of the golden monarch's arms. Their rejoicings proved somewhat premature; for a force under Major Evans. arriving afterwards, drove the enemy from their works, and fully retrieved the disgrace of the sepoys.

The recent occupation of Tenasserim proved of the greatest importance, the air being uncommonly salubrious, and the climate peculiarly suited to Europeans. Hence it became the sanatorium of the army, while the districts of Mergui and Tavoi furnished the British with ample supplies of cattle and grain. The seizure, however, of a territory that had been wrested by the Burmans from the Siamese, rendered the latter people somewhat inimically disposed; the more especially, as

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ADVANCE OF THE BANDOOLAH.

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the emissaries, despatched to Bankok by the Court of Ava, used every possible mode of persuasion to draw their former opponents into a close alliance against England. The capture of Martaban, however, a place of some note, situated on the Burmese frontier, opened the eyes of the Siamese to the power of the English, and induced them to preserve the strictest neutrality.

Towards the end of November, 1824, the Maha Bandoolah, having abandoned his position at Denoobew, marched at the head of about 60,000 men, towards the Golden Dagon. His advance had been made with the greatest possible rapidity and secresy, the leading columns of his vanguard being the first heralds of his approach. Fortunately, the English were already in some measure prepared for this sudden attack, General Campbell having, during the last few weeks, anticipated a hostile movement on the part of the Burmese. The first post assailed was that at Kemandine, where the ships and gunboats in the river supported the operations of the land forces. The thunder of the artillery, the yells of the enemy, and the cheers of the British seamen, reached the ears of the main body at the pagoda, from whom a dense cloud of smoke concealed for a long time the scene of action. At length, the mist of battle dissolving, the English beheld their vessels in their old position, with their ensigns still floating proudly from the mast-head.

In a short time, the Burmans were seen moving across the plain of Dalla, in the direction of Rangoon. They advanced to all appearance with regularity and order, the gilt umbrellas of their leaders glittering in the sunshine, and the whole army presenting a splendid military spectacle, as their columns pressed forward to take up their position immediately opposite Rangoon. Almost simultaneously, another large body emerged from the forest, and formed their front to the east of the great pagoda. The subsequent proceedings are

thus graphically described by Colonel Snodgrass, the able historian of the Burmese war :

"The centre, or the continuation of the line from the great pagoda up to Kemandine, where it again rested on the river, was posted in so thick a forest as to defy all conjecture as to its strength or situation. In the course of a few hours we thus found ourselves completely surrounded, with the narrow channel of the Rangoon river alone unoccupied in our rear, and with only the limited space within our lines, which we could still call our own. The line of circumvallation taken up by the enemy obviously extended a very considerable distance, and, divided as it was by the river, injudiciously weakened his means of assailing us on any particular point; but as far as celerity, order and regularity are concerned, the style in which the different corps took up their stations in the line, reflected much credit on the arrangement of the Burmese commander.

"When this singular and presumptuous formation was completed, the soldiers of the left columns, also laying aside their spears and muskets, commenced operations with their intrenching tools, with such activity and good-will, that in the course of a couple of hours, their line had wholly disappeared, and could only be traced by a parapet of new earth, gradually increasing in height, and assuming such forms as the skill and science of the engineers suggested. The moving masses which had so very lately attracted our anxious attention, had sunk into the ground; and to any one who had not witnessed the whole scene, the existence of these subterranean legions would not have been credited: the occasional movement of a chief with his gilt chattate (umbrella) from place to place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant observer, the hills covered with mounds of earth, would have been taken for anything rather than the approaches of an attacking

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THE BURMESE TRENCHES.

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army; but to us who had watched the whole strange proceeding it seemed the work of magic or enchantment.

"The Burman trenches were found on examination to consist merely of a succession of holes, each capable of containing two men, and excavated so as to afford shelter both from the weather and the fire of an enemy; even a shell lighting in the trench could at most kill but two men. As it is not the Burmese system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel for its inmates; and under the excavated bank, a bed of straw or brushwood was prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When one line of trench is completed, its occupiers, taking advantage of the night, push forward to where the second line is to be opened, their places being immediately taken up by fresh troops from the rear, and so on progressively, the number of trenches occupied varying, according to the force of the besiegers, to the plans of the general, or to the nature of the ground."

The commander-in-chief, wishing to ascertain precisely the movements of the enemy, ordered Major Sale with the 13th Light Infantry to attack their trenches. The Burmese being taken by surprise, fought at a disadvantage, but although they eventually sustained a severe loss, they defended their position with couragé and skill. The victors destroyed all the implements of fortification that they could find, and pursued the Burmese to the entrance of the forest; but the officers held back their men from penetrating into its dangerous

recesses.

In the meantime, the Burmese war-boats on the river made desperate efforts to break through the British flotilla, lying before Kemandine, with the intention of occupying, finally, the port of Rangoon. Their attacks having been repelled in every instance, they at last attempted to force a passage by means of fire-rafts.

These destructive machines measured about 100 feet in length, being composed of strong bamboos. Rows of earthen jars, containing petroleum or earth-oil with cotton, gunpowder, and other inflammable materials, had been placed in different parts, and the combustibles being ignited, the rafts were sent down the river, when the ebb tide began to flow; the Burmese expecting they would inflict serious injury on the English vessels, or at least drive them from their anchorage. The sailors, however, succeeded in averting the anticipated peril, by conducting the flaming masses past the ships, which thus were enabled to maintain their position in perfect security.

On the 5th of December, the enemy's left wing emerged from their defences, and presented themselves on the open plain, thus affording the English a favourable opportunity for attacking them. The advantage was not neglected; two columns immediately pressed forward, under Major Sale and Major Walker; while a squadron of gun-boats, commanded by Captain Chads, ascended the river, and menaced the rear divisions of the Burmese. After a sharp conflict, the British troops proved victorious, the enemy sustaining a greater loss in this action than they had ever experienced before.

A final attack by the Burmese on the 7th, proved still more disastrous for them, and the Bandoolah, who had formerly promised to bring the governor-general in chains to Ava, now found himself obliged to concentrate at Kokien, four miles distant from the Shoo Dagon, the miserable remains of his shattered forces. The diminution in their numbers was said to be immense; but as some reinforcements arrived soon after, the Burman commander resolved to endeavour by one last effort to retrieve his tarnished honour.

Recent events, however, suggested caution rather than impetuosity, and the Bandoolah seemed disposed to trust more to the force of his stockades, than to the valour of