ness, if he could devise no other system by which to govern his creatures, and give them a relish for happiness, but such a one as involves so much temporary suffering of all mankind. If eternal misery, as a part of God's system of moral government, proves him greatly deficient in wisdom, certainly the temporary sufferings of all his creatures, as a necessary part of his moral government, proves him some deficient in wisdom. And a perfectly wise God could no more be deficient in the one case than in the other. Again, it is objected to the doctrine of endless misery, "Would not that God, who is infinitely powerful and good, if he foresaw (as he must, unless he was imperfect in knowledge) that the introduction of sin would be attended with endless consequences of misery to some of his creatures, have prevented the introduction of sin into the world? Surely he had power to prevent it; why did he suffer it?" And on the same principles we ask, Would not that same God have prevented sin, if he had foreseen (as he must, or be imperfect in knowledge) that it would have involved his creatures in so much suffering and pain, and that it would occasion so much confusion and disorder in the world? Surely he had power to prevent it. Why did he suffer it? Does it make him any the less an imperfect God in the one case than in the other? But in reply to this we are told, "If sin had not been introduced, we never should

have seen the perfections of God displayed in the plan of redemption." With the same propriety it may be said, if God had not suffered free agents to transgress, he never could have displayed his character as a moral Governor, his faithfulness in performing his promise, his justice in punishing men,-his goodness in rewarding obedience. And if it was not derogatory to the character of God, to suffer that to take place, which involved so much temporary misery and disorder, because it gave him an opportunity of displaying his perfections in the plan of salvation, so neither is it derogatory to the character of God, to suffer that to take place, which will undoubtedly involve the endless misery of some, because it gives him an opportunity of displaying his perfections, as the moral Governor of the world. "But God," it is urged, "will permit no more suffering and seeming disorder in this world, than he will overrule for the general good. They shall all 'work out a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.' The individual suffering here shall promote the general happiness of all hereafter." So neither will God permit or inflict any more suffering, in case of the endless misery of some, than he will overrule for the general good of the universe. And none can prove that the general good of the universe does not require that endless misery should be a part of God's system of moral government. Till that is done, no ra

tional objection can lie against the doctrine. "But I cannot see how the punishment of some souls eternally, can be required by God's system of government." Your seeing or not seeing has nothing to do with the argument. Neither could you have seen how any misery would be connected with God's system of government, if matter of fact had not proved that it was so. If you do not believe, because you cannot see why it should be so, you should be consistent with yourself, and believe nothing till you could ac count for it. You should believe nothing till you could comprehend the Almighty, and understand all that his wisdom can devise; —that is, you should not believe in God, nor in any of his works, till you yourself have become a god. The sum is, If it was necessary that sin, though it involved so much evil as we know exists, should be suffered, because it was the only way in which such a display of God's perfections could be made as was made, in the plan of redemption, so it may be necessary that sin, though it involves the eternal misery of some, should be suffered to be, because God saw it was the best way in which he could display his perfections, as the moral Governor of the universe. In the same way it might be shown, as will be seen in some subsequent objection, that the argument which Universalists draw, from the circumstance that endless punishment is abhorrent to their feelings, and that

God will not inflict it, lies equally against the sufferings of this world, and against matter of fact, and therefore it cannot be sound. The fact is, on this subject, as on all others, feelings, opinions, theories à priori, must all yield to matter of fact, and to actual experience; and with the candid and intelligent it is only necessary to show, that any argument, on which they rely to support any system, if pushed out into its legitimate consequences, would contradict what we know to be true, and they will immediately relinquish it. Men have become too intelligent to be syllogized out of their senses. The spirit of the present-age will not permit it. When the philosophy and divinity of the schools were in vigour,-when metaphysical reasonings had the precedence of the senses, such arguments might have weight. But, happy for us, and fortunate for the cause of truth, those days have gone by. We have only to say, Such things are, and all objections must cease. The assertion of what is, is truth; that which denies or contradicts what is, is falsehood,

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OBJECTION III.

UNIVERSALISM makes God cruel, unjust, and false to his creatures.

It may be a matter of surprise, that we object that to Universalism, which it brings as an objection to our system; for Universalists profess to have found out a system which alone frees the Divine character from cruelty and injustice. But let the candid judge whether our charge is not supported.

Universalism is founded upon predestination. It is a fact which, it is presumed, will not be denied, that most of the Universalists through our country are fatalists; and those who are not, are evidently ignorant of their system. To believe in the final salvation of all men, and not believe in predestination and irresistible grace, is an inconsistency, which few men of sense and thought have long persisted in. Hence many, who when they first embraced the doctrine of universal salvation, were Arminians as to human agency and the work of grace upon the heart, have either given up Universalism, or einbraced predestination. The more general motto now is, "Whatever is, is right." Every thing is according to the will of God. And laying these premises, they go on to prove their doctrine logically, thus:

A merciful God will never punish his creatures eternally, for unavoidable acts.