to the examination of the public, and if it will bear the test, we will all become Universalists. But till then, thinking men, candid men, and men who love the truth, and dig after it as for hid treasures, will not embrace the doctrine. But so long as Universalists are afraid to define their system, lest, as Mr. Ballou says, they should meet with disagreeable consequences, their system will be deservedly suspected. Truth is afraid of nothing: it dares face a world; but a system that shows itself so partially and fearfully; that builds itself up more by pulling down others than by establishing any thing of its own, that puts on so many turnings and windings as it partially presents itself to view, is so much like error, if it is not error itself, that we fear to confide in it.

It is worthy of notice too, that as this diversity and confusion on the subject does not make them fall out with the system itself, só neither, in the general, does it make them fall out with each other. It is true there is of late a little stir in the camp of Universalism, and some of the Restorationists begin to oppose the modern school of Universalists. This is an encouraging symptom. It is encouraging to its opposers; for we believe if Universalists once begin to examine their own ground, and probe each other's views, anti-Universalists will have little to do. And this too is the only ground on which Universalists themselves, if their system be true, can

hope to succeed. For though their numbers have been increased from the causes already shown, yet it is not in the nature of things that so crude and indigested and multiform a system as Universalism now is, can long keep itself in countenance before an intelli`gent public. If it is all erroneous, the heterogeneous mass cannot long cohere; and if it has any of the precious metal of truth about it, it cannot pass as current coin until it has purged itself from the dross, and has put on the distinct and pure form of the currency of truth. We hope, therefore, Universalists will look about themselves, and purify their own system, if they can. At present, they have done but little in this way. When they have accomplished this work, it is believed there will be but little left of Universalism. And this is evidently what Universalists fear. Therefore, they use every means to prevent a rupture among themselves. Fatalists, Freewillers, Unitarians. Trinitarians, the followers of Winchester and of Ballou, Deists, New Harmonists, all unite in associations and in societies, in settling ministers and supporting periodicals, and all is well, if they can only agree in the main point, as Mr. B. calls it. The impenitent multitude throng after them, and seem to say, Only tell us we shall all get to heaven, -only assure us there is no danger of that eternal fire, which we have been taught to dread, and to expect, and prove it by saying many

hard things and shrewd things against the partial sects, and by talking much, in general terms, about the love of God; and for the rest, you may point out many ways, different ways, or new ways,-it is all the same to us. This is the practical language of Universalists. And it is evidently the fruit, not of Christian love, but of an indifference to truth, and a determination to adhere to a favourite proposition, by supporting it, if they can, or without support, if they must.

OBJECTION II.

UNIVERSALISM is supported by arguments which prove too much for the system, and which, when pursued, run into absurdities, and contradict matter of fact.

We have already seen that Universalism supports itself principally by attacking others, and by intrenching itself behind negative propositions. It sometimes, however, ventures upon assertions; but these assertions are so framed, as to take the form of objections to other systems. And since this is the chosen weapon to carry on the controversy, it becomes the advocates of truth to array themselves in the same armour. For in this way alone can the arguments on each side have their proper, comparative weight. If this is a wise method of contending for the truth, we shall have the honour of answering wise men according to their wisdom; if otherwise,

we shall obey Solomon, who directs to answer a fool according to his folly." If the objections made to the doctrine of eternal punishment, when they have their full weight, contradict matter of fact; or if they lie with equal weight against the doctrine which they are supposed to support, it must follow of necessity, that these objections are too objectionable to be of any service to the cause of Universalism, and too futile to be of any weight against the doctrine of endless misery. "This doctrine," it is said, "is derogatory to the character of God." Wherein? Why it proves, either that God is unable to save all mankind, or he is not willing! If you say he is able, and not willing, you impeach his goodness; if you say he is willing, but not able, you deny his omnipotence." This argument lies equally strong against limited punishment hereafter, and even against suffering in this world. The sufferings of this life are proverbial. All ages and classes of beings are exposed to sufferings of mind and of body, of the most severe kinds, which finally terminate in death. Now, either God is unable to prevent these sufferings, or he is unwilling. If you say he is unable, you deny his omnipotence; or if you acknowledge his power, and yet say he is unwilling, you impeach his goodness. But it is replied, "There is more propriety in temporary suffering than in eternal misery Not if temporary suffering is unnecessary.

יין

If eternal

punishment is necessary, there is a propriety in it, and not otherwise; and if temporary punishment is unnecessary, there is no man of common sense and candour that would say there is the least propriety in it. And if you can conceive of God being guilty of a small impropriety, in punishing men so severely in this world, I can as readily conceive that the same defective God may be guilty of a great impropriety, and punish them eternally. A perfect. God can no more conduct improperly in one case than in another. "True, but temporary suffering is necessary, in order that man may know how to prize and enjoy happiness. For much of our relish of happiness is by comparing it with pain, with which we have been experimentally acquainted." And can God give us this relish for happiness in no other way? Must there be some pain, in order that there may be a good deal of happiness? Must there be some suffering, that heaven may be the sweeter!-Give me that argument, and it is all I want to do away your objection to endless misery. "But," it is replied, "God must certainly be deficient in wisdom, if not in power and goodness, if he could devise no other system by which to govern his creatures, and make heaven glorious, than one that involves the eternal misery of a part of mankind." And we in our turn beg leave to say, on the same principles God is certainly deficient in wisdom, if not in power and good