of Hebraic derivation, we might, in the abstract, fairly conjecture the grammatical possibility of the word's bearing the yet additional sense of punishment on account of sin.

But, while I readily allow these matters, I am constrained to say, that, as yet, I have seen no PROOF that the word Chattath actually does bear this third signification. Instead of PROOF, Mr. Davison, so far as I can find, has given us nothing save ETYMOLOGICAL CONjecture.

Yet the point, I take it, is not, what, on the acknowledged principle of Hebraic ideality, the word abstractedly may be thought CAPABLE of meaning but the point is, what, in well-ascertained usage, it actually DOES mean.

In other words, it is not enough for Mr. Davison to shew, that speculatively and conjecturally, on the principle of Hebraic ideality, the word MAY BE THOUGHT CAPABLE of denoting punishment for sin: he must further shew, by absolute proof, that the word, as employed in scripture, ACTUALLY DOES bear such a sense.

II. Now, so far as I can see, the only mode, in which this necessary matter can be accomplished, is by the production of a passage, in which the word Chattath MUST denote punishment for sin, and CANNOT denote either sin or sinoffering..

Such, if I mistake not, is the rational and satisfactory process, by which that word is absolutely DEMONSTRATED to signify, not only sin, but also an offering for sin.

In the Hebrew scriptures, we read of the blood of a Chattath*: in the same scriptures, we find it asserted, that a sacrificed bullock is a Chattath↑ : in the same scriptures again, we find the priest laying his hand upon the head of the Chattath‡ and, still in the same scriptures, we have it asserted, that a Chattath may be eaten §. Now, that the word Chattath primarily denotes sin, all are agreed. But it is quite clear, that sin has no blood, that sin is not a sacrificed bullock, that sin is non a material substance upon which a priest can lay his hand, that sin is not a thing which is capable of being eaten. Therefore, when the word Chattath is thus constructed, it clearly CANNOT denote sin. What then, under such construction, does it denote? Evidently it denotes a sin-offering: for, in truth, the word is utterly INCAPABLE of any other translation. Hence, by a perfectly legitimate and intelligible process, we demonstrate, that the word Chattath, which primarily denotes sin, MUST secondarily denote a sin-offering.

* Exod. xxx. 13.

† Exod. xxix. 14.

Levit. iv. 29. § Levit. x. 17.

Now, to the same practically rational process, for the purpose of eliciting the sense of punishment for sin, let Mr. Davison subject this identical word Chattath: and let him try, whether, by such a process, he can bring out a satisfactory result. From the entire volume of the Hebrew scriptures, let him produce even a single passage, in which the word so MUST OF NECESSITY be translated a punishment for sin, that it is clearly INCAPABLE of any other translation. Let him do this; and I will then allow, that he has fully established his point: let him do this; and I will then allow, that he has effectually neutralised the litigated text in the book of Genesis. But, until this palmary matter shall have been accomplished, I must continue to think, that he has given us INGENIOUS CONJECTURE instead of SOLID PROOF: I must continue to think, that his proposed version of the text in question rests only upon the insecure basis of UNAUTHORISED SPECULATION *.

* Perhaps it may not be improper to remark, that, as the word Chattath primarily denotes sin, while it secondarily denotes a sin-offering; so the ancient Greek translators occasionally view it, as bearing the yet additional sense of purification. See Numb. viii. 7. xix. 9.

In this interpretation they have been followed by the authors of our common English version.

But such a rendering will afford no benefit to the cause

III. To produce authority for his proposed version, Mr. Davison, no doubt, has made an attempt: but, in this attempt, I scruple not to say, that he has completely failed. He has NOT proved, that the word Chattath ever denotes, in actual use, a punishment for sin: and, if he should hereafter be able to produce a text to that effect, it will be my misfortune, in the present stage of the discussion, to have totally overlooked it.

Mr. Davison's attempt to establish his version by authority is two-fold: he appeals to the Septuagint; and he produces what he requires us to receive as actual examples.

1. With respect to his appeal to the Septuagint, the whole, that he brings forward in regard to certain Greek phrases as renderings of the

of Mr. Davison: for it evidently springs out of the word Chattath's secondary sense of a sin-offering; nor has it the slightest connexion with his proposed hypothetical idea of sin-punishment. To trace the process of the notion, from sin-offering to purification, is no way difficult. When a sin-offering had been devoted on behalf of the congregation, its result was purification through the medium of expiation.

I have thought it right to notice this rendering of the Seventy but, after all, even in the two passages referred to, there is no absolute necessity to translate the word in the involved sense of purification; it may just as well be rendered sin-offering. Certainly, it cannot be rendered sin-punishment.

word Chattath, proves nothing whatsoever to his purpose.

His evidence of this description shews, what I presume no person ever thought of denying, that, in point of etymological ideality, the secondary sense of Chattath is something for sin: whence, obviously, the word comes to signify a sin-offering: but it does not shew, that the word was ever USED to denote, or that it was ever THOUGHT to denote, a punishment for sin. As I have already observed, the question is not, what the word, in point of etymological ideality, MIGHT BE CONJECTURALLY GUESSED TO MEAN: but the question is, what, in absolute use or in naked matter of fact, it IS ACTUALLY EMPLOYED to denote.

Now this vital matter is not, in the slightest degree, determined by Mr. Davison's Appeal to the Septuagint. That version proves indeed, what we all knew, that, in point of ideality or in respect to the train of thought which influences the process of Hebrew derivation, the secondary sense of Chattath is something for sin: but it does not prove, that, in matter of fact or in actual use, the word was ever EMPLOYED to denote a punishment for sin.

2. In his production of alleged examples, Mr. Davison does not strike me as more felicitous than in his reference to the Septuagint.