pressure on the Government became too strong to be resisted. Secretary Salmon P. Chase was the champion in the cabinet of the intense feeling in the North for a prompt and vigorous campaign. Public sentiment became irresistible, and in response to it, the army advanced, about 35,000 strong. The Confederates had at their command about 30,000 men. Patterson was directed to prevent Johnston's army from going to the rescue of their comrades at Bull Run, a task which he did not succeed in doing. On the 18th of July the Union advance found a Confederate force at Blackburn's ford, on Bull Run, and after a sharp conflict the Federals fell back to Centreville. On the 21st they resumed their march, and fought the Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas Junction. The conflict opened at about 10:30 in the morning. McDowell bore heavily on the enemy's left, hoping to drive it from the stone bridge, to make himself master of Manassas Gap, and to prevent the junction of Johnston's reinforcements. He did not know that 8,000 of Johnston's men had arrived the day before. By three o'clock the enemy had been driven back some distance, when the remaining brigade of Johnston's army, under the immediate command of Gen. Kirby Smith, arrived by rail. Cheer after cheer burst from the Confederate forces as their fresh ranks rushed to the front. The Union columns broke, rushed down the hillside, and all efforts to re-form them were of no avail: the retreat was continued in confusion to Washington. The three-months men, whose term of enlistment had expired, went home. A shadow of gloom was

cast upon the North; the spirit of triumph and confidence upon the South.

The Confederates did not attempt an active pursuit. Their army was much demoralized, not in a condition to engage in a campaign against the defenses at Washington. The Confederates lost about 2,000 killed and wounded, while the Union loss was about 3,000, many of whom were prisoners. The disaster taught the lesson so many in the North needed to know-that the war would be long, bloody, and costly. At once movements were put on foot for a gigantic struggle by both rival govern

ments.

CHAPTER III.

NAVAL WAR.

The

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GROWTH OF NAVAL SCIENCE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR.-Until the year 1840, naval science had made but little progress. Ships were essentially the same as they had been for the last two hundred years, and naval warfare was conducted on the same principle. A few improvements had taken place, but none of any great importance. The introduction of steam as a motive power in 1840 marked the beginning of a new era. The next thirty years witnessed great improvement. Sailing-vessels were abandoned for the improved steamers. ram again came into use as a powerful weapon of destruction. The Greeks and Romans had used a ram on their galleys with great effect. When sailing-vessels superseded the galleys, this engine of warfare fell into disuse. The introduction of steam again revived the use of the ram, with greatly increased power. The manufacture of guns had undergone a great change. Their caliber was increased. Breech-loading and rifling came into use. Greater range, accuracy and penetration were obtained. The sides of vessels, hitherto unprotected, were shielded by two-inch iron plate, which was gradually improved until the vessels were armored with solid masses of steel, 22 inches thick. In fact, the whole system of naval tactics underwent a change. The improvement began with the introduction of steam as a

motive power, but only reached its culmination in the trials and emergencies of the Civil War.

THE NAVY OF 1861.-At the outbreak of the Rebellion our navy was not in a condition to render the effective assistance which the occasion demanded. The total number of vessels in the service of the Government at the time was ninety. Fifty of these were sailing ships, and, splendid as they had been in their day, they had now become almost useless. Forty were propelled by steam. Most of these were in foreign ports, or laid up in the navy yards. Only eight vessels were ready for immediate usethose of the home squadron; and only four of these were steamers. More than two hundred officers resigned their commissions and hastened to join their fortunes with the Southern States.

The Government began the work of collecting a great navy. Six hundred vessels were demanded at once for blockading the Southern coast and for operating against Confederate privateers. Six screw-frigates, constructed in 1855, commanding the admiration of naval men at home and abroad, were the chief reliance of the Government. They proved of little value, however, because they were unable to enter the shallow waters of the Southern coast. The vessels in foreign ports were called home. Those in the navy yards were soon made available. The merchant marines, though of limited facilities, afforded an opportunity for improvising a naval force.

The South entered upon the war without any navy, and with limited resources for creating one. Had it not been for the aid from England, acting contrary to the rights of a neutral nation,

but little damage would have been done to the commerce of the North, and little resistance offered to the naval force of the Union. The Confederate government seized several revenuecutters and lighthouse-tenders, belonging to the United States; but these were of little value. The Merrimac, which was sunk on the abandonment of Norfolk, was raised by Confederates, and for a time threatened much harm.

OBJECT OF THE NAVY.-The navy with its limited resources had a weighty task imposed upon it at the very beginning. Its objects may be included under several heads:

1. It was to blockade the entire coast of the Confederate States, a distance of nearly three thousand miles.

2. It was to aid in the opening of the Mississippi river and its tributaries.

3. It was to acquire control of all bays and sounds from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande.

4. It was to protect the commerce of the United States, destroy or capture all Confederate cruisers and blockade-runners.

5. It was expected to capture all forts along the coast and seaports, and to aid in the movements and campaigns of the armies within coöperating distance along the coast.

ABANDONMENT OF NORFOLK, APRIL 21, 1861.-Norfolk, located about twelve miles from Fortress Monroe, was abandoned by the Federals in the early spring of 1861. It was the seat of one of the principal navy yards of the Nation. At this time there were four war vessels lying there, which could have been