there were present at this juncture troops that stood imperturbably amidst the confusion of their routed men, rushing pell-mell to take up a position on the hill.

There had been in the main praiseworthy earnestness in the conduct of the troops which had finally dislodged and driven the Confederates upon the Henry House hill. But in this very first part of the battle became apparent what was perfectly manifest before its close, that the successful handling of large bodies of troops in attack must be preceded by much previous drill. To disengage the regiments coming up successively in McDowell's column and bring them into action took, from a military point of view, entirely too much time. The situation was now this: The Federals occupied the ground in front of the Confederate line on the Henry House hill, which line, therefore, of course faced north. Colonel Wm. T. Sherman, commanding one of the brigades of General Daniel Tyler, had crossed Bull Run at Red House Ford, just above the stone bridge, and had combined his forces with McDowell's in the final advance which had driven the enemy south of the Warrenton turnpike. General Tyler, commanding in person another brigade of his division, crossed at the same place, but after making only a slight attack on the enemy at the Robinson House,-a house on the northeastern side of the Henry House hill,-marched to the south along Young's Branch, and was not heard from again during the battle. To this unfortunate occurrence must also be added, that Burnside's brigade had most inopportunely been allowed to rest and refresh itself. To march away after firing a few shots, or to rest and refresh in an emergency like this, when the enemy is sure soon to receive reinforcements from his unattacked wing, is an introduced condition likely to lead, as it did in this case, to need of much longer rest and refreshment. Here were two brigades neutralized at one

of the most critical parts of the day, the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the fact being that there was at the time an impression in some quarters that the affair engaged in was somewhat of the nature of a picnic.

At this time, about 2 P.M., when McDowell made his attack on the Henry House hill, he had only four brigades in hand-Colonel Wm. T. Sherman's, Colonel William B. Franklin's, Colonel Andrew Porter's and Colonel Orland B. Wilcox's, two batteries of regular artillery, and a company of regular cavalry. The pioneers of General Robert C. Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, were clearing away the abattis at the stone bridge, so as to permit the brigade to cross Bull Run, the rest of Tyler's division having crossed at Red House Ford. The brigade of Colonel Oliver O. Howard, of Colonel Samuel P. Heintzleman's divison, had not reached the field by the circuitous route from Centreville around by the way of Sudley Springs. The brigade of Burnside, and that of Tyler-which, in the presence of his superior officer, Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes only nominally commanded-have been accounted for. Therefore, at the moment when McDowell concluded to attack the hill, he determined to do it with only two-thirds of the force close at hand. It would not have done to await the coming of Howard, but there is no reason why, when he was advancing, Burnside and Tyler should not have been summoned to follow, or to try to outflank the enemy. Tyler's brigade was nearly intact, and the men of Burnside's were merely fatigued, not exhausted, and could at least have rested in reserve.

The first great mistake of the day was in not overwhelming Evans at once. This was the second, to be followed soon by a greater than both of the preceding. The general in command ought to have seen that, as it was 2 P.M. and he was pushing the enemy toward the south, he was

pushing him towards reinforcements that must be on the way and on the eve of arrival, and therefore, that if the enemy was to be finally routed, it were well that the attempt were made quickly to put him to flight. The Confederates, doubtless appreciating the situation, fell back to the southern and eastern edge of the plateau, which was thickly wooded there. Here, under shelter, their sharpshooters began to come disastrously into play, and they could retreat, and under cover reform and advance at their pleasure. This was the point of time when the third and final great mistake of the day was made, and all the more remarkable a one because regulars committed portions of it. McDowell ordered forward, near the Henry House, the two batteries of regular artillery. It is sometimes as dangerous to pursue when one fleeth, as it is to flee when no one pursueth. It is not good military practice to advance artillery within musketry range of woods held in force by the enemy, or to any position unsupported by reliable infantry. The pieces, in this case, began to advance before the infantry to support them had arrived, and when the infantry selected for this purpose had been pushed forward, it proved to be the only thoroughly worthless regiment in the army, the regiment of New York Fire Zouaves. So incredible was the order to Captain Charles Griffin, that he at first remonstrated with the chief of artillery, Major William F. Barry, who seemed to think it imperative, and so Griffin and Captain James B. Ricketts promptly obeyed it, and placed themselves where their presence meant almost certain destruction in the face of an enterprising enemy. The enemy's sharpshooters in the woods began to disable the batteries by picking off their men, the Fire Zouaves were routed by a charge of cavalry whose men they ought to have destroyed, for the enemy had only two companies of horse; and, finally, a regiment of the enemy,

emerging from the east toward the left, was mistaken by the chief of artillery for supports arriving, when it, coming within range, poured into the batteries so deadly a volley that they were rendered completely useless. The final possession of the batteries became the object upon which the energies of the combatants were concentrated, and the enemy was repulsed into the sheltering woods. Too late in the contest Howard's brigade, which had come up, took a share in it.

Here General McDowell ought to have seen that, with the force which he had at his disposal at the moment it was impossible to win the battle. It would seem to have been perfectly feasible, if the movement had been ordered in time, for Burnside's and Tyler's brigades to turn the enemy's position. The enemy had as much as their forces engaged could encounter, as proved by the fact of his taking shelter in the woods. If two brigades, under General Kirby Smith and Colonel J. A. Early, which now arrived as reinforcements to the enemy, changed the fortunes of the day, it is presumable that two Federal brigades, which were not utilized to any great extent, would, had they been put into a timely turning movement, have routed the enemy before he was reinforced.

The battle was a drawn one when the Confederates received the reinforcement of the brigades under Kirby Smith and Early. They fell in on the left of the Confederate line, and overlapped the right of McDowell's. Then the Federal troops began to move simultaneously towards the rear. There was no appearance at first of rout. That episode in the retreat occurred later. The troops for a while took their way gradually towards the rear, and reached the open plain from which they had ascended the Henry House hill, and then pursued their course back to Centreville by the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley Springs road. Their

organization was for a time fairly well preserved. When, however, those retreating by the Warrenton turnpike reached the bridge over Cub Run, a tributary of Bull Run, and came under the fire of a battery which the Confederates had brought to bear on it, panic manifested itself. The panic, like all other panics, was unnecessary. Panic is either a fear entirely groundless, or else with grounds that ought to be inadequate to produce the loss of self-possession. On the northern side of Bull Run were bodies of troops with morale undisturbed. The smaller one of these, under Colonel Israel B. Richardson, had guarded Blackburn's Ford. Troops from it repulsed the enemy in an attempt to cross McLean's Ford. The larger force, under Colonel Dixon S. Miles, was nearer Centreville. The two

bodies, constituting the reserve mentioned, of three brigades, became the rear-guard of McDowell's retreating army. Between Centreville and Washington two brigades had guarded the communications. Some portions of the army, under good officers, maintained their organizations, while others poured continuously, as a mere mob, towards Washington, and the next day thronged the streets of the city and filled it with the tales of their wonderful experiences. There was, however, really no disgrace attachable to most of the troops. They had been called upon to do more than lay in the power of their recent organization and often faulty leading. General Johnston himself warned his own people against vainglory in consequence of the event of the battle, calling their attention to the fact that the task which had been set the Federal troops to perform, in marching and attacking, was a far more difficult one than that which they themselves had executed in standing on their defense.

The mistakes connected with the battle at this place may be summarized as follows: It may be said that, as Centreville is a strong position, and as raw troops are better fitted