trenched. The army in its renewed movements is marching now nearly due south. The march and assumed isolated position of Hancock was a bait thrown out to Lee. It was imagined that he might be led to attack the Second Corps, in which case the other troops would be brought up in time to support Hancock, and a battle on open ground (for the country was becoming more open now) might be precipitated before the Confederates would have time to entrench. But Lee did not take the bait; perhaps, in the midst of his own plans, did not perceive it. Hancock being secure in position, the other corps marched in the same general direction. On the 22d Lee's army, too, was in motion, marching towards Hanover Junction, where the two railroads passing south to Richmond meet, engaged in interposing again between the Federal army and Richmond. Nearly concentrated there on the 22d, he awaited Grant's final movements. About noon of the 23d, as the leading Federal column approached the north bank of the North Anna, could be seen the heads of column of the enemy beginning to take position on the southern bank. The position finally assumed by Lee proved to be a most remarkable one. At this point the Virginia Central Railroad meets the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at Hanover Junction, at an angle of about seventy degrees. Northward of the Virginia Central, varying from one to two miles, and, excepting bends, somewhat parallel to it, lies the stretch of the North Anna with which we are here concerned. Here the river has a sharp bend in it towards the south, bringing it at that point only a little over a mile from the Virginia Central, with a stretch of river there, straight for nearly a mile. Lee was therefore able to throw his left wing, refused, to the southwest, so as to rest on Little River, three miles in his rear, and his right wing, gradually more and more refused as the Army of the Potomac ad

BATTLE FIELI

NORTH ANN Fron Surveys under the dir Bvt Brig.Gen.N.MICHLER.Maj

BY COMMAND OF

Bvt. Maj.Gen A.A.HUMF Brig Gen and Chief of Engi 1867.

Surveyed and drawn by M

assisted by FYNKILKURL ST

and & THOMPSON

vanced, so as to cover Hanover Junction and a river-road, called the Telegraph Road, leading towards his lines, while his centre formed a short front of about three-quarters of a mile in length on the south bank of the straight stretch of the river. We have seen from the experience at Chancellorsville how vicious a narrow front with sharply refused wings is for the disposition of an army, how vicious it proved, even with entrenchments, to Lee at Spottsylvania, but this case of a narrow front was entirely exceptional, introducing difficulties for the attacking side and eliminating them from that of the attacked. As Lee's narrow front rested for three-quarters of a mile on the very river bank opposite the enemy, he had there a citadel, with a river for a wet ditch, thrust into the face of the enemy, making combination between the two wings of the attacking force impossible, save at the expense of twice crossing the river in front of him, and thus neutralizing any concerted action between those wings.

Warren led the right column, and reached the North Anna at Jericho Ford, four miles west of the point where, about two miles north of Hanover Junction, the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses it. Hancock, who led the left column, reached the river at the point of its intersection by the railroad, and also at the point where the Telegraph Road crosses the river at Chesterfield Bridge, about a half mile further west than that of the railroadcrossing. Warren's column passed the river, partly by fording, partly by pontoon, and advanced unmolested, the enemy's preparations being at that place still incomplete. Hancock, on the contrary, had to capture some works which defended Chesterfield Bridge, which was handsomely done by assault. Warren, however, although crossing unmolested, had a severe engagement after he had begun to advance, whereas Hancock, after the resistance overcome at

the bridge, ascertained the next morning that the enemy had swung back his right, and then advanced without heavy fighting and took position opposite Lee's right wing, with which, on the 24th, he had a spirited engagement.

The Sixth Corps, coming up the next morning, followed the lead of Warren, but all attempts of the troops on the right to join hands with those on the left were frustrated by the enemy's occupation of the river bank along the short front already described. On the 24th Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, attempted the passage of the river at Ox Ford, between the place where were Warren and the Sixth Corps, on the right, and Hancock with the Second Corps, on the left, but was obliged to desist from the attempt, finally sending a division to co-operate with Warren in a movement to break through the enemy's line along the southern river-bank, so as to connect with Hancock. It was useless. Lee was exactly in the position to defy attack from across the river, because the short front there could not be directly engaged in face; and to defy attack from the same side of the river, because either of his refused wings could readily reinforce the other. Why proceed further in description of the situation? It was a deadlock. There was no help for it but to retire from a position which could not have been foreseen. Accordingly, after closing in somewhat on Lee's left wing, and finding the enemy strongly entrenched there with traversed works, the withdrawal of the army from a most dangerous position was skilfully effected. Even Grant had begun to see the desperate character of assaults on earthworks manned by troops of such mettle as those of the Army of Northern Virginia. Napoleon lays great stress upon the neglect, up to a certain period in European war, of simple entrenchments; but unless all signs fail, Grant had never read Napoleon's military comments attentively, certainly not as to this particular. Humphreys, in one place, puts the