was amply prepared for a counter-assault over the same ground as that over which the assault had taken place. The troops forming Pickett's advance were independent of the lines in their rear, leaving no gap there. Those lines were intact, and could be plainly seen advancing to cover their return when the remnants of Pickett's force were retreating in confusion. And besides, there was the artillery of the enemy still in position ready to concentrate its fire on any advancing column. Only when, as has happened, a powerful body of heavy cavalry, heretofore unengaged, has been able to act instantly and seize the moment of a trained army's temporary discomfiture, has it ever been possible to make a counter-assault over nearly the same ground as the one over which an assault by infantry has been made and repulsed. Confederate officers within that portion of the lines from which Pickett's charge proceeded have testified that an attempt by Meade to make a counter-assault over the same ground over which Pickett had passed would have been followed by as signal a repulse as that which the Army of the Potomac had just inflicted. The testimony of such witnesses, if any is to be considered, must be held good. It remains, then, to consider the alternative of attacking elsewhere. The reconnoissance of the 2d had shown that the ground opposite the right, at and near Culp's Hill, was not a favorable one from which to make an assault. The ground on the left might perhaps admit of it. It is not even generally known that that was attempted. The repulse of the enemy on the left-centre of the army had scarcely been made certain when General Meade rode rapidly to the left and ordered an advance. The ground there, however, as has already been incidentally noted, is not favorable for the offensive of an army occupying the lines prescribed by Cemetery Ridge for the general and inevitable position of an army occupying the ground east of the valley. The enemy was occupying

with powerful artillery the ridge from which Sickles had been driven, and with infantry well closed up towards the new position of the Army of the Potomac on its left. McCandless's brigade, of Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, of the Fifth Corps, and Nevin's brigade, of the Third Division, of the Sixth Corps, advanced and pushed the enemy to some advantage, as he happened to be slightly withdrawing to strengthen his position there. The case, as I view it now, and believe that it will in the future be regarded, was one of deadlock, in which it was impossible at the moment, without undue risk, unhesitatingly to attempt to advance. The ability of the Army of the Potomac to assume a sure offensive had been distinctively impaired by the terrible losses of the second day, growing out of the then unfortunate advance of the lines on the left beyond their true position. The situation after Pickett's charge was such that hazards assumed in ordinary battles were not to be assumed here. Why Austria did not avenge Sadowa when the Franco-Prussian war subsequently came, no one but a few diplomats knew until Lord John Russell wrote his memoirs. We know now, and had reason to suspect then, that had the day at Gettysburg been lost to the Union cause, European recognition of the independence of the Confederacy and all that that implies would have immediately followed.

While this momentous charge on the left-centre of the Army of the Potomac was being made and repulsed, Stuart's cavalry, on the right-rear, was making strong efforts to break through the Federal cavalry under General David McM. Gregg. If Stuart had succeeded, the reserve-artillery and ammunition and supply-train of the Army of the Potomac would have been at his mercy, for even the reserveartillery and munitions had, on account of the furious artillery fire on the front, been retired to a point on the Baltimore

Turnpike, well to the rear. Besides, Stuart's success would have directly contributed towards that of Pickett's infantry charge. Under Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton and Chambliss and Jenkins, brigade-commanders, represented the powerful Confederate force of cavalry on the right-rear. Gregg met the enemy's four brigades with three, led by J. B. McIntosh, J. Irvin Gregg, and by Custer, of Kilpatrick's division. Only two of the Federal brigades, however, were in strenuous action. Randol's and Pennington's batteries were present, the fight beginning with artillery and ending with charging. At one point of time Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton emerged in strong force from a wood, and charged with the sabre, in the full belief, which the Confederates cherished until late, that the Federal cavalry would not stand before cold steel. But on this, and on the recent occasions at Beverly Ford and Brandy Station, and also at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, the Federal cavalry proved that its training had had its effect, and that, from being at first unable to cope with that of the Confederates, it was able to meet it on equal terms. Hampton was severely wounded, and the fight died out without the enemy's being able to effect his purpose. But for the circumstance that prescribed limits do not admit of presenting the details of this cavalry action, it could be here shown that solely because it was eclipsed to popular interest by the main events of the day, has its meritoriousness never been generally known, and that, but for its skilled and gallant conduct under General Gregg, the issue might have been serious, nay, in the event reversed, fatal to the Army of the Potomac, had Pickett's charge also been at the same time successful.

On the left of the Army of the Potomac had continued to be stationed, from the afternoon of the 3d of July, Farnsworth's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, and Merritt's brigade, of Buford's division. These two brigades