arrival, as in fact the time noted on the orders also clearly shows. But, what if General Meade's orders to concentrate had followed, instead of preceded, Hancock's personal reappearance at Taneytown? Hancock's function was simply investigation and report; Meade's, decision upon the basis of investigation and report. General Meade was evidently so well satisfied with the report from the field that he acted at once, before his emissary had had time to return.

As to another point connected with the battle of Gettysburg, an interested attempt has been made to detract from the merit of General Meade by means of the allegation that, after having reached the ground, he showed immediate intention of retreating, as evidenced by a provisory order which he directed to be framed regarding the positions of troops and roads in all directions. Yet it can be shown conclusively, as he himself testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and as numerous officers present on the field have testified, that if he intended to retreat, he was at the same time doing things wholly incompatible with that intention, planning attacks, ordering up trains, artillery, etc. Every capable general, in undertaking a pitched battle, obtains all the knowledge possible of his surroundings, the position of his troops, of roads to the rear, of roads in advance, so that he may be able to fight to the best advantage, to pursue, or to retreat, as the fortunes of war may determine. The alleged instructions, upon which was based the figment of an order, were nothing but ones to cover any usual contingency.

Lastly, there has been an attempt to fix upon General Meade, through the citation of proceedings of a council of war, on the 2d of July, the charge of desire to retreat, although the condition of things at that time, and the testimony procurable as to the actual proceedings of the council, give no warrant for such a belief, while, on the

contrary, animus that would be fully equal to encouraging such a belief is clearly demonstrable. With this summary of the groundless aspersions to which General Meade has been from time to time assailed, I return with the greatest relief and pleasure to the main thread of the narrative.

When General Meade reached Gettysburg night had long fallen on the scene. Along the opposing crests preparations were making for the conflict of the next day. Weary men were resting on the field, and others pressing onward towards it through the moonlit gloom. In the stillness of midnight of the 1st of July General Meade rode up the Taneytown Road on to East Cemetery Hill. After receiving reports from various officers, he rode off with General Hunt, viewing the lines while Hunt was posting artillery. About daylight of the 2d of July he established his headquarters in a house just back of the centre of the army.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SECOND DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

IT unfortunately happens that the majority of the world imagine that they know much that they have not studied, and that a small but active minority often act as bell-wethers to the innocent following flock. Things have come to be traditional about the battle of Gettysburg which are entirely false. They who have for the most part furnished these myths will, however, in the course of nature soon pass away, and with them the need of anything but the unvarnished truth as nearly as it may be reached by human imperfection. We are studying a battle in which, not we alone, but future generations of the earth will take interest. The world, as time goes on, and more and more as it lapses, will find it full of interest. The time will come when the battle shall stand in the minds of men as among the greatest, as representing an epoch in the continuous civilization of the world. Then, in that day, when students of government and of war scan the data from which they will reach their conclusions, there will be no question in their minds as to whether or not General Meade proposed to retreat from Gettysburg, none whatever as to the field being his own deliberate choice, none that Sickles was wholly unjustifiable in taking up the position along the Emmettsburg Road, none that Little Round Top was made secure by Hancock and finally by Meade, none that it was by no accident by which it was seized by Warren when relinquished by Sickles. The ascription of these and other events to the category of accident, or to the wrong person, will be

rejected. They were the outcome, either direct or indirect, of Meade's action, and unless the world should be prepared to say what it never yet has declared, that a general must personally do everything himself, under penality of forfeiting all credit for the event of battle, Meade will be safe in the future for the glory of Gettysburg. Nor should any one suppose, and parrot-like repeat, that the history of this and other great events of the same time is likely to renew the unreliableness of much past history. It is not so, for in these modern days the whole world, from land's end to land's end, is one vast library of information in the literature of letters, magazines, books, newspapers, and public records innumerable. The day will come, is in fact rapidly approaching, when it will be impossible to distort the history of the men and the events of our civil war, even false witness lending itself to analysis for the furtherance of the truth that will be patent in the distant, but not far distant future, even if the beginning of its term should be rated at a hundred years. Under the lead of false teaching, and with the sublime assurance of ignorance, writers who have evidently never set a squadron in the field, or studied the military art from the writings of its masters, have made all sorts of comments on the battle of Gettysburg. These will be part of the task of the future to consign to the limbo of the forgotten among the transient curiosities of literature. Imbued as I am with the deepest faith in this beneficent future, it will become manifest, as we proceed, that my intention is not to write from the point of view that General Meade, like the kings of old, could do no wrong, for it is fully admitted in one place, and intended to be implied throughout, that, as Turenne once said, when he confessed to having made a military mistake, that the general who has not made one has not been long engaged in war. The fixed purpose here is, however, incidentally to correct pre