array of collated facts. They begin to approach this historical interest even at this early day, when, reconciliation having followed strife, men have had opportunity to revise the experiences which, owing to the rapidity of modern events, seem to belong to quite a remote past. What now presents itself to the reason and imagination as most interesting is, that the event of the war was one which, with the greater enlightenment that time has wrought, has long been a subject of thankfulness among the people of a united country.

CHAPTER V.

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR.

No more prejudicial error entered into the conduct of military affairs in the North than the popular notion that a military education necessarily makes the great commander. The ideal soldier, the strategos of the ancients, the general of modern times, is born as truly as the poet is born, not made. A military education does but give the training which brings forth to the best advantage natural powers. There are, and always have been, but two military schools in the world, that of actual war, and that of the academy, for the teaching of the theory and practice of war; but neither of these can create a soldier of any grade intrinsically beyond that of the rank and file of an army. The reason of this is not far to seek, if one come to realize two fundamental facts, that genius or talent for war, like any other special manifestation of mind, cannot be created or supplanted by any amount of technical acquirement; and, additionally, that back of the intellect requisite to constitute a great commander, and the very foundation without which his gifts are unavailing, is character, the sort of mind which, in the midst of the mutability of affairs, keeps its equal poise. Who can doubt that, even if Napoleon had had no military education whatever, he would have been, except perhaps Masséna, the first of France's strategists fitted for the field. The popular ignorance in the North on this subject rose far beyond the bounds of ordinary popular limitations, pervading the sphere even of men of military training, some of whom had modesty conson

ant with their just estimate of their powers, but some of whom exaggerated those powers to their own minds, or else came to think, as was extremely natural, that they must have the talents which were attributed to them by others. Even in the immediate realm of the occupants of the highest civil executive positions of the Government, there was not any previous association with military men, technical education, or aught else that could have put them in touch with military demands. Moreover, as has been previously remarked, it was unfortunate for Washington to be situated where it was, near the theatre of the most important military operations. There is another aspect of the same circumstance, which was not less objectionable. It was as unfortunate for the Army of the Potomac to be so near Washington as it was for Washington to be so near the army. In consequence of this, petty interference with the army, and with lesser forces posted in the vicinity of the city, went on from the beginning to the end of the war. Congress took an amateur hand in its operations, the hotel corridors of the city became the greenroom and the coulisses of the awful drama which was being enacted only a few miles away and over the whole United States. Blatant military orators there declaimed of the progress or retardations of events, with which they had naught to do but by their presence at the front. Scheming for rank and place and assignment, speculating in gold and bonds, moneyseeking amidst the throes of the nation, went on apace. Virtue and vice, patriotism and selfishness, were blended in apparently inextricable confusion; but only apparently, sad as that was, for amidst the chaos patriotism stood firmly, and shaking off at last all crawling things, brought the nation, through dearly bought experience, to a triumphant issue.

It will be well here, as we are about to enter upon a

description of more extensive military movements than those connected with the Mexican War, to define what are meant by the terms strategy, tactics, and logistics. "Logistics" relates simply to the science of moving armies, which necessarily includes any means of movement, in marching and commissary, or any other kind of locomotion. "Strategy" is sometimes distinguished from "tactics" by representing the former as related to movements made out of sight of the enemy, and the latter as made within his sight. But this definition is positively incorrect, for a strategical movement may, on occasions, be made within sight of the enemy and a tactical movement beyond it; that is to say, if "within sight" is to be construed as meaning within the range of sight, and this is what is intended by the expression "within sight." For instance, supposing two armies to be drawn up, facing each other, and so near that, at any point in either line, the opposing one is clearly seen, and that, by means of a sunken road in the rear, a large body of the troops of one of these lines is subtracted and placed, unknown to the opposite side, on either flank of the line to which the troops belong. That would, according to the current definition, be a tactical movement; and yet, according to the intrinsic difference between strategical and tactical movements, it would be strategical. To take a converse case, supposing that, after two opposing lines are drawn up as just described, and in plain sight of each other, a false appearance is intentionally presented, as Cæsar once created it by dressing up teamsters and camp-followers as legionary soldiers, and thus making the enemy think that a powerful military body was marching off from camp. Sheridan employed, partly within and partly beyond sight, a similar strategical stratagem at Deep Bottom, on James River, when he made cavalry march by night over a pontoon-bridge muffled with hay, marching the men back on foot on the following morning,

with the intention of leading the enemy to believe that reinforcements of infantry were arriving from the south side of the river. These were strategical movements, and yet, according to the common definition, they were tactical, because they were made not only within the range of sight, but within actual sight of the enemy. Therefore it is plain that the distinction which is really to be drawn between strategical and tactical movements, as representing their true differences, has sometimes no relation to whether the operation is performed within sight, within the range of sight, or beyond sight. The real difference between them, related to space and time, whether much or little of either, consists in the fact that, whereas strategy either deceives or anticipates the enemy to his disadvantage by acts relating to prospective or present battle, and secures or interferes with combinations leading to the best concentration for prospective battle, tactics are confined, without intermediation, to the best concentration during battle. Strategy as well as tactics therefore enter into the actual collision on the battle-field.

Strategy, acting over a large zone of operations may force an adversary to fight a battle in a place tactically disadvantageous. This, at bottom, reverts to the advantage inherent in skill of concentration for prospective battle; successful concentration sometimes involving tactically, as to place, as well as strategically, as to time, a disadvantage to the adversary in position. It thus becomes evident, from all that has been said, that strategy may occur beyond the horizon of the zone of operations, or near the field of battle, or, lastly, at the very place of and amid the operations in the heat of battle, while tactics are confined to the time and place of actual battle. Tactics, however, has a range beyond this, when the body of men called an army is not in action. In advancing it has an advance-guard,