in Burnside's ability to command the army. He then laid out another plan of campaign by way of retrieving his great failure. This was to cross the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg. The movement, long in preparation, began on the 19th of January, 1863. How it would have prospered, had it continued, no one can say, but it was stopped by heavy rains. These produced such a condition of the roads, that the wheels of the artillery and of the wagons were often embedded to the hubs, and soldiers were covered with a coat of slime. So the movement came to an end amid laughter and jeers, for the Army of the Potomac never lost heart, and this passed into history under the name of the Mud March. Burnside's command had begun with a tragedy and it ended with a farce.

Much ill-merited sympathy and false sentiment have been lavished upon Burnside for the manly way in which he took upon himself the blame for the disaster at Fredericksburg. But who should be allowed to expiate by expressions of regret the fault that sacrificed fifteen thousand men? The mantle of charity is broad enough to cover that among the multitude of sins over which it is cast, but there is a great gulf between the forgiveness that may be granted to frailty, and acceptance of the wrongdoer's deep regrets as full quittance for his deed. The responsibility for the consequences that ensued from the appointment of Burnside as commanding-general must be apportioned between the Administration and Burnside. The Administration was to blame for appointing him, and he for accepting the appointment. He could not be held blameless for that, unless he had first positively declined to accept the appointment, and then accepted it only in obedience to express and positive orders, which, as a soldier, he would be bound not to disobey. This he did not do, but weakly yielded after demurring. To him,

therefore, belongs the greater share of fault, for whereas the Administration acted in ignorance of his incompetency, he knew it well, and ought not to have thought that he had relieved himself from responsibility by confessing his unfitness to command.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

From

THE bitterness of the chalice that the North constantly drained was from time to time mitigated by the welcome draught of successes in the West and Southwest. the first it was not intended, for want of space, to make special mention of these; nor is it now, but only occasionally to record, as illustrated here, remarkable events having bearing on the war, lest the Army of the Potomac should appear as if occupying a world of its own, having no relation to the rest.

On the 6th and 7th of April, 1862, Grant won the battle of Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, in Tennessee, through the timely arrival of Buell's army to his assistance. Halleck, however, then taking command of those forces in the field, made progress so slow towards Corinth, in Mississippi, moving fifteen miles in six weeks, that the enemy availed himself of the ample time placed at his disposal to evacuate the place with all his material, and leave only the husks of victory behind. Yet Halleck was the general who, from Washington, subsequently told McClellan that his men did not march enough for exercise. Such military critics may well be likened to the literary ones said to be recruited from the ranks of unsuccessful authors. His generalship, however, had not, as we have seen, prevented Halleck from being called to Washington as general-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

On the 1st of January, 1863, Mr. Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Emancipation.