with something more of ornament, in those of Dugald Stewart. Dr. Gregory will not be angry with us for commending these models to his imitation. On the whole, we do not hesitate to say, that few more important gifts have been of late years presented to the public, than the work before us. Those who have not leisure (and, who has any leisure in these busy days, in times when every man must know every thing and every body) to examine the massy folios through which the evidences, doc. trines, and duties of Christianity are dispersed, will find this compendium of Dr. Gregory compact, accu rate, and complete. Those who have explored this wide sea of knowledge, will be glad to see it reduced to a map by Dr. Gregory; to find their own discoveries noted and measured, as it were, upon a tangible meridian. There is a single topic, on which we cannot help dwelling for a moment, in conclusion. It has almost grown into a proverbial observation, that the study of the mathematics indisposes men to religion; and the solution provided for the phenomenon is, that the mind, accustomed to the demonstrative evidence of mathematics, is apt to be dissatisfied when, as is the case in religion, the evidence falls short of demonstration. Now we are inclined to dispute both the fact and the solution: in the first place, we do not by any means think it the fact, that the study of the mathematics has this tendency; on the contrary, the most eminent mathematicians have many of them been distinguished by their reverence for religion. Thus Thales and Pythagoras, the first fathers of this science, were scarcely less celebrated for their mathematical attainments, than for their zealous support of the superstitions of their country. And although in modern times, the French mathematicians have the reputation of infidelity, it is to be remembered that they only partook of the general disease of their age and country; and to their unthinking scepticism, may be opposed the firm belief of Pascal, Bacon, Boyle, Euler, Barrow, Cotes, Newton, and the present inheritor of the chair once possess‣ ed by these three last celebrated per sons. But an appeal nay more confidently be made to bodies of men than to individuals. If, then, we cast our eyes upon that university of our country which is chiefly occupied in these studies, in what state do we find religion among her sons; driven up into a corner, abandoned to a few of her more illiterate members? On the contrary, the university of Cambridge, not content to follow the march of ordinary society in religion, has boldly led the way; has burst through the barriers of surrounding prejudices; has been the first to re-erect the banner of the Reformation; has pioneered the way to the successes of its children in all parts of the nation. And as we doubt the fact itself, so also we think the solution provided for it very questionable. In the first place, admitting the evidence for any mathematical conclusion to be stronger than for a moral truth, is it the fact, that a man, accustomed to one species of evidence, upon one subject, will be satisfied with that alone upon all subjects? Is not the mathematician compelled to act continually upon evidence inferior to demonstration? Is not his daily life, his determinations when to eat, sleep, drink, or walk; with whom and where to live; his conclusions as to every question in morals, politics, physics, law, formed upon inferior evidence? If, therefore, the mind is likely, in every instance, to covet the evidence upon which it ordinarily judges and acts, there is little fear that it will demand in religion that force of evidence which is called demonstration. The uncertainties of life will, even in this view of the subject, correct any evils springing from the certainty of the mathematics. But the fact is, that the precision of mathematical demonstration is much overstated, Take the following illustrations of this position from Dr. Gregory himself: « Mathematics is not the science which enables us to ascertain the nature of things in themselves; for that, alas! is not a science which can be learned in our present imperfect condition, where we see through a glass darkly? but the science of quantity as measureable, that is, as comparable; and it is obvious, that we can compare quantities satisfactorily in some respects, while we know nothing of them in others. Thus we can demonstrate, that any two sides of a plane triangle are, together, greater than the third, by shewing that angles, of whose absolute magnitude we know nothing, are one greater than the other and then inferring the truth of the proposition, that the greater angle in a triangle is subtended by the greater side." Vol. i. p. 71. : If our views be extended from what are called the pure mathematies, to that branch of the science in which geometry and physics are combined, it is obvious to every one at all acquainted with the subject, that here the method of proof is by no means of that precise and obvious kind which is likely to seduce the mind into any unwarrantable or enthusiastic expectations of clearness and precision upon other subjects. Upon the whole, then, we can discover no ground, either in fact or theory, for the alleged perils of mathematical studies. Will our readers yet bear with us upon this somewhat onerous topic, while we venture to state to them how we conceive those very mathematical studies, hitherto deemed the enemies of religion, might he converted into her allies? Our rule would be simply this; to employ the same means, with earnest prayer for the Divine blessing, in the establishment of religious truth, that are used for the discovery of mathematical truths. With justifying, by certain examples, the rule thus promulged, we shall conclude. First, then, the sound mathematician takes care to obtain clear ideas of the things of which his science treats. Let the theologian, also, seize upon the plain, definite, intelligible parts of his subject, instead of endeavouring to define what does not admit of definition, and to decipher what was never meant to be explained. Secondly, the mathematician is in general cautious to employ those terms of simple, pure, invariable, accredited meaning; whereas the divine too often employs a loose, metaphorical, unaccredited, fluctuating, partial phraseology. Thirdly, the axioms of the mathematician are truths, either self-obvious or established by universal consent; whereas those of theologians are apt to be obscure and ambiguous, clear to one half the world perhaps, but denied by the other. Lastly, the mathematician has in general no temptation to call in his passions to assist the decisions of his judgment; whereas the polemic scarcely suffers his judgment to interfere with the "fiat" of his pas sions. In all these instances, then, let the divine emulate his more philosophic brethren, and we shall cease to hear so much of the vast interval between their respective proofs. Moral evidence will, indeed, never arrive at demonstrative; but it will be more difficult to ascertain where the one begins and the other ends. They will be no longer separated, as the colours in the prism; bat melt into one another, as these colours in the solar ray. Our correspondents sometimes complain, that we hesitate to determine, or even to argue, upon some vast and most important topics. We beg to assure them, that these more curious investigations are delayed only till we can find precisely such a reasoner as we have just described. Such a man, having discovered the causes of gravitation and attraction, the philosopher's stone, and the longitude at sea, will, we have no doubt, soon put an end to sectarianism in Great Britain. If he does not, at least the fault will lie in ourselves; and who will affirm that now? We beg to console our readers for the pain which our last dull reason ings may have inflicted upon them, by the following eulogy upon mathematics, from the hand of a man at once the best mathematician, orator, and divine of his day. The mathematics, I say, which effectually exercises, not vainly deludes nor vexatiously torments, studious minds with obscure subtleties, perplexed difficulties, or contentious disquisitions; which overcomes without opposition, triumphs without pomp, compels without force, and rules absolutely without the loss of liberty which does not privately over-reach a weak faith, but openly assaults an armed reason, obtains a total victory, and puts on inevitable chains; whose words are so many oracles, and works as many miracles; which blabs out nothing rashly, nor designs any thing from the purpose, but plainly demonstrates and readily performs all things within its verge; which obtrudes no false shadows of science, but the very science itself, the mind firmly adhering to it as soon as possessed of it, and can never after desert it of its own accord, or be deprived of it by any force of others: lastly, the mathematics, which depends upon principles clear to the mind, and agreeable to experience; which draws certain conclusions, instructs by profitable rules, unfolds pleasant questions, and produces wonderful effects; which is the fruitful parent of, I had almost said all, arts, the unshaken foundation of sciences, and the plentiful fountain of advantage to human affairs*." the work now before us; but many of the subjects which have occupied our attention since its appearance have possessed a temporary interest, to which it was necessary to have some regard, and which could not belong to a collection of essays upon abstract subjects. We have felt also the less unwillingness to yield to these demands, from a knowledge that philosophical writings, in general, attract the public attention slowly, and live long in their re collection. It is now about twenty years since Mr. Stewart gave to the world. his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; a work which is already established among the classics of the country; and which, whether we consider the originality of many of the truths contained in it, the justness and scientific arrangement of the observations which are not strictly original, or the elegance of its composition, is entitled to be classed among the most valuable productions which we possess in philosophy and literature. It was intended by the author as the first part of a systematic inquiry into the nature of man, contemplated as an intellectual being, or moral agent, and a member of political society. Mr. Stewart complains, in the earlier parts of that publication, that the proper objects of metaphysical investigation had been, in general, much mistaken, and the progress of the science proportionably retard. ed;-that philosophers had been chiefly employed in controversies concerning the origin of our knowledge, while the steady contemplation of the known powers and affections of the human mind had been little attended to;- and that the only true way to render this important science of practical value to men, or to make real advances in it, must be, as in physics, to collect carefully the phenomena which belong to it, and build upon them a system of general principles; observing rigidly, through the whole process, the same laws of induction which have long been universally tical. The Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind were intended, as In the mean time, and still, as he informs us, intent on the prosecution of his great work, Mr. Stewart has presented to the public a volume of Essays on subjects intimately connected with his favourite studies. Of these we are now to give some account. They were written, the author tells us, during an interval of ill health, which disqualified him from severer labours; like Baxter's Saint's Rest," in the time of his lan * See Advertisement to the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. guishment:" but there are probably few persons whose full vigour would have been sufficient for the production of such a volume; and certainly none whose years of health and strength had not been assiduously devoted to the cultivation of science and letters. The Essays before us are preceded by a Preliminary Dissertation, which is divided into two chapters. In the first of these, the writer offers some strictures on the hypothetical systems in metaphysics, for which some of the followers of Hartley and Priestley have, since the appearance of his former work, claimed the public approbation; and defends, with a little warmth, that more cautious process of observation and induction which he had formerly recommended, and himself steadily pursued. There is no doubt, we believe, now entertained by judicious scholars, that the scheme of investigation adopted by Mr. Stewart is as sound and unquestionable in metaphysical researches, as in all the branches of natural science. Of the theories of the Hartleian school, we shall have occasion to say more hereafter. The second chapter, in the Preliminary Dissertation, is employed upon a question, which we have always thought interesting, and which is now rendered more so by the character of the disputants. Mr. Stewart, in some early chapters of his former work, expatiated pretty largely on the benefits which might be expect ed to result from a just view and assiduous cultivation of the metaphysics. It is natural for an author to be partial to his own pursuits. But the philosophers of the north are sceptical. A writer in the Edinburgh Review, in one of the early numbers, controverted this opinion, and insisted on the inutility of metaphysical knowledge for practical purposes. The sum of his * Some of the metaphysical articles in the early volumes of the Edinburgh Review, are written with great ability. If their doctrine is correct, have not the writers a little misCHRIST. OBSERV. No. 129. argument is, that the proper use of knowledge being to increase the power of man, a science of which the phenomena are observed, but not discovered, can be of little service to that end: that in physics a great variety of new facts are obtained by skilful experiments; but that in metaphysics the most accurate inquirer can only notice what has been, from time immemorial, open to the view of all who were disposed to examine: that it is, therefore, highly improbable that new phenomena should now be discovered; and though an able philosopher may classify more skilfully what is already known, and perhaps have sagacity enough to point out inferences not immediately obvious, he can add nothing new to the facts of the science, and even his results will generally be found to have been anticipated by the practical good sense of mankind; who know perfectly well (for example) how memory depends upon attention, and is assisted by association, without any elaborate inquiry into the nature of the human faculties. The argument, of which we have here presented the substance, is expanded and enforced by its author with considerable ability, and Mr. Stewart has judged it worthy of a pretty large examination. He denies, in the first place, that there is any essential difference between physical and metaphysical science, as to the manner of collecting the data properly belonging to each. Berkley's theory of vision, he observes, is "at least an attempt towards an experimental decomposition of our perceptions: and the whole of a philosopher's life, if he spends it to any purpose, is one continued series of experiments on his own faculties and powers." Even with respect to the distinction attempted to be made between experiment and observation, he insists that it is, in employed their industry? We, however, have no hesitation in preferring those papers to the vehement political diatribes which have for some time past overrun that journal, 4 G |