it is, so is it no less absurd to suppose the different existence of any of the parts, " since all variety or difference of existence must needs arise from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficacy of that cause, whatsoever it be." How contrary the very form and appearance of the world is to this notion of necessity, need not be much insisted upon. Many parts of it are, in fact, annually undergoing the greatest changes. Probably no theorist can be found hardy enough to assert of particular lakes or seas, or mountains, even that they did exist, much less that they must have existed necessarily, and have borne the form they bear at present, from eternity. Yet, if you take these qualities away from individual parts of the universe, a Socratic disputant may stick close to the concession, and gradually deny them of the whole*. Can we conceive it otherwise than * Sykes has done this: "If the universe is God, every part of him, except what constitutes space, may be conceived arbitrary, whether our earth should be attended by a single moon, or be surrounded by as many satellites as Jupiter or Saturn? But if the world be necessarily existent, these things are not arbitrary, but governed by the same immutable necessity by which the world itself exists: unless it can be denied that to suppose the possibility of alteration in that which exists necessarily, involves a contradiction, and is absurd. These cursory observations are sufficient to show that the doctrine of the world's eternity is embarrassed by objections which forcibly urge us to seek some further explanation of the phenomena by which we are surrounded. If it be asked, what advantage can be expected from bringing the subject back at all to metaphysics; a sort of argument which an Alciphron may say at last "he has always found dry and jejune, unsuited to his way of thinking, which may perhaps puzzle, but will never not necessary, and yet the whole is necessary. be more self-contradictory than this?" Ch. iv. Can any idea convince him ;"* I would reply, that there is some advantage in showing that, to whichever side we turn, insurmountable difficulties oppose us, till we admit the agency of an intelligent immaterial Creator; whose presence in the system at once dispels the cloud, and diffuses the only light which on a subject so far removed from our comprehensions as the creation of the world, our minds are capable of receiving. It will not be denied, that if metaphysical speculations were adverse to the existence of such a Being, the positive evidence which asserted it would require extraordinary strength and cogency. It is reasonable therefore to expect, that whatever historical or probable evidence we may hereafter find in favour of the existence of a Creator, should derive at least as much additional force from the concurrence of metaphysical arguments, as it would be deprived of, if such researches terminated in the contrary conclusion. * See Berkeley, Minute Philos. vol. ii. p. 445, quarto edit. 21 CHAPTER II. On the Opinion which ascribes the Formation of the World to Chance. * WHILST the most reasonable among the heathen philosophers who have left any record of their opinions, asserted that matter was itself eternal, but moulded into the form of our world by the operation of an intelligent Deity; and others (as we have seen), deifying the world itself, contended for the eternity of its visible form; the hypothesis of Epicurus and his followers differed altogether from them all; and referred the existence of the world neither to the necessity of its own nature, nor to the interference of a Divine Architect, † but to the fortuitous concurrence of eternal atoms. Atoms, * I do not hesitate to give this character to Pythagoras and Plato, notwithstanding the absurdity attending their doctrine of the eternity of matter. † The δημιεργος of Plato. he affirmed, of an infinite smallness and in perpetual motion, compose the universe: and falling by chance into the region of our world, were in consequence of the innate motion, brought gradually together, and collected into an indigested mass. These atoms, according to their size and weight, either subsided and settled into earth, or formed themselves into air, or collected themselves into stars; and hence arose the material globe: while the vegetable and animal productions of the earth sprung from various seeds intermixed with the first combination of atoms, and being preserved and nourished by moisture and heat, afterwards grew up into organized bodies of various kinds. Such was the mechanism of the world of Epicurus. * It would be idle to enter upon the refutation of an hypothesis which assumes without a shadow of proof or probability, first, that the universe is composed of space and atoms; secondly, that these atoms, without any assign * See Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiæ, for the quotations on which this arrangement is founded; or the valuable abridgment of that laborious work, by Enfield. |