tions on Clarke's Demonstration, are from the pen of the late Professor Stewart, and are fully entitled to an attentive consideration. They place the great question in an interesting point of view.

"But although the argument, as stated by Clarke, does not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own existence. Nay farther, I think that these conceptions are very intimately connected with the fundamental principles of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, we are unavoidably led to apply to this cause our conceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive Him as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those awful impressions which are naturally produced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still more by the idea of endless duration. Nor is this all. It is from the immensity of space that the notion of infinity is originally derived; and it is hence that we transfer the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. When we speak, therefore, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so that the conceptions of

Immensity and Eternity, if they do not of themselves demonstrate the existence of God, yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes."

In Rousseau's "Emilius," the following passage occurs, in reference to Dr. Clarke's system. "Then in reviewing in my mind all the various opinions which had, alternately, hurried me along from my birth, I saw, that, though none of them were so evident as to produce immediate or absolute conviction, yet they all possessed divers degrees of probability; and that the internal assent I gave or refused to them was in varied proportions. Upon first thought, comparing all these different ideas in silent thought, I found that the first and the most common, was also the most simple and reasonable; and that to obtain perfect acquiescence, it only needed to be last proposed. Imagine all our ancient and modern philosophers, having forthwith espoused all their fantastic theories of forces, of chance, of fate, of necessity, of atoms, of the animus mundi, of living matter, of materialism of all kinds; and after them all, the illustrious Clarke announcing and demonstrating to the world at last, the existence of a Universal Creator and Dispenser of all things. With what universal admiration, with what unanimous applause, ought not this new discovery to be received; so grand, so consoling, so sublime, so well calculated to elevate the soul, and to form a solid foundation for virtue; and, at the same time, so striking, so luminous, so perspicuous, and, as it appears to me, presenting

fewer incomprehensible things to human reason, and fewer absurdities, than are to be found in any other system! I say to myself, insolvable difficulties are to be found in all systems, because the mind of man is too limited to remove them. They prove nothing, however, against a preference, but only in reference to their direct proofs."*

Dr. Clarke had, in some way which does not appear, incurred the displeasure of Mr. Pope, who took several opportunities of throwing a sarcasm at him. There is one in allusion to this à priori demonstration, which has been often noticed by philosophers and theologians.

"Let others creep by timid steps and slow,
On plain experience lay foundations low,
By common sense to common knowledge bred,
And last to Nature's cause through Nature led;
We nobly take the high priori road,

And reason downwards till we doubt of God."

The metaphysical discussions which Dr. Clarke entered into with Leibnitz and others, on the liberty of the human will, and other topics, are well entitled to a careful perusal. The reader will find a vast fund of subtile and dexterous argument.†

* Vol. 3.

† Dr. Clarke's work on the "Being and Attributes of the Deity," produced an extended controversy in his day. It was noticed by Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, in his Notes on Archbishop King's "Origin of Evil." This gave rise to another piece, entitled, "A Defence of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration." Bishop Law again took up the

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pen to defend his positions, in a Postcript" to Dr. King's work. "A second Defence of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration" appeared. Then came a pamphlet called "Dr. Clarke's Notion of Space examined." A Mr. John Jackson published an Essay, "The Existence and Unity of God, from his Nature and Attributes; being a Vindication of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration."

CHAPTER V.

BAYLE.

BAYLE'S Dictionary exercised a great and beneficial influence over the interests of philosophy in general, and the study of the human mind in particular, in the eighteenth century. For many years it formed a sort of rallying point for all discussions founded on human nature. History, biography, morals, politics, religion, and metaphysics; everything was jumbled together, without order or system; yet everything possessed an interest and charm, from the peculiar manner in which it was treated.

We cannot tell what Bayle's real opinions were on the Philosophy of the Mind; or whether he had any settled ones at all. He was accused of having a decided leaning towards the Manichean theory, but this accusation has been amply rebutted by Le Clerc, in his publication entitled "Parrhasiana, ou Pensées Diverses." This want of settled opinions on the nature of mind, did not arise in Bayle from