how completely Collins has anticipated Dr. Jonathan Edwards, the most celebrated, and indisputably the ablest champion of the scheme of necessity who has since appeared. The coincidence is so perfect, that the outline given by the former, of the plan of his work, might have served with equal propriety as a preface to that of the latter.

"From the whole tenor of the Philosophical Inquiry,' it is evident, that Collins (one of the most obnoxious writers of his day to divines of all denominations) was not less solicitous than his successor Edwards to reconcile his metaphysical notions with man's accountableness and moral agency. The remarks accordingly of Clarke, upon Collins's work, are equally applicable to that of Edwards. It is to be regretted that they seem never to have fallen into the hands of this very acute and honest reasoner. As for Collins, it is a remarkable circumstance, that he attempted no reply to this tract of Clarke's, although he lived twelve years after its publication. The reasonings contained in it, together with those on the same subject in his correspondence with Leibnitz, and in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,' form, in my humble opinion, the most important as well as powerful of all his metaphysical arguments. The adversaries with whom he had to contend were, both of them, eminently distinguished by ingenuity and subtility; and he seems to have put forth to the utmost his logical strength, in contending with such antagonists. "The liberty or moral agency of man (says his friend Bishop Hoadly)

was a darling point for him. He excelled always, and showed a superiority to all, whenever it came into private discourse or public debates. But he never more excelled than when he was pressed with the strength Leibnitz was master of; which made him exert all his talents to set it once again in a clear light, to guard it against the evil of metaphysical obscurities, and to give the finishing stroke to a subject which must ever be the foundation of morality in man, and is the ground of the accountableness of intelligent creatures for all their actions." "*

Mr. Collins's "Essay concerning the right use of Reason in Propositions," is a sensible little work. He defines Reason to be "that faculty, whereby it perceives the truth, falsehood, probability or improbability of propositions."

The true criterion of truth is the perception of the mind. Collins maintains there can be no other foundation of certainty.t

See Note A. at the end of the Volume.

* Dissertation, p. 148.

This Essay was attacked in "A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Benjamin Pratt," by William Caroll, published in 1707, wherein it is affirmed that it leads directly to Atheism.

CHAPTER IV.

DR. SAMUEL CLARKE.

THE controversial writings of Dr. Clarke, on metaphysical subjects, fully entitle him to a particular notice in this work. His zeal in defence of sound principles of philosophy and religion led him to engage in controversies with Leibnitz and Collins.

The Doctor is distinguished in metaphysical history by his famous demonstration, à priori, of the existence of a Deity. This disquisition took its rise from a passage in the Scholium attached to Sir Isaac Newton's "Principia" in these words, "Eternus est et infinitus omnipotens et omnisciens! id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum......Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit." This proposition is stated

"God

by Dr. Clarke in the following language. is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, he endures from everlasting to everlasting, and is present from infinity to infinity. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures always, and is present everywhere; and by existing always and everywhere, constitutes duration and space.'

Upon this foundation Dr. Clarke endeavoured to rear his à priori argument for the existence of a Deity. The substance of his doctrine is briefly this. The mind of man is so framed, that it is forcibly led to a firm belief, that space and time are two things whose annihilation it is impossible to conceive. Immensity and eternity do not possess a real substantive existence, they are but mere attributes of matter. The great and eternal Being to whom these attributes of immensity and eternity belong, must also necessarily exist. The existence of a Deity is, in Dr. Clarke's opinion, clearly demonstrable, from these general ideas of time and space, which form, as it were, a constituent part of the mind of man, and which, under no conceivable circumstances, seem susceptible of any elementary modification or change whatever.

This line of argument has, for many years past, been considered among the learned and philosophical, as very defective; and it has, consequently, been generally abandoned by metaphysicians and theologians for the arguments à posteriori in favour of the existence of a First Cause. Indeed Dr. Clarke

candidly owns the weakness of his argument; for in his 8th Proposition, on "The Being and Attributes of God," he affirms that the First Cause must be intelligent, but admits that the proposition is not susceptible of a strict à priori demonstration. His language on this point is, "Now, that the self-existent Being is not such a blind and unintelligent necessity, but in the most proper sense an understanding and really active Being, cannot indeed be demonstrated à priori; because, (through the imperfections of our faculties) we know not wherein intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary connection of it with selfexistence, as we can that of eternity, infinity, unity, &c."*

The celebrated dispute carried on between Leibnitz and Clarke, related to the necessary existence of Time and Space. The former maintained that Space is merely the order of things co-existing, and Time nothing but the successive order of events. Dr. Clarke, on the other side, affirmed that both Space and Time were infinite, immutable, and indestructible. Both disputants showed great knowledge and talent in the discussion, but threw little light on our perceptions or ideas of these two things. On the Continent, victory has generally been proclaimed in favour of Leibnitz.t

The following beautiful and profound observa

• Demonstration of the Attributes, p. 52.

† See D'Alembert, "Mélanges, &c." § 14; and Bailly's "Eloge de Leibnitz."