the author's general principle relative to the formation of our ideas, and the best means of communicating knowledge to others.*

*The complete works of Condillac were published at Paris, 1821, in 16 vols. 8vo.

CHAPTER XI.

ROUSSEAU, DUMARSAIS, VAUVENARGUES, LE CAT, TURGOT, AND D'ALEMBERT.

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

ROUSSEAU was not a theoretical metaphysician, but he did cultivate the science of mind to some extent. His power of disseminating what he did know was prodigious. No man in France ever displayed more influence over the imagination of the people, or could more intensely rivet their attention, than the author of " Emilius." His mental philosophy was chiefly taken from the writings of Descartes and Montaigne. It was on the whole an impure mixture, and its influence was any thing but salutary on the minds of the public.

DUMARSAIS.

The metaphysical opinions of Dumarsais are contained in his "Logique," which is grounded on that of the Port-Royal. There is great clearness

and simplicity in all the mental disquisitions of the author. He culls out of all preceding writers what he considers worthy of selection, and adds many novel and acute observations of his own.

Dumarsais rejects the doctrine of innate ideas, and thinks there is no good ground for their existence. He acknowledges, however, the existence of an innate aptitude to acquire certain ideas, and this he thinks is one of the great principles of our nature, which those who are occupied with the important office of instructors should carefully study.

The impressions we receive from external objects he denominates immediate sentiments; and the recognition which the mind takes of these, by an act of inward reflection, he calls mediate sentiments. These latter ideas are the most important we possess.

The faculty of abstraction is considered the most important of all the mental powers; it is the key to all our knowledge. Dumarsais describes it with great clearness and accuracy. On the nature of language, and its influence on the mind in the operations of reasoning, the author has treated at considerable length in his "Fragmens sur les Causes de la Parole." In this work he has adopted the maxim of Leibnitz, that language is the mirror of the understanding.

VAUVENARGUES.

Luc de Classiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues, was

descended from an ancient and noble family in Provence, and was born in 1715. He is the author of a small metaphysical work, entitled "Introduction à la Connaissance de l'Esprit Humain." He entered the army at a very early age, and remained there for the space of nine years. Having lost his health from the fatigues he underwent at the famous retreat from Prague, in 1742, he quitted the profession of arms. He was soon after attacked by small-pox, which nearly deprived him of sight. He died in 1747, at the age of thirty-two years.*

The metaphysical opinions of Vauvenargues seem to have been founded on those of Mr. Locke. The former maintains there are three intellectual principles in man, the imagination, reflection, and memory. By the term imagination, he seems to mean the gift of conceiving things in a metaphorical or figurative manner; and, also, to include all the sensations we experience from the external senses. He says, "Imagination speaks always to the senses; and is the inventor of the arts, and the ornament of the mind."

Reflection is the power we possess of falling back, as it were, upon our ideas; of examining them, and modifying, combining, and arranging them as we

Marmontel speaks highly of Vauvenargues. He says, "En le lisant, je crois encore l'entendre, et je ne sais pas si sa conversation n'avait pas même quelque chose de plus animé, de plus délicat que ses divins écrits." Again the same writer remarks, "Doux, sensible, compatissant, il tenait nos âmes dans ses mains. Une sérénité inaltérable dérobait ses douleurs aux yeux de l'amitié. Pour soutenir l'adversité, on n'avait besoin que de son exemple; et témoin de l'égalité de son âme, on n'osait être malheureux avec lui."

like. This power is the foundation of all reasoning and argumentation.

Memory acts as a sort of dépôt or store-house for our ideas. Most of our reasonings are founded upon the faculty of memory. It is requisite, however, for a perfect constitution of mind, that the memory should bear a due proportion to the other powers. It is chiefly upon this harmony that our mental excellencies depend.

Upon these three faculties of the mind the Marquis engrafts all our other intellectual powers. These are invention, quickness, sagacity, correctness of judgment, common sense, depth of thought, delicacy and sensibility, comprehension of mind, wit, taste, genius, seriousness, and presence of mind.

The views of Vauvenargues on that power of the mind called common sense, is worthy of notice. "Good sense, or common sense," says he, "does not seem to consist in a very subtile or profound judgment, but rather in that accurate perception of those obvious relations which objects bear to our nature and condition. Common sense does not then mean the act of thinking upon things with what is commonly designated great profundity of thought, but in considering them in relation to their utility, and their obvious connexions with every-day life and movements."

"If we look through a microscope, we shall undoubtedly perceive many qualities of objects which the eye alone does not reveal to us; but then we shall see all such objects not in their natural relations to the nature of man, as they manifest them