campaign began, it was scarcely believed, in high quarters, that this could be done. To supply an army of such a magnitude, over a single line of faulty railroad, hundreds of miles from its true base, was a new and untried thing.1

The best soldiers in Europe pronounced the attempt quixotic, and the War Department and Mr. Lincoln, it must be confessed, grew more and more nervous, as Sherman plunged deeper and deeper into Georgia. The Army of the Potomac, not much more numerous as a whole, professed to be baffled by it, again and again; it never got a hundred miles away from its base at Washington on a single-track railroad; and experienced quartermasters East and West, of acknowledged capacity, were dubious as to the result. But Allen and his subordinates, at Nashville, Chattanooga, and elsewhere, accepted the task, and not only "filled the bill," but did it magnificently.2

In his "Official Report of the Atlanta Campaign" Sherman said: “From that day to this (May 1 to September 15, 1864) stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time." It is not often that the quartermaster's department gets such generous recognition. But Sherman could well afford it; for the whole problem of his campaign was wrapped up in this one question of transportation and supplies, as no one more willingly conceded than that great captain himself always.3

With the fall of Atlanta and Sherman's departure for

1 It is true he had river transportation also, via the Cumberland and the Tennessee to Nashville part of the year. But from Louisville south there was only a single track road to Nashville about two hundred miles, and it was one hundred and fifty-one miles more to Chattanooga, and one hundred and thirty-eight more to Atlanta, or nearly five hundred in all from the Ohio-his true base.

2 Several of his officers were of great ability and singular devotion-particularly the Senior and Supervising Quartermaster at Nashville, General J. L. Donaldson, another West Pointer of rare gifts and superior merit--but it does not come within the scope of this chapter to particularize further.

In his "Official Report of Atlanta Campaign," speaking of this, Sherman frankly says: "I know more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this, than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign.-War Records, vol. xxxviii, part i, p. 84.

Savannah, General Thomas soon coupled the defeat and almost annihilation of Hood before Nashville. This ended the war, practically, in the West; and though General Allen continued to send large supplies to Nashville, and down the Mississippi generally, until after the surrender of Lee and Johnston, yet his chief work was

over.

It is true, he "lent a hand" in the transportation East of the Twenty-third Corps, in the spring of 1865; and had considerable to do in fitting out and following up various cavalry expeditions into East Tennessee and West Virginia soon afterward; and also was somewhat busy again later in the season, when Sherman's and Thomas's veterans returned to Louisville for muster out and retransportation to their homes. But all this was "child's play," compared with the multiplied and herculean labors he had performed throughout the war, and for which he was duly brevetted major general to date from March 13, 1865.

To present some of his work a little more specifically, I give the following figures from official reports; which, it is submitted, speak for themselves. From October 1, 1861, to June 30, 1865, he received and disbursed himself, on account of the United States, $106,694,657.24. During the same period there was disbursed at St. Louis, under his direction, $90,799.435.88 in addition. That is to say, during the said period, he made and controlled an aggregate expenditure of $197.494,093.12 of the public funds. His total disbursements during the Civil War, including those prior to October 1, 1861, and subsequent to June 30, 1865, exceeded $200,000,000-a greater sum, I venture to say, than was ever handled by a single quartermaster in this or any other country, during an equal period of time. And not a dollar of it stolen or misappropriated. To gain some idea of the magnitude of this amount, and what it represents, and what the Civil War

cost us, it may not be amiss to add, that the total disbursements of the quartermaster's department for 1860 by all its officers from Boston to San Francisco, and from the Lakes to the Gulf-were only about $6,000,000!

To enumerate the supplies purchased and transported by this great sum of money is, of course, impracticable. But a few of the principal items are suggestive, to wit: 26,234,423 bushels of oats; 8,864,173 bushels of corn; 337,518 tons of hay; 100,364 horses; 75,329 mules; 60,854 sets of harness; 6,638 wagons; 1,269 ambulances.

Other heavy items will occur to the reader, but those above cited are difficult to realize, so vast are the figures. Suppose we try to. For example, if you hitch six mules to each of his wagons, the usual army team, and allow sixty feet to each team and wagon, the usual marching distance when teams are well "closed up," they would extend about seventy-five miles. If you hitch two more of the mules to each of his ambulances, and allow forty feet to each team and ambulance, their usual marching distance, they would extend about ten miles more. This would still leave about forty thousand of his mules ungeared. If you put these in column, two by two, and allow fifteen feet to each span, which is as close as they can well travel, they would stretch out about forty-eight miles farther. If to these we add the surplus horses, at the same rate, they would extend one hundred and fifty miles more. That is, altogether, they would constitute an army train or traveling caravan two hundred and eighty-three miles long; which is fortythree miles farther than from New York to Washington; or, to turn the other way, the train would reach from New York, through Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, to Portsmouth.

If now his wagons are driven up to his huge pile of forage, and loaded at the rate of two thousand pounds to each wagon, the usual marching load, it would take one million

eighty-seven thousand one hundred and seventy-eight wagons more to move the remainder of his oats, corn, and hay. These wagons all put in line, with teams in marching order, would extend to the enormous distance of twelve thousand two hundred and fifty-seven miles, or more than half around the earth. If, in addition, we were to load up the clothing and the tentage which he received and issued, of which no figures are given above, we would require several thousands of wagons more.

To load up the rest of his quartermaster stores, such as iron, coal, lumber, lime, hardware, paints, oils, rope, etc., would complete a wagon train that, altogether, would belt the globe. If now at the head of this grand column we were to place his garrison equipage, in the hands of his numerous civilian employees (clerks, mechanics, teamsters, laborers, etc.), amounting to the many thousands— at Nashville alone over twelve thousand in 1865-with orders to "Forward, march!" what a blare of bugles, and what a flutter and waving of guidons and colors there would be!

Such was Robert Allen: soldier, gentleman, Christian -a great staff officer; an American and a quartermaster of whom we may well be proud. I had the honor to serve under him nearly two years (1863-65), chiefly at Nashville, Tenn.

Other good quartermasters we had, such as Rucker, at Washington; Donaldson, at Nashville; Ingalls, in the Army of the Potomac; and Easton, in the Army of the Mississippi. All these were great and brainy officers, too -all old West Pointers, of course. I knew and honored them all. But Allen, I think, outtopped them all, and will live in history as the Great Quartermaster of our Civil War.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE ANGEL OF THE THIRD CORPS

IT is true that our mothers and sisters, our wives and sweethearts, did not do any fighting during the war. They did not carry muskets, nor swing sabers, nor storm batteries, nor even campaign and march with us. But they did pretty much everything else; and in many instances. and on frequent occasions they felt the war even more keenly than the average officer and soldier did. They scraped lint; they made havelocks and hospital bandages; they packed our knapsacks; they cheered us as we left; they prayed for us while absent; and they welcomed our return. They were our faithful allies in the rear, and with cheerful hearts sent their bravest and best to the front for four long years, though certain of heart-breaking news sooner or later. Alas, how "long" they were to

many a poor lady!

So, too, these allies thronged our hospitals and hospital boats, both at the front and in the rear; and by their angelic presence and divine sympathy saved many a poor fellow's life, or eased and comforted his dying hours. So, too, they organized "Soldiers' Children's Homes" all over the North, where the orphan children of our soldiers would be tenderly cared for and educated, and future homes provided for them. What nobler work could there be than this?

I did not meet "Mother Bickerdyke," of Western memory; but I did meet Miss Gilson, of Eastern memory, and beg to record some recollections of her here. For over two years she came under my frequent observation in the Army of the Potomac; and I personally knew her, and