plies, and, drawing the Confederate cavalry off in that direction, thus opened the way for Grant's advance to the James.

Grant's Wilderness campaign as a whole, it must be confessed, was bloody and disappointing. But he had grimly made up his mind "to fight it out on that line, if it took all summer," and pluckily stuck to it, as he ought to have done. About the middle of June he crossed the James and sat down before Petersburg, holding Lee as in a vise, but unable to compel his surrender.

Secure within his marvelous lines, Lee soon began to play his old game of menacing Washington, by way of the Shenandoah Valley, hoping thus to induce Grant to relax his hold or finally to retire like McClellan. But this time

he mistook his adversary. Grant retained his deathlike grip on Petersburg; but, detaching Sheridan, sent his young lieutenant to the Valley, with orders to clean it of Confederates and destroy all military supplies there, and thus close that back door to Washington for the rest of the

war.

This was Sheridan's first independent command. He had fairly earned it by his gallantry and good sense, and right well did he justify it. He no longer had Rosecrans, or Thomas, or Grant to lean on or consult with; but now, widely separated from army headquarters, had to think and plan and act for himself. Mr. Stanton, looking him all over through his imperious spectacles, thought him too young for such a grave command;1 but yielded his opinion to the joint and wiser opinions of Halleck and Grant. He was given a mixed command of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, amounting to about twenty-five thousand men, against the Confederate force of, say, twenty thousand. It is true Jubal Early afterward alleged he had only about eight thousand men altogether in the Valley; but Sheridan

1 Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. i, p. 463.

answered by publishing the provost marshal general's receipts for over thirteen thousand prisoners he had captured from Early.

Once in the saddle, he quickly assembled his command in the lower valley, with headquarters at Hall Town, near Harper's Ferry. As a whole, it was not a very satisfactory command. For much of it had been ridden over and around and through, pretty much as the Confederate chiefs had willed. But Sheridan immediately set to work to reorganize and discipline it-changing officers, inspecting regiments, consolidating brigades-until he knew what he had and whom he could depend upon, and how much he could depend upon them. Then, about the middle of August, he advanced cautiously to Cedar Creek, but presently retired again to Hall Town, because the enemy seemed too strong, and he was still uncertain of his men, and could find no good defensive position farther up the Valley.

This retrograde movement, so like its predecessors, and so disappointing to Mr. Lincoln, filled Stanton and Halleck with dismay, and even Grant became impatient, and finally left Petersburg and came up to Washington himself, resolved to force the fighting in the Valley. He even proceeded as far as Charlestown, with a prepared plan of campaign in his pocket. But Sheridan easily satisfied him his own "plan" was right, and in reply to Grant's eager inquiries answered that he had completed his preparations, and was now all ready to go in. Grant characteristically pocketed his "plan of campaign"1-never even alluded to it-and tersely bade him "Go in ;" and immediately Sheridan moved out from his lines and advanced upon the enemy like a thunderbolt.

He struck the Confederates first at Opequan (or Winchester) September 19, and again at Fisher's Hill Septem

1 Grant's Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 328.

ber 22, and "sent Early whirling up the Valley," with the loss of over five thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle flags. He struck them again at Cedar Creek October 19, and, although his command had been surprised and routed in the early morning under General Wright, and was in full retreat on his arrival from Washington (whither he had rightfully gone under orders hastily to confer with Stanton and Halleck on imperative matters he could not otherwise settle1—being absent but three days, with only four hours in Washington, something extraordinary), he stopped the retreat, reformed his lines, and before nightfall attacked and routed Early in turn-recapturing our old camps, and all the artillery, camp equipage, and transportation Wright had lost, and also taking over twelve hundred prisoners, twenty-four pieces of artillery, and many battle flags from the Confederates, now routed and fleeing like chaff before the wind.

This was by all odds the most brilliant victory of the war, of its size and kind, and has well been immortalized by Thomas Buchanan Read in his stirring lyric, "Sheridan's Ride." It captured the imagination and aroused the enthusiasm of the loyal North as few victories did; and out of the very depths of his soul President Lincoln wrote him: "I tender to you and your brave army the thanks of the nation, and my own personal admiration and gratitude, for your month's operations in the Shenandoah Valley; and (what was dearer to Sheridan) immediately promoted him to be Major General U. S. A. Stanton, as I have said, had thought him too young to command in the Valley; but now he also wrote, commending him unreservedly for "his personal gallantry and military skill, whereby, under the blessing of Providence, his routed army was reorganized, a great national disaster averted,

1 See Appendix, p. 381.

and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days."

Sheridan now set to work to clean out the Valley as a field for Confederate operations, and, it must be conceded, made thorough work of it. He stretched his cavalry from mountain ridge to mountain ridge, and then moved down the Valley, driving all horses, cattle, sheep, and swine before him, and capturing or destroying all grain, hay, and other military supplies, and burning all grist mills, until that paradise of Virginia was one wild scene of devastation and desolation; or, as he himself wrote General Grant: "We have cleaned out the Valley so completely, that if a crow wants to cross it, he will have to carry his rations with him." Of course, this was not relished by the inhabitants there; but it was war, pure and simple, stern and awful, and closed that "back door to Washington" effectually for the remainder of the Rebellion.

Late in February following he entered upon his final campaign in the Valley. Early in the winter he had sent his infantry mainly to Grant, and now took ten thousand cavalry and swept up the Valley, and swooped down on James River above Richmond, intending to cross it and join either Grant or Sherman. But he found the James swollen and impassable, because of spring freshets; with its bridges gone and his own pontoons insufficient. So he contented himself with destroying canals and smashing railroads there, and then swept back around Richmond with superb disdain; threshing as with a flail all forces sent in pursuit of him; and, crossing the James below Richmond on March 26, reported in person to Grant again in front of Petersburg. How it must have delighted General Grant to receive him and his column back, and what a welcome he must have given to his brave and capable young lieutenant!

Clearly here was an officer after Grant's own heart, who

had vindicated his judgment and sagacity-whom he could trust all through-and he hastened to set him to work again. Lincoln came down from Washington, Sherman came up from North Carolina, and they all four met in council at City Point. Grant's first thought was to send Sheridan down to Sherman, and then for them both to march up and join him before Petersburg, and Sherman also favored this plan. But Sheridan hotly opposed it, and insisted that the Army of the Potomac alone was well able to whip Lee, and would be dishonored if helped by Sherman.1 Finally Grant yielded, Sherman went back to North Carolina, and March 28 Sheridan got his orders to move out and “reach the right and rear" of Lee, and "force him out of his intrenched lines," if possible.

"Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy, as circumstances dictate!" These were the final orders of General Grant, that led to Lee's surrender-the beginning of his end-and they well show how much Grant relied upon and trusted Sheridan.

The very next morning Sheridan was in the saddle again, and our whole cavalry moved out, with the infantry following in part. But now a vicious rain set in, and the bottoms dropped out of the Virginia roads. Both horses and soldiers became stalled in the mud and quicksands, and March 30 Grant ordered a halt and partial return to the railroad again.

This disgusted Sheridan, and mounting a powerful gray (captured at Missionary Ridge) he rode six miles through the mud and rain, from Dinwiddie Court House to Grant's headquarters at Gravelly Run, and earnestly protested that they would all be ridiculed and ruined, if

1 Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 128-132.