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printed in this colle&ion, appears to great advantage, from the judicious amendment which our editor has bestowed upon it. In his note he says:
• These four stanzas appeared to the editor to be all that are genuine of this elegy. Many additional ones are to be found in the common copies, which are rejected as of meaner execution,'
Lady Bothwell's Lament, as it now tands, is perhaps one of the prettiest elegiac poems in our language, as it excels every thing of the kind in nature, pathos, and simplicity. It may be read over and over, with the greatest pleasure;
decies repetita placebit. We shall therefore insert this elegant morceau, for the entertainment of our readers.
It may be neceffary to premise, that the old Scottish word balow, in the first line, signifies bush. The amicted and deserted mother is suppofed thus to address the infant in her
“LADY BOTHWELL'S LAMENT.
fwo Discourses; on Sovereign Power, and Liberty of Consciences
Translated from the Latin of G. Noodt, formerly Profesor of Law in the University of Leyden, by A. Macaulay, A. M. 8vo. 5s.
Dilly. THE HE design of this work is to enquire into the nature and
extent of sovereign power; and into the true principles of toleration in matters of religion. The judicious manner in which the author treats those subjects; soon recommended both the Discourses to the attention of the public ; and they have since been translated into different languages.
In the former of those discourses, the author sets out with delineating the difference between a prince and a tyrant.
• I have often been astonished, says he, gentlemen, that some men of great and eminent abilities, who have professed to treat of sovereign power, should ascribe the same rights to a prince and to a tyrant; than which no two characters can be conceived more widely opposite. The one governs his subjects by their own consent; the other against their consent: the one has the public good solely in view ; the other only consults his own advantage: the one observes the laws ; the other tramples them under foot: the one regards the life, liberty, and property of every individual as sacred things, and from which he withholds his hands, his looks, nay his very defires; the other imagines that he possesses an absolute right to all those, and that he may dispose of them according to his own pleasure. In short, the one resembling the Supreme Being ; and, according to his example, desirous of promoting the happiness of mankind ; is beloved, respected, and adored both at home and abroad ; all flock to him, as to the source of their felicity; with a determined resolution to devote themselves to the fervice of a prince, whose foul, they perceive, animates, unites, and governs them, by whom they are rendered flourishing and happy : the other, born for a public plague, never promotes the happiness of any worthy citizen, but rather does all the mischief he can to the whole world ; therefore becomes an object of universal disguft, abhorrence, and execration ; and wherever he goes, like a beast of prey moving from his den, he spreads fear, terror, and desolation all around him. But it is an evident dictate of reason, that a prince should not be confounded with a tyrant ; and also, that the power of the former should not be allowed to operate according to his own caprice, but be confined within the limits of justice and the laws : yet, notwithstanding, it happens, by I know not what fatality, to be a generally-received maxim, that it is effential to the nature of sovereignty, that the prince should be raised above the laws ; insomuch, that if he regard nothing but his VOL. LII. Sept. 1781.
own interest, to the entire neglect of his subjects, they have no other remedy than the glory to obey, and to suffer patiently; and, that he is responsible for his conduct to God alone, from whom, according to them, all supreme authority is originally derived. Few there are who in this question take the part of the people. The cause of the tyrant is generally maintained under the specious appellation of prince; and, if the interests of the prince and people should happen to clash, so as to render necessary the diminution, or even entire destruction of one party ; in such a case, those people would fain persuade themselves and others, that to allow the prince a full liberty of oppreiling his subjects by acts of injustice and enormous cruelty, would be more just and advantageous, than to permit the subjects to repress the violence of a prince bent upon their ruin: as if they who have been allotted to live under the authority of others, were not of the same species with those who exercise that authority; or, as if those alone were to be regarded upon the footing of men, to whom the confent of other men has delegated an authority over themselves ! For my own part, when I enquire into the reasons of a fentiment so illiberal and inhuman, I am at a loss to reconcile them in any point of view to the law of nature. Whoever
be that entertain fuch sentiments, whether princes or courtiers, give me leave to say, that you pervert what is in itself excellent and sacred; and that by means of
ambition mean adulation, civil government, which was established to secure the peaceful enjoyment of the conveniences and pleasures of life, is turned to the destruction of mankind : that you reject truth, justice, and public utility, and adopt maxims that are destructive, unjust, and precarious ; for an unlimited power can never be secure nor durable.'
The author next proceeds to fhew, that unlimited power is no necessary confequence of greatness ; that though God himself were the author of fovereignty, yet would that give princes no right to claim an unlimited power; that all men are by nature equal; but that this natural liberty does not authorize licentiousness. He shews that men have been led by nature to live in society ; and proves from the nature and defign of civil sociсty, that sovereign power should not extend beyond what is necessary for the public good. He contends, that it matters not, whether a prince have solemnly engaged to follow certain laws or not; and that a people who submit to the discretionary authority of a prince, do not therefore invest him with unlimited power.
The second part of the first discourse is chiefly an illustration of the Lex Regia of the Romans, or that law upon which the
fu. empt left
fupreme authority of the emperors was founded. In treating of this subject, the author makes several just observations, tending to elucidate and ascertain the meaning of Ulpian, in regard to the extent of the sovereign power. He maintains that the Roman emperors were not exempted from the observance of all the civil laws, and for this opinion, he produces strong arguments in opposition even to the authority of Dio Caslius.
• It will be replied, however “ that the authority of Ulpian is no less express, who in general terms afferts, that the prince is discharged from all obligation to observe the laws.' Granted : but when, I pray, and by what law, was he exempted ? “ By the Lex Regia, it will be said, which was enacted under Auguftus, and by which the Roman people are said to have transferred to that prince, in his own person, all their empire and all their power.” I must beg leave to inform those who build their opinions upon this point, that most of the emperors who succeeded Augustus, received their government by a fingle decree of the senate, or by a single law, to which the ancient civilians afterwards gave the name of the royal or imperial law; that Aagustus never received the empire under any such name, but by a variety of laws, and ordinances of the senate, paficd at different times. Should you be surprized at this, I would have you attentively examine the whole course of Augustus’s life, trace all his consulships in the order that Dio Cafius hath related them, and you will be convinced of the truth of the above affertion : I could adduce a variety of arguments in proof of it, had. I not been anticipated by a writer of diftinguished eminence, one of the greatest ornaments not only of this university, but of the republic of letters ; I mean Gronovius.
I will only add one remark, which seems not to have occurred to that illustrious writer, nor to any other author, so far as I recollect, and it is this : that by whatever ordinance of the fenate Augustus might have been exempted from the laws, it was not the fame by which the supreme government of the empire was conveyed to him ; for this (if we believe Dio Cailius) took place in the seventh consulthip of Augustus. But it was in his tenth consulship, according to the same author, that the senate passed a decree by which he was exempted from the observance of the laws : and even in that decree to which our author refers, the emperor was not fet above all the laws, but only above one, and that was the Cincian law; although Dio in this place expresses himself in terms too general. And this I ground upon the narration of our historian himself; for, speaking of the reasons which induced the fenate to ex
empt Auguftus from the laws, he informs us, that the enperor having promised to distribute a certain sum of money among the people, pretended afterwards that the laws would not permit him to perform his promise, without the consent of the fenate; in confequence of which, that this emperor might be enabled to extend his liberality beyond the limitation of the Cincian law, Dio says “ that the senate discharged him from the obligation of the laws.”
This form of expression, according to the usual modes of speech among the Romans, ought to be confined to the Cincian law; but Dio, who was a Greek, extends it to all laws in general, whether from ignorance or fattery I cannot say, but he certainly had no right nor reason to take such liberties.'
The learned professor seems clearly to evince, that Augustus was not freed from the observance of all the laws, but of those only which the fenate had nominally dispensed; and that he was under equal obligations to observe the rest as any other private citizen.
In the discourse on Liberty of Conscience, the author fhews, that by the law of nature and nations, religion is not subjected to human authority ; that by the law of nature, every man is at liberty to conduct himself according to his own judgment, in matters which relate only to himself; that the nature of religion requires, that every one be free to follow his own judgment; and that this freedom is absolutely necessary, on account of the unavoidable diversity and infinite variety of sentiments among men. He remarks, that to refufe iberty of confcience, is, to encroach on the rights of God, and to counteract his intention; and that intolerance cannot be vindicated by any reasonable motive. He contends, however, that every man ought to submit to the ecclesiastical difcipline of that fociety of which he is a member; and he afterwards defines, with precision, the extent of ecclefiaftical authority.
The second part of this discourse contains answers to the objections against toleration. The whole of the author's observations and arguments, in both discourses, evinces a clear uuderstanding, an attentive examination of the subjects, and a (trong attachment to the principles of civil and religious liberty.
Eight Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. By
James Bandinel, D. D. of Jesus College, and Public Orator of the Univerfity. 8vo. 45.
Cadell. THESE discourses were preached before the University in
year . and pious John Bampton, M. A. canon of Salisbury; who