guard. They never minded doing sentinel duty on the out-posts. The picket line was a place of horror, of danger, and responsibility, yet there was something inspiring and soldier-like in guarding the front. But camp guard, compelling them to stand and watch over a pile of corn, or a lot of half starved army mules, or some equally uninteresting object—it was then that the iron entered the soul, and many were the devices practiced by "old soldiers" to be relieved of this duty. Here let us pause. The years have passed, summer and winter. Each season in its appointed time has held in its embrace the north land and the south land alike. The shell-shattered tree, the cannonrifted earth, the torn bastions, the fields ploughed by "war's dread enginery" have all changed their rude, sad features. The tender touch of nature has shrouded in moss, creeper, and verdure, the riven tree. The broken earth has been brought by industry into smiling places of plenty. The wild flowers bloom where the deadly missiles hurtled fast and furious. Dear nature has kissed alike the graves of Union and Confederate, and her robes of verdure or of snow are the proofs of loving impartiality. But memories live. The "boys" came home again, North and South—but alas! not all of them. As Francis A. Durivage so simply and pathetically sings: "There hangs a sabre, and there a rein, "Come out to the stable; it is not far, The moss-grown door is hanging ajar; "The good black steed came riderless home, "All? O God! it is all I can speak, His saddle and sabre hang on the wall, And his horse pined to death — I have told you all.” CHAPTER XXV. A WARNING ON THE RIO GRANDE. SHERIDAN IS SENT TO TEXAS-GRANT'S LOVE FOR "LITTLE PHIL -AFTER JAUREZ AT PASO DEL NORTE-THE OLD CHURCH — OUR CALI- THE surrender of Lee with the chief army of the Confederacy at Appomattox, the capture of Richmond also, and the flight of the Confederate President and of his Cabinet, promised, but did not quite insure, that peace for which the leaders of the Union armies had been so long laboring. Sherman was well into North Carolina when Grant told the men of Lee's army to take their horses and go home to plough, accepting unhesitatingly the paroles of men who had been under arms four years for the purpose of dissevering our National Union, that thereafter they would become and remain faithful and peaceful citizens of the land they had sought to disrupture with such courage and vigor as compel one to mourn that the splendid qualities they so lavishly displayed had not been expended in a better cause than that of making "African slavery" the "corner-stone" of a confederacy, which could not exist except upon the ruins of our Federal Union. The military situation, however, concerns the victorious commanders more than the political consequences that directly follow their victories. Still, Grant could not be quite regardless of these. The assassination of Mr. Lincoln, so soon after Appomattox, terribly complicated affairs by its rapid creation of a public opinion bitterly hostile to all elements in the fallen Confederacy. We now see how little the Southern people had to do with the atrocious acts of Wilkes Booth and his small band of conspirators; but at that date we knew it not. Then came the Sherman-Johnston compact, under the pretense of an armistice. With all his genius, Sherman lacked the marvelous equipoise which made Grant so supremely sagacious in war, and in all its operations and consequences. He could not and did not resist the trap into which he was led at Raleigh, under the hope of solving seriously the problems of permanent peace, found in the relations of the states to each other. It needed Grant's faith in his great lieutenant and the public confidence in himself to arrange the North Carolina affair, without leaving anything but some sharp personal feeling behind it. But there was serious work for Sheridan to do. As Adam Badeau shows, there was on Grant's part a genuine love for, as well as confidence felt in Sheridan by his commanding officer and those about him Badeau says: Without Sheridan, Grant's triumph would not have been so complete; for it was Sheridan, who by rapid marches and incessant blows secured the enveloping, and thus the surrender of Lee. After this Grant fairly loved Sheridan. The affection was founded on admiration ; the intimacy grew out of achievement.] While Grant was sick and dying, Sheridan wrote: 'It is unnecessary for me to use words to express my attachment to General Grant and his family. I have not gone to see him, as I could only bring additional distress to them, and I want to remember him as I knew him in good health.' "At the close of the war, on the very day of the grand review at Washington, Grant dispatched Sheridan with secret orders to the Rio Grande to watch the frontier. He was told to be ready for any emergency. He performed his part, as usual, well, and when the French were withdrawn Grant placed him in command at New Orleans.” The interest thus manifested by General Grant in the Republic of Mexico, and the condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, are forcibly illustrated in the following letter, written a little later by the conqueror of Lee. Grant had a great dislike to William H. Seward, and in this letter indirectly exhibits this feeling. The letter reads: HIS EXCELLENCY A. JOHNSON, WASHINGTON, June 19th, 1865. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. The great interest which I feel in securing an honorable and permanent peace whilst we still have in service a force sufficient to insure it, induces me to lay my views before you in an official form. In the first place, I regard the act of attempting to establish a monarchical government on this continent in Mexico by foreign bayonets, 319 as an act of hostility against the government of the United States. If allowed to go on until such a government is established I see nothing before us but a long, expensive, and bloody war; one in which the enemies of this country will be joined by tens of thousands of disciplined soldiers, embittered against their government by the experiences of the last four years. As a justification for open resistance to the establishment of Maximilian's government in Mexico, I would give the following reasons: First-The act of attempting to establish a monarchy on this continent was an act of known hostility to the government of the United States; was protested against at the time, and would not have been undertaken but for the great war which was raging, and which it was supposed by all the great powers of Europe, except, possibly, Russia, would result in the dismemberment of the country, and the overthrow of republican institutions. Second-Every act of the empire of Maximilian has been hostile to the government of the United States. Matamoras and the whole Rio Grande under his control, has been an open port to those in rebellion against this government. It is notorious that every article held by the rebels for export was permitted to cross the Rio Grande, and from there go unmolested to all parts of the world; and they received in return, all articles, arms, munitions of war, etc., they desired. Rebels in arms have been allowed to take refuge on Mexican soil, protected by French bayonets. French soldiers have fired on our men from the south side of the river in aid of the rebellion. Officers acting under the authority of the would-be empire, have received arms, munitions, and other public property from the rebels after the same has become the property of the United States. It is now reported, and I think there is no doubt of the truth of the report, that large, organized, and armed bodies of rebels have gone to Mexico to join the Imperialists. It is further reported, and too we will find the report confirmed, that a contract or agreement has been entered into with Duke Gwin, a traitor to his country, to invite into Mexico armed immigrants for the purpose of wrenching from the rightful government of that country states never controlled by the Imperialists. It will not do to remain quiet and theorize that by showing a strict neutrality all foreign force will be compelled to leave Mexican soil. Rebel immigrants will go to Mexico with arms in their hands. They will not be a burden upon the states, but, on the contrary, will become producers, always ready, when emergency arises, to take up their arms in defence of the cause they espouse. That their leaders will espouse the cause of the empire purely out of hostility to this government, I feel there is no doubt. There is a hope that the rank and file may take the opposite side if any influence is allowed to work upon their reason, but if a neutrality is to be observed which allows armed rebels to go to Mexico, and which keeps out all other immigrants, and which also denies to the Liberals of Mexico belligerent rights the right to buy arms and munition in foreign markets and to transport them through friendly territory to their homes, I see no chance for such influence to be brought to bear. What I would propose would be a solemn protest against the establishment of a monarchical government in Mexico by the aid of foreign bayonets. If the French have a just claim against Mexico, I would regard them as having triumphed, and would guarantee them suitable award for their grievance. Mexico would, no doubt, admit their claim if it did not affect their territory or right as a free people. The United States could take such pledges as would secure her against loss. How all this could be done without bringing on an armed conflict, others who have studied such matters could tell better than I. If this course cannot be agreed upon, then I would recognize equal belligerent rights to both parties. I would interpose no obstacle to the passage into Mexico of emigrants to that country. I would allow either party to buy arms, or anything else we have to sell, and interpose no obstacle to their transit. These views have been hastily drawn up, and contain but little of what might be said on the subject treated of. If, however, they serve to bring the matter under discussion, they will have accomplished all that is desired. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. West of the Appalachian ranges there still remained, even at the time of the grand review at Washington, some considerable Confederate forces in the field. They were not moving actively, it was true, but sufficient remained for a possible nucleus of any projected irregular operations. Certainly, west of the Mississippi, in Northern Louisiana, Southern Arkansas, and Indian Territory, and in the whole of Texas, Kirby Smith, Dick Taylor, and Sterling Price remained in command of a considerable army. The army under the latter had, it was true, been thoroughly defeated and disorganized the preceding fall by our "Army of the Border," under Generals S. R. Curtis and James G. Blunt, commanding the troops of Kansas and Missouri. But Texas was rich in supplies. Her people had grown rich from the necessities of the Confederacy. It was a serious problem for the Federal authorities to consider, and Sheridan was the one commander to be intrusted with a task that also involved the possibility of a foreign war. To subdue Kirby Smith and destroy the last remnants of Confederate resistance was an easy job to set before the young soldier who had harried the Shenandoah Valley, fought the battle of Five Forks, and at Appomattox secured all chances of Lee's retreat in his vice-like grip. But there was a deliberate intention, not publicly expressed at the time, but felt by the loyal nation, to see to it that the |