while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing, and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building.

"On the 13th, Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge and over on the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed that stream and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler who directed all supplies he wanted to be furnished.

"Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either it or Lee's army was placed. Great caution, therefore, had to be used in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of the White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised, and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 22d he was at Ayletts on the Mattapony where he learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

"Sheridan on this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army, encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them all; recaptured 400 Union prisoners, and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many munitions of war and supplies; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks."

Sheridan's rejoining the army on the North Anna was the signal for renewed cavalry service. The North Anna country was a different field of operations from any the army had been in during that series of battles. The roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. But we had neither guides nor maps to tell where the roads were, or where they led to. By reconnoitering Grant was enabled to locate those in the vicinity of each army corps. The course was south, and we took all routes leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. Hancock had the lead. He marched easterly to Guinney's Station, on the Fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly, to Bowling Green, and Milford, and was at Milford on the night of the 21st of May. Here he met a detachment of Pickett's division, which was coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guinney's Station that night without

molestation. Burnside was in supporting distance. The cavalry was again with the army, and played an important part in the Cold Harbor movements. These required that there should be great vigilance exercised. Grant threw the head of his columns to the south, and directed that they march on all roads so leading that were not too widely separated. The impression was given by our movements that we were designing to attack the left flank of Lee's army, while the real aim was to throw our own forces safely across the James, as well as other important streams that intervened. Their presence made the country very defensible. Grant says of these movements, and the use made of his cavalry, that:

"Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to Little River. Here he managed to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army. Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbett's cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's Ford, toward Hanover. As soon as it was dark both cavalry divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be made. We were enabled, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover town. This move crossed all three streams at once, and left us still where we could draw supplies. It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna, in the presence of the enemy."

In a letter of instruction to Major-General Meade, of this date, he says:

General Smith will start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, say 3 A. M. It is probable that the enemy being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank, for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out toward Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville road. I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, at 5 A. M., and communicate with Smith and return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. G.

On the 31st Sheridan's advance was near the Old Cold Harbor. He found it intrenched and occupied by rebel cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued, but the place was carried, as was the constant custom

of our troopers at this date. The importance of Cold Harbor was understood. The Confederates seemed determined that we should not hold it, returning to the attack with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any further effort to hold it against overwhelming odds. He had commenced the evacuation, but received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent him. To receive was to obey. The rebel works were speedily faced against them, and his men were placed in position for defense. Night came on, however, before the enemy was ready to renew the assault. Wright's corps was ordered directly to Cold Harbor that night, marching in the rear of our army. It was expected to arrive by daylight, but was not there till 9 A. M., on the 1st of June. Sheridan had gallantly and successfully repelled two fierce assaults. Smith, who was expected early, did not arrive till the afternoon had half waned. Anderson, of Lee's left, moved along Warren's front and was vigorously attacked on the flank, but he succeeded in holding and fortifying the position he had gained. At six that evening (June 1, '63), Wright and Smith charged the rebel works, broke their lines, driving them back, and capturing over seven hundred prisoners. Grant expected to take the offensive early next morning, and especially ordered that every advantage gained was to be pressed to the utmost, in order to drive or draw Lee out of his cover. Sheridan having reconnoitered the banks of the Chickahominy to find crossings and the condition of the roads, reported favorably upon the chances of crossing. During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond with ours. The Confederate lines extended from the Tolopotomy and New Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry watching our right.

An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps under Hancock, Wright, and Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with earnestness if a favorable opportunity presented itself. Hancock sent Barlow forward, and after some very severe fighting he carried a position outside the enemy's main line. Three pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners were also taken. Gibbon had an encounter and gained much ground. Wright's corps captured the outer rifle-pits in its front. Smith's also carried the outer rifle-pits in its front. Warren and Burnside advanced and gained ground which brought the whole army on a line. These assaults cost us heavily. The next day and night were spent making our intrenchments as strong as Lee's.

CHAPTER XIV.

BREAKING THE CONFEDERATE COM

MUNICATIONS.

SHERIDAN'S SECOND GREAT VIRGINIA RAID-INTENDED TO CONNECT WITH
HUNTER- · OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY-THE REBEL CAV-
ALRY LEADERS DESTROYING THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD FIGHT
AT TREVILIAN
IN RICHMOND-RETURN ΤΟ

STATION-CONSTERNATION

CITY POINT-OPERATIONS ABOUT PETERSBURG-WILSON AND KAUTZ SOUTH OF RICHMOND THE BATTLE OF REAMS STATION.

JUST before the completion of the great operations by which the Army of the Potomac had been brought to the north bank of the James, the second of Sheridan's great raids became a necessity. Lee's position was now so near Richmond that it was determined by the next flank movement to carry the Army of the Potomac across and south of the James River. This movement was a hazardous one. The Chickahominy had to be crossed. All the bridges over it had been destroyed; the enemy had shorter roads and better ones to travel on to confront us on crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between Grant and Butler, and lastly, the Army of the Potomac had to be got out of a dangerous position: it was but a few hundred yards from Lee's army at the widest place. Sheridan was sent on the 7th of June with two divisions to communicate with Hunter, and to break up the Virginia Central railroad and the James River Canal, also taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him.

The canal and Central road and the region penetrated by our troopers on this raid, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies they required for the Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan got off on the 7th, Hunter's messengers reported his advance to Staunton and a successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, General W. S. Jones, was killed.