tails. Such alterations may very possibly be improvements, and even if they are not, as the law is intended for all classes,-that to which the Lords belong, and that large body which leans towards them, as well as the far more numerous and powerful class, the nation at large,-a law is better for the whole community which does not shock the opinions and feelings, even the prejudices and erroneous opinions of the former, though it may be the less acceptable to the whole community,-nay, even though it should be altogether a somewhat worse law. Thus the two branches of the government may differ either diametrically or angularly (so to speak): The two forces, that of the Lords and that of the Commons, may either act on the machine of the state in the same straight line and in opposite directions, which will make it stop or tear it in pieces, or they may act on the machine at an angle, and so make it move safely in the diagonal, but nearer to the one direction than to the other, according as the one force exceeds the other. This latter result gives neither force the entire sway, and the motion is the result not of either impression only, but compounded of both-neither body has it all its own way, but both have something to say, though the Commons a good deal more than the Lords; and this is and ought to be the result, as needful for the common weal in all ordinary times. This compromise, leaning, however, plainly to the popular side, is the real excellence of a mixed constitution. There is nothing more erroneous than the panegyrical view which represents such a government as a system of equally balanced powers-for then, indeed, the vituperative argument of those who deny any excellence to a mixed government is unanswerable, that where the powers are independent, and thus equal, their opposition must reduce the whole to inaction and confusion; and that where one overbalances the other, the system is one professing to be mixed, but in truth pure, except that the attempt at checks only tends to produce dangerous and sudden shocks; in other words, that the government has all the disadvantages ascribed to the pure or simple form, with certain shocks and jolts into the bargain, from which the simple form is free. But the real excellence of the mixed form is this, that it secures fuller deliberation on all measures, whether of government or of legislation, or of administration that it tempers the vehemence of the larger by the more deliberative capacity of the smaller bodies-that it secures its due weight to knowledge, wisdom, character, and property, as well as to numbers-that it makes the measures and the laws of the state such as suit the interests, and consult the wishes of all, preventing the domination of one class over the rest-and that it effects all this, not by the opposite action of equal and independent forces, exercised by the different classes, but by those classes combining their different efforts, and casting the measures, both of administration and of legislation, in a course differing from the single will of either, but partaking of the combined desire of both. That is not done which either body would like best, but that to which neither has any insuperable objection. Neither gets all it desires, but perhaps that is chosen which each would prefer to any thing else, if it could not have what it liked best. It was said of old in favour of a great man's appointment to a high place, that he was not chosen to it by a majority thinking him the best, but by every body thinking him the second best. The same thing which we have been observing as to the mutual action of two chambers, or other constituent parts of a government, and the result of that action, is true of the parties which may be formed in any one body. Suppose two to exist in a state, and to find their representatives or organs in one of the legislative chambers, if those parties were equally balanced, there must either be absolute inaction or compromise-inaction if their opinions are diametrically opposite; compromise if they choose that some middle course should be taken. If one party is wholly predominant, of course the same results cannot take place; but in practice this seldom happens, and, from external influences, from the power of individuals in debate, from the fear of extremities, from moderation in many who belong to neither party, the machine of government is made to move in a middle course a diagonal, inclining to the side of the party which has the upper hand. Hence the error of those who hold that party excludes from the public service half the nation. On the contrary, it may operate as a salutary check, giving a security for ample investigation, and full discussion of all measures, and obtaining for the country the cooperation of most of its citizens, by making the Government take a course compounded of the motions which the influences of each party singly would give it. The administration of affairs is, practically speaking, in the hands of the Opposition, as well as of the Government ;* and both contribute, though in different proportions, to give its course the direction which it ultimately takes. One of the worst evils of party is, that where two great and powerful bodies are opposed to each other on principle, and nearly balanced, a temptation is held out * When the Tories were last in place, for in power they were not, all important measures, and it is now still more so, were dictated by the opposition. But this is an unnatural state. -which the deserters from each, the place-hunters and the jobbers, cannot resist-to form a third party, a little squadron of observation, which, having no principle but the pursuit of its own interest, is perpetually affecting agreements and differences of opinion with the great and respectable parties alternately, by way of showing its importance and furthering its selfish views. A few such voices will turn an equally, or almost equally, balanced scale, though men of feeble and silly minds frequently join those speculators, and help them to drive those bargains for place, in which the scheme always ends. Nothing so much as this kind of base and dirty work lowers the character of public men, and hurts the service of the state. One of the most shameless tricks of such little knots of political tradesmen, is to cry out against party-meaning powerful and reputable parties-they being themselves, in the worst sense of the word, a mere faction, a fragment of a faction. Such as we have now described it, is, in all ordinary times, the state of things, and such the working of the machine. Such, too, it must be, not in the English Government merely, but in every mixed government whatever; the principles which we have laid down being of universal application to all systems of a limited or mixed nature, which are composed of two or more separate and independent parts, whether of an executive and a legislative chamber-or an executive and two chambers-or two chambers and a council-or three councils, chambers, or other bodies. The principles which we have laid down are universal, as far as the working of the system is concerned. That working is, however, liable to various other modifications, and even subject to forces which may disturb its movements, from the manner in which the parts are composed. Thus, suppose one of the chambers, by the manner of its composition, is somewhat under the influence of the other-as the House of Commons was in England greatly influenced by the Lords, before the late change of the representation. The force of the former body was much more likely to act in the direction given by the will of the latter, than it is now; and the like result, though in a lesser degree, will be produced, if the bodies who choose one of the chambers are naturally under the influence of the other chamber, and apt to partake of its opinions. In all such cases the two bodies are really less different in their action than they appear to be, and the total movement of the government, which results from their combined operation, will be more near the direction which the single influence of one of the two would give it, than could have been expected, or than would have been the case, if the two had stood really separate from and independent of each other. And so of the influence of any third body, as the Executive, upon either, or it may be upon both. But although we have been contemplating the action of the constituent parts of a mixed government in ordinary circumstances, we must now come to the case of a wide, irreconcilable, and entire difference between any two of them-the case, too, of no mutual influence exercised by one upon the other. Suppose the Commons, in our system, wholly independent of the Lords, and that the two bodies are of views diametrically opposite to each other that a majority of the Commons desires one line of policy, and an equally preponderating portion of the Lords, resisting that view, is bent upon an opposite course-a dissolution, and appeal to the people is the first measure to be taken, in case there is any reason to believe that their representatives speak not their opinions and wishes. But suppose the contrary, and that the people agree with their representatives and oppose the Lords-then comes the case which puts the excellence of our constitution to the test. The Crown has the power of creating Peers; by law it may create them for life, although this has rarely been done; but certainly a creation of Peers, if the Crown agreed with the country and the Commons, would, for the present, though at the expense of great mischiefs in various kinds, remedy the evil, by bringing the two houses to an agreement. This is a strictly constitutional course, that is, it is a proceeding not only lawful, but taken in the exercise of powers expressly given for the purpose of meeting such an emergency. It has, however, never been adopted but once on a small scale, and once threatened on a scale much greater, on a far more important occasion. But suppose either that the Crown sides with the Lords, or is averse to adopt this means of gaining unanimity, what then follows? If the Commons were like a West Indian Assembly, which has only to vote certain small supplies, and agree to certain legislative measures,-or, which comes to the same thing, if the Crown had, as in other countries, and as in England also of old times, revenues independent of Parliament,then the opposition of the Lords, supposing the Crown to join in it and refuse a creation of Peers, would prevent the measures being carried which the people desired. No measure which the Lords might desire could be carried, nor any which the Crown desired; but the machine of government could go on, as long as nothing was wanted which required legislative interference, and substantially, the victory would be gained over the people. The government would be therefore in form only popular, because, although nothing could be done against the people's wish, yet as nothing could be obtained which the people desired to accomplish, the government would be conducted, possibly not upon principles which either King, Lords, or People approved, but certainly not upon popular principles. In such a state of things, it is quite clear, that Parliaments would very soon cease to be holden at all. But this is not the situation, nor any thing like the situation of England. The necessities of the Crown require perpetual recourse to the Commons, and as that House alone can vote supplies, nothing can be done without its leave. It has only to refuse supplies, and the whole machine of government is at a stand. But for this power, the government would be a Monarchy or an Aristocracy-this power it is that makes ours a Popular go vernment. If the Commons require, at the desire of the people, certain measures, and the Lords obstinately refuse to let them pass, and if the Crown sides with the Lords, the government has become an Aristocracy, unless the Commons stop the supplies, and compel the other two branches to satisfy the demands of the country. This proceeding is the lawful right of the Commons-it is their first power-it is their highest interest-it is their bounden duty. If they refuse to adopt it, they confess one of two things—either that the policy in question is a matter of no importance, not worth a struggle-or that the Peers are the lords of the ascendant and rule the country. The government has, in the hands of the Tories, become almost a pure Aristocracy-and under their sway the privileges of the English people have passed away. Nor let it be imagined that this recourse to stopping the supplies will injure the state, or damage the machine of the Constitution. It is a remedy which never can be resorted to on trivial occasions; never but when the public opinion is strongly and clearly with the Commons; never but when the great body of the people are both agreed in favour of a certain policy, and attach to its adoption an extraordinary importance. Now, in all such cases, after the resistance of the Lords or the Crown shall have given time enough for the country to reflect maturely on the question at issue, and after the desire to avoid extreme proceedings shall even have modified as far as possible the measures desired by the people, it is plainly good for the commonwealth that the desires of the country should be granted, and the measures thus modified be adopted. Even here the Lords are not without their weight; neither the same measures will be insisted on, nor, after the victory, will those insisted on be finally carried without some such change as may render them less unpalatable to the Lords. Nothing but an obstinate, pertinacious, unmeaning, and wholly unreasonable determination of the Lords to refuse every concession, and have it all their own way, can prevent the policy on |