seat on accepting office ought no longer to be rigorously and jealously maintained,' he must also admit, that it can never have been one of our great securities against an overwhelming influ'ence.' Before the Reform bill, the distinction between the duty of keeping out of the House of Commons a class of obscure dependents, who ought not to be there at all, and the reasonableness of imposing difficulties upon persons, the necessity of whose sitting there is universally acknowledged, was a distinction which might be easily overlooked. Mr Hallam appears to have overlooked it; at least, so we suppose, in our habitual and unfeigned regard for his deliberate opinion upon all questions of this description. He may in some respects think differently of the Reform bill from ourselves. But he is the last writer in the world likely to advisedly insist, that the Constitution could be ever really interested in the existence of a law, which must unavoidably become mischievous as soon as it ceased to be evaded.

The arguments put forward in behalf of the present system are so far from countervailing the opposite inconveniences, that there is not one of them which, when strictly examined, goes so far as to prove the point for which it is advanced. They do not make out, separately or collectively, even a prima facie case.

The following are among some of the principal arguments. Because the enactment was contemporary with the first efficient Place-bill, and was unfortunately made a part of it, it has been supposed to partake of the character of a Place-bill. Nothing can be more erroneous. The two things are not only not the same, but are positively contrary. The essence of a Place-bill is the incompatibility between the bias arising from the situation, and that independence in which a Member of Parliament ought, as far as possible, to be secured. The objection there is against the office. Whoever holds it must be excluded. In the instance of Ministers it is precisely the reverse. All incompatibilities of that nature are overruled by a stronger necessity of a higher order. The presence of Ministers in Parliament, notwithstanding their bias, is not simply a much less evil than the only other alternative the fact of Ministers not being there at all-but is quite indispensable. The bias, such as it is, is part of the case; and, being such, it of course must be exactly the same in every instance, whether the ceremony of a re-election has been gone through, or whether it has been dispensed with.

Others have seen in the necessity of submitting every Ministerial appointment to this popular sort of ordeal, a valuable preliminary check on the prerogative of the Crown. Supposing that the risks of a re-election may, on any occasion, have prevented the King from venturing upon a total change of administration, or

from promoting a particular individual, the absurdity is, in immediately conciading, that the restraint, qui restraint, must of course have been beneficial. Wherever this obstacle has been, in point of fact, the real operative obstacle, the probability is all the other way. For the rightful jurisdiction over this prerogative, is—in Parliament. And by the supposition, the jurisdiction is partially diverted to some unknown, inferior, and incompetent tribunal. These are cases on which the judgment of Parliament is so complete and exclusive, that the accident of being represented by a person who has been selected for high office, can give to neither this nor that constituency the right to anticipate or counteract it. If Parliament does not object to the appointments, it must be presumed to approve of them. If it objects, let it speak out. No legislation can be more preposterous than any thing which tends to substitute the opinion, caprice, or interest of a few fractional and precarious constituencies, in the place of the deliberate resolution of the representative majority, alone competent in fact and law and reason to answer for the whole. The merit of this partial check then amounts to this: Where the particular constituency pulls in the same direction with the nation in Parliament assembled, it is merely useless. Where it pulls in an opposite direction, it is a gross inconsistency and a great public evil.

But it is suggested, that the option of recognising their representative in his new character, is part of the very principle of representation. This is a pure assumption. Abstract theories of representation are, in truth, just whatever the fancy of the framer likes to make them; and, betwixt the two extremes-that of the complete independence and complete dependence of a representative -any number of intermediate hypotheses may be ranged. There is no admitted standard, to which positive systems must conform. In the absence of one, the changes which are daily taking place with things so variable as the elements of human nature, and the circumstances of human life, may raise the question at every turn, and almost at every instant. Nothing so uncertain in this case as the terms of the electoral power of attorney. One man will consider one thing essential; another another. Whether it may be desirable or not to send a member back to his constituents on his accepting political office, is quite a different affair. So stated, it is highly fitting that it be fairly argued out. But any definition of representation which is framed upon this single circumstance, must be altogether arbitrary and dogmatical. Nor can it by any means be described to be the theory of the English constitution. On the contrary, that theory was established on the doctrine of complete independence. According to its spirit as

well as letter, the relation between the electors and the elected is a relation formed for a certain period; and during this period they are joined together for better for worse. It was, therefore, the great moral of the Common Law that the electors ought to be proportionably careful in the object of their choice. The case which we are now considering, has been made an exception by statute. In this solitary instance, the relation is interrupted before the period has expired. Was this the result of any subtle disquisition (such as has been since carried on, and is still under the controversial harrow both in England and America) on the several conditions which might properly belong to the representative relation? For example-pledges, instructions, resigning on demand, and so on. Nothing of the sort. The exception was introduced partly on supposed grounds of national policy; partly from a temporary suspicion of the Crown. The imagination that there is any definite connexion between this particular exception and the true principle of representation is a more recent invention. It belongs to the airy wardrobe which furnishes specious arguments in behalf of things as they are; not to the armoury whence are taken those substantial reasons by which new opinions are successfully enforced.

Another plea is, that the right of declaring whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the conduct of their member on his appointment or promotion, is a privilege conferred upon the electoral body by the actual law. And to the taking away of any popular privilege, popular advocates naturally demur. Unfortunately for the advocates of a contingent privilege of this description, the doctrine of political privilege is now merged in that of political trust. It is too late (especially since the Reform bill) to argue any question of private pretension arising out of the electoral franchise, except in subordination to the more comprehensive principle of the public good. As fallacies and partial considerations are seldom had recourse to, except for want of sound and ample reasons, it is somewhat suspicious that the general interests of the public service nowhere appear among the enumerated advantages. By a brief statement of the mischiefs inseparable from the interposition of particular constituencies on these occasions, the grounds of the omission will soon be thoroughly understood. In the mean time, it is no slight objection to the continuance of such a privilege, that, from the nature of the issue which it raises, it can very rarely be faithfully exercised. By the supposition, the opinion of the constituency is asked on a single point-the propriety or impropriety, under the circumstances, of accepting office. This is clear, from the fact, that (whatever other grounds of dissatisfaction may have subsisted between the electors and the elected) it is the

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acceptance of office, and that alone, in consequence of which the opportunity of exercising the privilege arises. But is there a constituency in the empire which can be trusted with confining its consideration, on such an occasion, to this single point? Probably not. Bodies of men are not so logical. The most splendid instance of electoral justice which has happened in our time, was the late rejection of Sir George Murray. Taking place at a general election, it was eminently right. Supposing, however, Parliament not to have been dissolved, and that Sir George Murray, in consequence of vacating his seat by accepting office, had to reappear before the freeholders of Perthshire. The case is no longer the same. The simple fact which his constituents then would have had to try, would have beenwhether or no he had lost their confidence on that account. But,' shout a hundred honest voices, he did not keep his word to us ' about the Dissenters!' It would be in vain to answer, That ' is not the question. He has not vacated his seat by reason of 'breach of trust. The offence is one which the law, whether right 'or wrong, does not condescend to notice in a member of Parliament. Notwithstanding that objection, he remained by law C your member still. The only question on which your opinion is now called for, is that of his political appointment.' We sympathize with the feelings of the men of Perthshire. But it never can be consistent with legislative wisdom to submit a special point to a tribunal which you know beforehand will determine it, not upon its own merits, but upon collateral grounds. When the present Lord Stanley was rejected for Preston, and Sir John Campbell for Dudley, it is notorious that the cause of their rejection had nothing to do with their having accepted office-that is, it had nothing to do with the only question within the purview and intention of the law. On the other hand, we are quite willing, that the breach of a specific pledge should be made a substantive offence: the penalty to be expulsion from the seat so obtained. Let the malt-tax candidates be upon their guard. Popular orators, like Sir F. Burdett and Mr Richards, Mr Cobbett and Mr Hughes Hughes, and the rest of the basket of loose fish,' need not be afraid. Our proposition is limited to the case of specific pledges. Gentlemen will do well, however, to remember, that, in the same manner as perseverance in bribery and intimidation is making reluctant converts to the ballot, a few more elections like the last (fruitful, as it has proved, in expectations defrauded and confidence abused) will compel electors to take, in the shape of specific pledges, the only security within their reach. Of two evils, pledges may become

the least.

A full developement of the disadvantages of the present sys

tem will be found in the pamphlet before us. We can do little more than class them into those which take place on a total change of Ministry; those which take place on the appointment or promotion of a particular individual; and those which are common to both occasions.

In the case of a total change of Ministry, it may be next to impossible (now that close boroughs are destroyed) to reseat the several members of the new administration without a dissolution. To create the necessity of a general election, in order to fill up from ten to twenty seats, is to outrage all proportion between the cause and the effect. But, suppose that Ministers postpone dissolving, and take their chance of being returned for their former seats. On this supposition, what is the state in which Parliament is placed for a considerable period, and, in all probability, at a most critical conjuncture? Owing to the temporary absence of all the responsible members of the Government, it is in the same state, as long as that absence lasts, as it would be always, in case the responsible members of the Government were excluded from the House. Every thing is at a stand still. It is felt to be absurd even to ask a question, much more to debate one. The undersecretaries and the clerks discreetly wait for the arrival of their superiors. Dissolution or no dissolution, the public inconvenience must be very great. These difficulties may affect the Administration itself in different ways, favourably or unfavourably. But as the difficulties are common to every Administration, they are clearly altogether independent of the merits or demerits of any one in particular. Therefore, while in some respects they must weaken the new Government, and in some others perhaps may strengthen it, these incidental consequences, so considered, are far too uncertain and conflicting, for even party politics to assign to them the lowest appreciable value.

The characteristic evil arising from the effect of the law when it is brought into action on the appointment or promotion of an individual, lies in much narrower compass. The effect is positive or negative; positive, when the individual accepts office notwithstanding; negative, when he is prevented on this account from accepting it. In the first case, a single member of a government, going down on an event of this kind to the crossquestioning of the hustings, may be drifted by accidental currents into a position equally injurious to the interests of all parties at least of all whose interests are entitled to be considered. The communications or explanations expected from him by some of his constituents, may very easily be of a nature, that, while, on the one hand, he cannot make them without committing his colleagues or the public service; on