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accommodation with the American ps equally apprehenfive of it. colonies, and the powers granted to the crown for negotiating and concluding a general or particular peace or truce, with the whole, or with any part of that people, and for fufpending and fetting afide all former laws, whofe operations were in contravention to that purpose, inftructions had been dispatched to Sir Guy Carleton (who fucceeded Sir Henry Clinton in the command of the army, and the government of New York) to ufe his endeavours for carrying thefe difpofitions into effect.

Upon these advices, Sir Guy Carleton, pretty early in the month of May, 1782, difpatched a letter to General Washington, informing him of the proceedings of parliament, of the difpofitions prevalent both in that body and the British government, and of his own confequent inftructions; accompanied with fuch written or printed documents, as were neceffary to illuftrate and authenticate what he had fated; and requiring, at the fame time, a palport for Mr. Morgan, his fecretary, who he wanted to difpatch on the fame fubject to congrefs. Washington, as ufual, evading to act from himself in the bufineis, referred the matter of the paffport to congrefs; and that body, on the 14th of the fame month, iffued a public refolution, forbidding the commander in chief to grant the pailport.

This idea of opening feparate negotiations with particular governments or bodies of men, or even of attempting to open a treaty with congrefs without the concurrence of its allies, caufed no fmall alarm, and was much refented by the feveral ftates. They were per

producing a fchifm among them. felves, and of its exciting the jea loufy of France. Refolutions from the general affemblies of Maryland, New Jersey, Penfylvania, and Virginia, were accordingly fpeedily iffued, in which they declared, that a propofition from the enemy, to all or any of the United States, for peace or truce, feparated from their allies, was infidious and inadmiflible. That a propofition for treating with any affembly or body of men in America, other than the congrefs, was infidious and inadmiffible. That they (the respective affemblies) would not liften to any propofition, nor fuffer any negotiation, inconfiftent with their national faith and federal union. And, that they would exert the utmoft power of their respective states to carry on the war with vigour and effect, until peace fhould be obtained in a manner confiftent with their national faith and federal union.

The council of Penfylvania went farther than the general affemblies in their zeal upon this occafion. They declared, that all men, or bodies of men, who fhould prefume to enter into any feparate or partial convention or agreement with Great Britain, ought to be confidered and treated as open and avowed enemies of the United States of America. That any propofitions which might be made by the court of Great Britain, tending, in any manner whatfoever, to violate the treaty between them and their illuftrious ally, ought to be treated with every mark of indignity and contempt. They feemed even to entertain fome jealousy with refpect to the integrity of the

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general reprefentative of the States, or at leaft to manifeft a difpofition to restrain its authority, by a refolution in which they declared, That the congrefs had no power, authority, or right, to do any act, matter, or thing, whatever, that might have a tendency to yield up, or abridge, the fovereignty and inI dependence of that ftate, without its confent previously obtained. The congrefs likewife paffed a refolution, That the United States could not, with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with any commiffioners on the part of Great Britain, unless they fhould, as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw their fleets and armies, or elfe, in pofitive and exprefs terms, acknowledge the independence of the faid

States.

Refolutions to a fimilar amount were generally paffed by the other States. In fact, the Americans were too young a people, and had too much depending upon the eftablishment of a favourable and equitable character with other nations, to venture, at the very threshold of their emancipation, and just entering into the rank and confideration of a fovereign ftate, upon any violation of their public faith; particularly, to abandon thofe who had juft faved them from the fubjugation, if not vengeance, of the parent country, would have been a degree of perfidy too flagrant, to be admitted under any laxity of moral ties, or almost juftified by any change of political fituation.

It was probably fome jealoufy on this fubject, expreffed or apprehended on the fide of France, that occafioned congrefs, fo long after as the month of October, to iffue public declaration; in which, af

ter reciting that France and they were equally bound by the conditions of their alliance, that neither fhould conclude either peace or truce with Great Britain, without the confent of the other; and obferving, that their minifters in Europe were vefted with full power and authority, in their behalf, and in concert with their allies, to negotiate and conclude a general peace; they then proceed to declare in the ftrongest terms (in order, as they fay, to extinguifh illfounded hopes, to fruftrate infidious attempts, and to manifeft to the whole world the purity of their intentions) their fixed and unalterable determination, inviolably to' adhere to the treaty of alliance with his Moft Chriftian Majefty, and to conclude neither a feparate peace nor truce with Great Britain: nor, that they would not enter into the difcuffion of any overtures for pacification, but in confidence and in concert with his Moft Chriftian Majefty.

The concluding article of this document fufficiently fhews the apprehenfions they entertained of a fchifm among themselves upon the subject of peace; that is, that fome one or more of the ftates might be fo lured, by the advantages to be derived from an early and feparate accommodation, that neither the bonds of federal union, nor of their foreign alliance, would be able to withfand the ftrong temptations of felf-intereft that might be held out to them. It was undoubtedly upon this principle, and perhaps, likewife, under an apprehenfion of popular commotions, if the people were to become fully acquainted with the extent of the advantages that might be offered, that they [] = Atrongly

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ftrongly urged the respective states (in order, as they faid to guard against the fecret artifices and machinations of the enemy) to be vigilant and active in detecting and feizing all Bri ifh emiffaries and fpies, that they might be brought to condign punishment: that the officers of all departments, who might be charged with perfons coming from the enemy under the protection of flags of truce, fhould be enjoined to take efpecial care, that fuch perfons might not abuse their privileges, but be refrained from all inter ourfe with the country and inhabitants, which was not neceffary for tranfacting the public bufinefs on which they might be fent: and, that no fubject of bis Britannic Majefty, coming directly or indirectly from any part of the British dominions, thould be admitted into any of the United States during the war.

While the Americans were thus oftentatiously displaying their public fidelity, and endeavouring even to cut off the poflibility of temptation, by fhutting out every overture towards a feparate accommodation, we are to look to the meafures that were purfuing in Europe, for the attainment of a general peace between all the parties concerned in the war.

Two of the firft powers in Europe, the Emprefs of Ruflia and the Emperor of Germany, were the mediators in this great bufinefs; the difficulties of which feemed in no fmall degree to be done away, by the difpofition of granting independence to America which prevailed in England. With refpect to France, indeed, as the attainment of that point was her only ayowed object in the war, its be

ing granted feemed at once to remove the very ground of contention; and to leave no farther ob ftacles in the way of an accommodation; than those which arofe merely from the circumstances of the war itself; nor did the adjuftment of these feem exceedingly difficult; for though her acquifitions in the Weft-Indies were undoubtedly confiderable and valuble, yet her loffes in the Eaft left the means of a reasonable equivalent in the hands of England; without even confidering the island of St. Lucia, upon the spot, which was a poffeffion of fuch importance, with refpe& to its fize, ftrength, harbours, fituation, and capability of unbounded improvement, as could not but weigh heavily in every political fcale of eftimation.

As to Spain, if her conduct and motives could at all be clearly comprehended, the entered into the war, rather as an auxiliary, and in confequence of the family compact, than as a principal, or as acting at all upon national principles. The establishment of an independent empire in America was to her the moft alarming measure in point of precedent, and the moft dangerous in its probable and natural confequences, that could poffibly have happened, the emancipation of Mexico and Peru from her own government only excepted. It feems probable, that the did not apprehend (though the defign was avowed) that this event would have taken place, at the time the was led into the war; unlefs indeed it is fuppofed, that the was to dazzled by the fplendid objects of Jamaica and Gibraltar, as to be blind to all others. The acquifition of thefe, as well as of

Minorca,

Minorca, however unlikely at that time to be attained, was artfully held out by France, not only as a lure to the ambition of the king, but as impofing an opinioa on the people that they had a national intereft in view, and that they were not plunged madly into a war, which was not only entirely Bour ba, but highly dangerous and defractive in its principle and defign to themselves. The ill fortune of England in the war, or, perhaps, it may be faid, the defect of wisdom and ability in the direction and application of the immenfe powers and the exhauftlefs ftoek of valour which the poffeffed, enabled Spain to recover Minorca, and to fubdue Weft Florida. As the war afforded no equivalent on the other fide to propofe for thefe, it was reafonably to be expected that they should continue in the hands of Spain, affording in one inftance a diftant frontier against the enterprize of that future enemy, which the had herself taken fo much pains in creating, and in the other, a confider. able facrifice to royal and national vanity. But neither the embarraffed flate of her finances, the repeated failure of all her defigns upon Jamaica, her late fignal defeat at Gibraltar, nor any other circumftances of her prefent condition, feemed to afford any folid ground to Spain, upon which the could reafonably attempt to eftablith further claims. We have laid no ftref's in this ftatement upon the Bahama islands, (though they were estimated at a high rate in the negotiation) as they could not have been retained by Spain, and they were in fact molt honourably and gallantly recovered by a hand

ful of private adventurers,, before any thing of the peace was known.

The republic of Holland, unfortunately fallen and degraded in a degree which the had never before experienced, from the first general acknowledgment of her independency to the prefent æra, was, of courfe and of neceffity, reduced to depend entirely upon the favour, generofity and protection of France, as well in the conclufion of a peace, as fhe had through the progrefs of the war.

With refpect to the general circumftances of the contending parties, the moft fuccessful members of the alliance, great and formidable as it was, fcarcely ftood much lefs in need of peace than England, notwithstanding all her loffes, and expofed as fhe had fo long been, as a common but, to withstand fingly all their attacks in every quarter. For it is probable that France had never been engaged, for the time of its continuance, in a more expenfive war than the prefent. Her extraordinary exertions at fea, the oppofite extremes of the globe in which they were made, the great and frequent loffes fuftained in the fupply, the immenfe current charges to which it was fubjected, by the greatnefs of the diftance, along with the conftant two-fold drain, by loan and otherwife, of her treasure by America, may well be fuppofed all together, in point of expence, abundantly to fupply the place of thofe vaft arrnies which she had heretofore ufually fupported, and even of the fubfidies which the had been in the habit, of paying, in the courfe of her continental wars. It is to be allowed, that her com

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merce had flourished to a degree, in the present war, which the had never before experienced in any conteft with England; but neither the advantages arifing from this circumftance, nor from the admirable financial regulations and reforms adopted during the prefent reign, were equivalent to the fupply of the continual demands, and of the numberless deficiencies produced by the war. Succeeding events have fhewn, that even a peace was not fufficient to prevent that nation from fuffering no fmall derangement of her monied and financial concerns, and which was accordingly attended with its ufual effect upon public credit.

Under thefe general circumftances of the contending powers, the independence of America being granted, there did not feem to be any mighty impediment remaining in the way to the restoration of the public tranquillity.

The new adminiftration in England fpeedily adopted this bufinefs upon their coming into power; and Mr. Grenville had been for fome time in Paris, in order to fettle the neceffary preliminaries, and to fmooth the way for opening a negociation in duc form. Thefe matters being fettled, Mr. FitzHerbert, the minifter at Bruffels, proceeded to Paris, he being appointed, on the part of England, as plenipotentiary, to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace with the minifters of France, Spain, and Holland. Mr. Ofwald, a merchant, was likewife dispatched to the fame place, as commiflioner from his Britannic majefty, for treating of peace with John Adams, Benjaming Franklin, John Jay, and

Henry Laurens, four of the com miffioners appointed for the fame purpofe on the part of the United States of America.

The differences with America were much fooner fettled so far at least as their dependence on the main treaty could at prefent admit) than those with the European powers. On the 30th of November, 1782, provifional articles were figned on both fides, which were to be inferted in, and to conftitute a future treaty of peace, to be finally concluded between the parties, when that between Great Bri tain and France took place.

By this provisional treaty, the freedom, fovereignty, and independence, of the Thirteen United States was, individually by name, and in the fulleft and moft exprefs terms, acknowledged, and all claims to their government, propriety and territorial rights, for ever relinquished by the crown of Great Britain. To prevent all fu ture difputes about boundaries, feveral imaginary lines were drawn, which interfecting immenfe countries, lakes, and rivers, threw vaft tracts of land and water into the hands of the Americans to which they had no prior claim. Befides the fertile and extenfive countries on the Ohio and Mifliflippi, which came within this defcription, thefe limits trenched deeply on the boundaries both of Canada and Nova Scotia: and the fur trade was faid to be in a great measure relinquithed, by the forts, patles, cat rying places, and waters, which were now to be furrendered. It was likewife faid, that four or fiveand-twenty Indian nations were by this arrangement given up to America;

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