HIBITION AGAINST WHAT IS DISAPPROVED (al-munkar) WOULD CEASE TO BE INCUMBENT, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. AND ALSO BECAUSE HE IS THE GUARDIAN OF THE LAW, IN WHICH CASE HE MUST BE IMMUNE TO SIN IN ORDER THAT IT BE SAFE FROM ADDITION OR LOSS. AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WORD OF THE MOST HIGH, MY COVENANT EMBRACETH NOT THE EVILDOERS" (2: 118).

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180. When he had proved that the Imâmate is necessary he began to explain the qualities which constitute the necessary condition for the validity of the Imâmate. And among them is immunity to sin, the meaning of which thou hast come to know. Now there is a difference of opinion as to its being a necessary condition in the Imâm. Our companions the Twelvers and the Ismâ'îlites have considered it a necessary condition, as opposed to the other sects (firaq). And the author sought to establish the belief (madhhab) of our companions by several proofs:

181. (1) First, if the Imâm were not immune to sin, then it would be necessary for the number of Imâms to be without limit. And that which is necessitated is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And in explanation of this necessity—we have already explained the cause which makes us need an Imâm, that is, the restraining of the oppressor from his oppression, and the avenging of the oppressed of his oppressor, and the leading of the people to that in which their soundness (ṣalâḥ) consists and turning them away from that which results in their corruption. Then if he were not immune to sin there would be need of another Imâm who would restrain him from his error (khațâ). And we transfer the discussion to that other Imâm. Then it would be necessary for the number of Imâms to be without limit, and that is false.

182. (2) If he were not immune to sin, then sin would be possible (jâ'iz) for him. Let us suppose that he committed sin. Then in this case there would have to follow either the loss of the value of his appointment, or the nullifying (suqût) of his command to do what is approved and his prohibition of what is disapproved. And that which is necessitated is false in both its parts. Hence that which necessitates it is false.

also. And in explanation of the necessity (we say that) whenever he commits sin it is either (a) incumbent upon men to disapprove of him, or (b) it is not. From the first alternative (a) it would necessarily follow that he would lose his place in men's hearts, and that after being a commander (âmir) he would have to become obedient to commands (maʼmûr), and after being a prohibitor he would have to heed the prohibitions (of others). And in such a case the value sought for in his appointment, namely, the elevation of his place in men's hearts and their obedience to his commands and prohibitions, would be lost. And from the second alternative (b) it would necessarily follow that his command to do what is approved and his prohibition of what is disapproved would become non-incumbent, and that is false by the agreement of all.

183. (3) Third, he is the guardian of the law, and it is incumbent that everyone who is such be immune to sin. (a) First, because the guardian of the law might be either the Book (the Koran), or mutawâtir tradition (that which has come down in a number of independent unbroken lines), or agreement (al-ijmâ'), or fundamental absolution (al-barâ'atu'laşliyya―e.g., when a Muslim is in doubt as to whether Ramaḍân is over or not he can pass judgment in his own mind that it is over and proceed to break the fast), or reasoning (qiyâs), or tradition that has come down in a single line (khabaru'lwâhid), or istishab (when one is in doubt as to whether something that was clean has become unclean or not, he has the right to say, "I decree (hukm) that this is clean "-this is istiṣhab). And no one of these is proper (sâliḥ) for guarding the law. The Book and tradition are not, because they do not contain (wâfî) all the commandments (aḥkâm), although in every situation Allâh has a command which it is incumbent to know (taḥṣîl). And agreement (ijmâ') is not, for two reasons: first, it is unable to meet most situations, although Allâh has a command for (each of) them; and second, on the supposition of the non-existence of one immune to sin, there is in agreement no convincing proof (hujja). Hence agreement is unprofitable, because of the possibility of error in every individual of them, and so in all of them. And Allâh the Most

High points to the possibility of error in all of them in His word, "If he die, therefore, or be slain, will ye turn upon your heels?" (3: 138). And the Prophet said, "Beware lest after me you refer your affairs to unbelievers" (namely, Abû Bakr, etc.). And this address is not directed to any except those to whom error is absolutely possible. (That is, in case there is no Imâm who is ma şûm, it is possible for the agreement of believers to result in error.) For man is not forbidden to fly to the sky, because it is absolutely impossible for him to do so.

184. And fundamental absolution is not able to guard the law, because it requires the removal (irtifâ') of most of the commandments of the law. And it may be said that what is fundamental (al-așl) is the absolution of man from the obligation (dhimma) of what is incumbent and forbidden. And the three remaining (namely, qiyâs, khabaru'l-wâhid, and istiṣhâb) all are alike in placing importance upon supposition (az-zann), and supposition especially gives no satisfactory knowledge of reality. And the proof for the rejection of qiyás is established, because our law is built upon the difference in things that agree (muttafiqât), such as the incumbence of fasting on the last day of the month of Ramaḍân and its being forbidden on the first of (the following month) Shawwâl, and the agreement in things that differ, such as the obligation to make ablution from both urine and stools, and the agreement of both accidental murder and zihâr in requiring atonement (kaffâra). (Zihâr is when a man says to his wife, "you are as my mother to me." He then has to make atonement before she becomes lawful to him again.) Not only so, but the Lawgiver cut off the hand of the petty thief but not of one who stole large sums (ghâṣib), and he scourged men for accusing people falsely of adultery and made four female witnesses necessary for it, but not for blasphemy (kufr). And all of this precludes qiyas. And the Prophet of Allâh has said, After me this people will act some by the Book and some by tradition and some by qiyas, and whenever they do thus then they have gone astray, and have led astray (others), and nothing remains to be the guardian of the law except the Imâm." And that is what we sought. And the Most High

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Creator has indicated this by His word, "But if they would report them to the Messenger, and to those who are in authority among them (that is, the Imâms), those who desire information. would learn it from them" (4: 85). (b) Second, since he is the guardian of the law (he must be immune to sin), for if he were not immune to sin there would be no security against addition and loss and change and interchange in the law.

(4) Fourth, everyone who is not immune to sin is unjust (zâlim), and nothing unjust is proper for the Imâmate. Hence no one who is not immune to sin is fit for the Imâmate. And the minor premise is true because an unjust person is one who places anything in a situation other than its own, and one who is not immune to sin is thus. And the major premise is true because of the word of the Most High, "My covenant embraceth not the evildoers" (2:118). And the meaning of is the covenant of the Imâmate, for the verse

"covenant points to that.

186. (3) THIRD, IT IS SPECIFIED (manṣûş) FOR (the Imâmate), BECAUSE IMMUNITY

NECESSARY THAT THE IMÂM BE

TO SIN IS A MATTER OF THE HEART WHICH NO ONE PERCEIVES

BUT ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH. HENCE THE SPECIFICATION MUST BE MADE BY ONE WHO KNOWS THAT THE IMÂM HAS THE IMMUNITY TO SIN (necessary) FOR IT, OR SOME MIRACLE (muʻjiza) MUST BE WROUGHT BY HIS HAND TO PROVE HIS VERACITY. (That is, the Imâm must be appointed by Allâh, not by the people.)

187. This is a reference to the way of appointing the Imâm. And agreement has been reached that in appointing the Imâm the specification can be made by Allâh and His Prophet, or by a previous Imâm in an independent way (without the voice of the people). And verily the disagreement is as to whether or not his appointment (ta'yîn) can be in a way (sabab) that is other than specification (nass) (by Allâh and the Prophet). And our companions the Imâmites deny that absolutely, and say that there is no way except nass. For we have explained that immunity to sin is a necessary condition of the Imâmate. And immunity to sin is a hidden

matter, and no one is informed of it except Allâh. Hence in such a case no one can know in whom it is (to be found), unless He who knows the unseen (al-ghayb) make it known. And that comes about in two ways: (1) first, by making it known to someone immune to sin, such as the Prophet, and then he tells us of the Imâm's immunity to sin and of his appointment (ta'yîn); (2) second, by the appearance of miracles wrought by his hand to prove his veracity in claiming the Imâmate.

188. And the Sunnites say that whenever the people (umma) acknowledge any person as chief (bâya'at), and are convinced of his ability (isti'dâd) for it (the Imâmate), and his power increases in the regions (khiṭat) of Islâm, he becomes the Imâm. And the Zaydites say that any rational ascetic Fâțimite who comes forth with the sword and claims the Imâmate is the Imâm. And the reality is contrary to all of this, for two reasons: first, the Imâmate is a succession (khilâfa) from Allâh and His Messenger, and it cannot be acquired except by the word of them both; and second, the establishing of the Imâmate by acknowledging anyone as chief and by his claim to it would result in conflict (fitna), because of the probability that every party would acknowledge some different person as Imâm, or that every rational Fâțimite would claim the Imâmate, and then fightings and struggles would result.

189. (4) FOURTH, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE IMÂM BE ABSOLUTELY THE BEST (afḍal) OF THE PEOPLE, BECAUSE OF

WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE REGARDING THE PROPHET.

190. It is necessary (wâjib) that the Imâm be the best of the people of his age, because he takes precedence over (muqaddam) all. And if there were among them one better than he then the worse (mafḍûl) would have to take precedence over the better, and that would be evil (qabîḥ) according to reason and tradition. And this has been already explained in (the section on) Prophecy (par. 170).

191. (5) FIFTH, THE IMÂM AFTER THE MESSENGER OF ALLÂH IS ‘ALÎ B. ABÎ ȚÂLIB, (1) BECAUSE OF HIS SPECIFICATION (nass)