replies that the reason for taklif's being good is that it apprises (ta'rîd) men of reward, not that it brings them reward. And apprising is universal as regards both believer and unbeliever. And that reward is decreed by Allâh the Most High in the beginning is admitted, but it is impossible for Him to begin with it except by means of taklif (that is, to reward men without first appointing tasks for them). For reward consists of exaltation and veneration, and reason pronounces the exaltation of a person who does not deserve it to be evil. And the author says in explanation of reward, that it is "merited advantage which is joined with exaltation." Now advantage (naf) comprises reward (thawâb) and grace (tafaḍḍul) and recompense ('iwad). Hence by the condition that it be merited, grace is excluded; and by the condition that it be joined with exaltation, recompense is excluded. (Recompense is merely wages paid-but Allâh does more--He pays us our due and exalts us besides. Hence this is not recompense but reward.)a 144. (5) FIFTH, REGARDING THE FACT THAT KINDNESS (luṭf) IS INCUMBENT UPON THE MOST HIGH. AND LUTF IS THAT WHICH BRINGS THE CREATURE NEAR TO OBEDIENCE AND KEEPS HIM FAR FROM DISOBEDIENCE. AND IT IS NO PART (ḥazz) OF ABILITY (tamkîn), AND IT DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS COMPULSION (al-iljâ'). FOR THE AIM OF THE IMPOSER OF TASKS (al-Mukallif) DEPENDS UPON IT. FOR WHENEVER HE WHO WILLS AN ACT FROM ANOTHER (that is, when Allâh wills that man do something) KNOWS THAT HE WILL NOT DO IT EXCEPT WITH THE AID OF AN ACT WHICH THE WILLER CAN PERFORM WITHOUT ANY TROUBLE, THEN IF HE DOES NOT PERFORM IT HE WOULD BE CONTRADICTING HIS OWN AIM, AND REASON PRONOUNCES THAT EVIL-ALLÂH IS EXALTED ABOVE THAT ! 145. On what does the performance of obedience and the refraining from disobedience depend? (1) First, on the presence of the power and means without which the act cannot be performed; and (2) second, on the presence of lutf (kindness), by which one who is responsible (mukallaf) for an act of obedience which he cannot perform without lutf is enabled to draw near to obedience and refrain from disobedience, (for example, in worship the acts of kneeling, speaking, etc., are ours, by Allâh's lutf). 146. And his saying, "IT IS NO PART OF ABILITY," refers to the first part, namely power, for power in actions is not lutf, but rather a condition of their possibility. (My power to pray is not Allâh's kindness to me-rather it is the necessary condition of the possibility of my obeying the command to pray.) And his saying, "IT DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS COMPULSION,' is true, because if it went as far as compulsion it would nullify taklif. 147. And since this is settled, then know that lutf is sometimes shown in the act of Allâh, in which case it is incumbent upon Him; and sometimes it is shown in the act of the mukallaf, in which case it is incumbent upon the Most High to inform the mukallaf of his duty and make it incumbent upon him; and sometimes it is shown in (the act of) someone other than Allâh and the mukallaf (namely, the prophet), in which case it becomes a condition of taklif that one know the prophet, and that Allâh make incumbent on him that act (namely, delivering his message), and confirm it for him. And our saying that they (the three kinds of lutf) are all incumbent on Allâh is because He would contradict His aim if this were not the case. And contradiction of aim is evil for Him. 148. And the explanation of this is that when He wills that someone perform some act, and knows that the man for whom it is willed will not perform the desired act unless the Willer aids him with an act which He performs with him, such as an act of kindliness (mulâțafa) toward him or of correspondence with him (mukâtaba) or of sending to him or of striving for him, and so forth, in which there is no trouble (mashaqqa) for Him-then if He does not do these things which He had resolved to do, rational beings would judge that He had contradicted His purpose, and would blame Him accordingly. And like this is what (the author) said regarding the Most High Creator, that if, when He wills the performance of obedience and the removal of disobedience, He does not do that on which these two things depend, He would then be contradicting His aim. And contradiction of aim is evil, and Allâh is exalted above that, the Most High and Most Exalted! 149. (6) SIXTH, IN REGARD TO THE FACT THAT AN ACTION IN RECOMPENSE ('iwaḍ) FOR THE SUFFERINGS (âlâm) WHICH COME TO MAN FROM HIM IS INCUMBENT UPON HIM AND THE WOULD BE UNJUST, AND ALLÂH IS EXALTED ABOVE THAT. 150. In the suffering which living creatures experience either some sort of evil is recognized (and that proceeds entirely from us); or else evil is not recognized in it, in which case it is good. And several things have been mentioned as to the good of pain: first, its being deserved; second, its containing advantage in excess (of the pain) which benefits the sufferer; third, its containing protection from injury in excess of the pain; fourth, its being common to man; fifth, its containing a sort of protection. And this good sometimes proceeds from the Most High, and sometimes proceeds from us. And that which proceeds from the Most High is for our advantage, and it is necessary that there be in it two things: (1) First, recompense for the suffering, otherwise He would be unjust, and Allâh is exalted above that. And it is necessary that the recompense be in excess of the pain to the extent that every rational being be satisfied. For it is evil in our opinion (fî'sh-shâhid) to cause anyone to suffer in order to recompense him for the suffering without (giving him) something in excess, because that would be in vain. (2) Second, there must be (in the suffering some) kindness (lutf), either for the sufferer or for another, that it may not be in vain. But as for that suffering which proceeds from us in which there is some sort of evil-it is incumbent upon Allâh to avenge the sufferer of his tormentor, because of His justice ('adl), and because the Koran teaches it. And in this case the recompense must be equal to the suffering. And if it were not thus He would be unjust. 151. And here there are several matters of importance: (1) First, recompense (al-'iwaḍ) is a merited advantage in which is no exaltation or veneration. By the condition of being merited it is distinguished from grace (tafaḍḍul), and by the condition of being without any exaltation it is distinguished from reward (thawâb). (2) Second, it is necessary that recompense be abiding (dawâm), because it is not good in our opinion (fî'sh-shâhid) for one to endure perilous woes and painful and great and laborious trials for a small transient advantage. (3) It is not necessary that the recompense be acquired in this world, for possibly Allâh knows that there is an advantage in its delay. Hence, it is sometimes acquired in this world, and sometimes it is not. (4) He who receives the recompense for his sufferings at the last day will be either of those who are rewarded or of those who are punished. And if he be of those who are rewarded, then it is sufficient for Allâh to give him his recompense, that is, that He divide it up into periods, or that He show grace to him in some such way. (The Ash'arites say that Paradise is in itself sufficient reward for pain, but the Shî'ites say that a recompense is also necessary.) And if he be of those who are punished, Allâh will cancel a part of his punishment because of his former sufferings, in such a way that the lightening of it will not be evident to him, since He will divide the measure of it into periods. (5) The suffering which proceeds from us to others, either by the command (amr) of the Most High or else by His permission, and that which proceeds from creatures such as the dumb brutes, and like the wasting of profit for the advantage of someone else which proceeds from Him, and the downpour of woes which come from something other than the act of man-the recompense for all this is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High, because of His Justice ('adl) and His Mercy (karam). SECTION V 152. CONCERNING PROPHECY: THE PROPHET (an-nabî)—ON HIM BE PEACE !—IS A MAN WHO BRINGS A MESSAGE (al-mukhbir) FROM ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH WITHOUT THE MEDIATION OF ANY HUMAN BEING. And by the term "MAN," angel is ex 66 153. When he had finished the discussion of Justice he connected with it the discussion of Prophecy, because of its being a branch of it. And he defined the Prophet as A MAN WHO BRINGS A MESSAGE FROM ALLÂH WITHOUT THE MEDIATION OF ANY HUMAN BEING. And by the term cluded. And by the term, A BRINGER OF A MESSAGE FROM ALLÂH," every one is excluded who brings a message from any besides Allâh. And by the term (which requires) the absence of human mediation, the Imâm and the doctor ('âlim) are excluded, for they are bringers of a message from Allâh through the mediation of the Prophet. 154. Since this is settled, then know that (the existence of) Prophecy and its being good (husn) are necessary (wâjib) on philosophical grounds, contrary to the Barahmiyya and the Ash'arites." And the proof of this is that since the purpose in the bringing of mankind into existence is the advantage (maşlaḥa) which accrues to them (that is, Allâh creates man not for His own glory but for man's good), then bringing them near to that in which their advantage consists and restraining them from that which would corrupt them is necessary on philosophical grounds. And that is (true), either in their present state or their future state. 155. (1) As for their present state, since for the preservation of the human race necessity requires a society (ijmâ'), and since in a society every individual opposes his companion in seeking what he needs, then a society must result in contentions and disagreements which arise from the love which every individual has for himself and the desire that he has for his own profit, not for that of another, so that it would end |