(b) Second, expression of gratitude to a benefactor is incumbent. But this cannot be done unless one knows him. Now it is incumbent, for all rational beings know that failure to express gratitude deserves blame. But it cannot be done without knowledge. For the expression of gratitude must be of a kind suitable to the condition of the one to be thanked, and that comes only from knowing him-otherwise it is not an expression of gratitude. Now the Most High Creator is a Benefactor. Therefore expression of gratitude to Him is incumbent. Therefore the knowledge of Him is incumbent.a And since taklif (the imposition of a task) is necessary (wâjib) on rational grounds, as shall appear later (see pars. 131-143), it is incumbent that one know the announcer (muballigh) of it, that is the Prophet, and the guardian of it, that is, the Imâm, and the Return, because taklif requires the necessity (wujûb) of requital.b

11. (2) Now for the traditional proof, which is of two kinds: (a) First, the word of the Most High, "Know then, that there is no god but Allâh " (47: 21). And this is a command making it incumbent. (b) Second, when there descended the word of Allâh, “Verily, in the creation of the Heavens and of the Earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding" (3: 186), the Prophet said, "Woe be to him who reads this with his tongue but has not reflected upon it!" Thus he attributes blame in case of failure to reflect upon it, that is, the failure to make deduction (istidlâl) from what the verse contained in the mention of the heavenly and earthly bodies, because in them are evidences of workmanship and power. And the knowledge ('ilm) of these things certainly proves the existence of their Creator (Şâni'), and His power and His knowledge. Hence reflection and deduction become incumbent, and that was what we were seeking to demonstrate.

12. AND ALL OF THIS IS BY PROOF (dalîl), NOT BY IMITATION (taqlîd).

13. And PROOF (dalîl) as a word means a director (murshid) and guide (dâll), and in usage it means a thing the knowledge

('ilm) of which necessitates the knowledge of another thing. And since knowledge (ma'rifa) is incumbent, it is necessary that it be acquired by means of reflection and deduction. For maʼrifa is not of necessity (darûrî), for what is known of necessity is that in which rational beings do not differ. Now 'ilm is acquired by means of the smallest cause by the direction of the mind upon it, or by the perception of it by the senses, such as the judgment that one is a half of two, and that fire burns, and that the sun is bright, and likewise that we are subject to fear and anger and strength and weakness and so forth.

14. But ma'rifa is not like that, because there is a difference of opinion about it, and because it cannot be acquired merely by the direction of the mind upon it, and because it cannot be perceived by the senses. Hence the first statement is demonstrated, because 'ilm includes both necessary knowledge and speculative (nazarî) knowledge. Hence speculation and deduction become incumbent. For that without which a thing absolutely incumbent cannot be performed and by which it is controlled is itself incumbent. (There are two kinds of obligations (wajib), absolute, like namâz, and conditioned, like hajj.) Because whenever anything on which a thing absolutely incumbent depends is not itself incumbent, then the thing absolutely incumbent either remains incumbent or it does not. If the first be the case, then there becomes necessary a taklif which cannot be performed, and this is impossible, as shall later appear (pars. 134-136). And if the second be the case, then it becomes necessary that a thing absolutely incumbent shall cease to be incumbent, and this also is impossible.

[That is, knowledge is incumbent, therefore investigation is also incumbent. For if it were not, then either a thing (namely, ma'rifa) would be incumbent which could not be attained-and this is impossible; or else a thing absolutely incumbent becomes non-incumbent which is also impossible.]

15. And speculation (nazar) is the orderly arrangement of known facts (umûr) in order to arrive at another fact. And in

explanation of this-first the soul (nafs) conceives the object sought, then it acquires the sound premises necessary for making a deduction, and then it arranges them in order so as to arrive at a knowledge of the object.

16. And it is not possible (jâ'iz) that knowledge (ma'rifa) of the Most High be by imitation (taqlîd). And taqlîd is the acceptance of the word of another without proof (dalîl). And this statement of ours has two aspects. (1) First, when mankind are equal in respect of knowledge ('ilm) and differ from one another in belief, then a mukallaf must either accept all that which others believe (in which case the agreement of things irreconcilable becomes necessary), or else he must accept some things and not others. In the latter case there is either something to cause a preponderance of opinion (murajjih), or there is not. If there be something which causes the preponderance, then that is the proof (dalîl). But if there be not, then it becomes necessary for there to be a preponderance without anything to cause it, and this is impossible.

17. (2) Second, the Most High has blamed imitation (taqlîd) by His word, "But say they, Verily, we have found our fathers of that persuasion and verily by their footsteps do we guide ourselves" "(43:21). And He has incited us to speculation and deduction by His word, " Bring me a Book sent down by them before this Koran, or traces of their knowledge—if ye are men of truth (46: 3).

18. AND SO IT IS NECESSARY TO MENTION THOSE THINGS REGARDING WHICH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A SINGLE MUSLIM TO BE IGNORANT, AND WHOEVER IS IGNORANT AS TO ANY OF THEM IS OUTSIDE THE BOND (ribqa) OF BELIEVERS AND

DESERVES EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT.

19. Since the knowledge (ma'rifa) of the above-mentioned things has been proved to be incumbent, it necessarily follows that it is incumbent upon every Muslim. That is, he should affirm the two testimonies (that there is no god but Allâh and that Muḥammad is His Prophet) in order that through knowledge he should become a believer, according to the word of the Most High, "The Arabs of the desert say, 'We believe.'

Say thou: Ye believe not; but rather say, 'We profess Islâm'" (49: 14). He denied faith (al-îmân)a to them, although they affirmed their belief in divinity and prophecy, because their faith did not derive its existence from speculation and deduction. And since reward (thawâb) is conditioned by faith, one who is ignorant of the knowledge of these things deserves everlasting punishment. For everyone who is undeserving of any reward whatever, provided he is in possession of the qualities which constitute the conditions of taklif (see par. 5), is deserving of punishment by agreement (of all Muslims).

20. BOND (ribqa) is a long rope with space enough to bind animals within it. And the author uses the term metaphorically for the inclusive command which rests upon believers, the desert (for obedience to which) is reward and everlasting honour.

SECTION I

21. AND HE HAS ARRANGED THIS CHAPTER IN SECTIONS. THE FIRST SECTION IS IN PROOF OF THE SELF-EXISTENT (wâjibu'l-wujûdi li-dhâtihi, the necessarily existent in itself). SO WE SAY THAT EVERY OBJECT OF THOUGHT IS EITHER NECESSARILY EXISTENT OBJECTIVELY IN ITSELF, OR IS POSSIBLE

OF EXISTENCE IN ITSELF (mumkinu'l-wujûd), OR ELSE IS IMPOSSIBLE OF EXISTENCE IN ITSELF (mumtani'u'l-wujûd).

22. The subject which is supreme and of extreme importance in this science is the Proving of the Creator (Şâni'). So he begins to do this. And as an introduction he gives a division of the objects of thought, because the argument to follow depends on this explanation. And in explanation of that, EVERY OBJECT OF THOUGHT (kullu maʼqûl) means the form (aş-şûra) which is acquired in the mind whenever we bring objective existence into relation to it. Then it is either sound for it (the objective existence) to be qualified by it (the mental image) in itself, or it is not. If it is not sound for it to be qualified by it in itself, that is impossible existence in itself, as (for example) the Creator's having a partner. But if it is sound for it to be qualified by it, then it is either necessary (wâjib) for it to be qualified by it in itself, or it is not. If the former be true, then it is the necessarily existent in itself, namely, Allâh the Exalted, and no other. And if the latter be true, then it is possible of existence in itself, namely, all entities (mawjûdât) apart from necessary existence.

23. But we have confined the "Necessary" (al-wâjib) to that which is necessary in itself, to guard against the necessary because of something else, such as the necessity of the existence of an effect when a sufficient cause is present. (That is, there are two kinds of necessary, self-existent and existent in something else but the term the Necessary should be used only of the former.) So the effect is necessary, not in itself, but rather because of the existence of a sufficient cause.