SECTION IV 111. CONCERNING JUSTICE ('adl). AND IN IT ARE SEVERAL SUBJECTS FOR INVESTIGATION. (1) FIRST, REASON (al-'aql) OF NECESSITY PASSES JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT ACTIONS ARE GOOD (hasan), SUCH AS THE RETURN OF A TRUST (fund) AND DOING GOOD (iḥsân), AND VERACITY WHICH IS PROFITABLE, AND AS TO WHAT ARE EVIL (qabîḥ), SUCH AS INJUSTICE AND AN INJURIOUS LIE. FOR THOSE WHO DENY ALL SYSTEMS OF LAW, LIKE THE MALÂḤIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHERS OF INDIA, JUDGE GOOD AND EVIL THUS; AND MOREOVER IF THEY ARE DENIED BY REASON THEY WOULD ALSO BE DENIED BY TRADITION, BECAUSE OF THE DENIAL OF THE EVIL OF LYING IN THIS CASE IN THE LAW-GIVER (ash-shâri'). 112. When he finished the discussion of the Unity he began the discussion of Justice. And the meaning of Justice is that the Most High is far removed from every evil act and from being remiss in what is incumbent. And since Justice depends on the knowledge of good and evil as determined by reason, he introduced the discussion of that first. And know that an act the conception of which is necessary (ḍarûri) either has a quality in addition to its origination (ḥudûth), or it has not. An example of the latter is the movement of one who acts thoughtlessly (as-sâhî) and of a sleeper. And as for the former, either reason hates that addition or it does not if it does, that is evil (al-qabîḥ), and if reason does not hate it, it is good (al-ḥasan). (That is, an act which one can know of necessity, such as the things we see and hear, either has a moral quality in addition to its occurrence, or it has not. If it has, and reason does not hate it, it is good-otherwise it is evil.) 113. Either (1) the doing and not doing of an act is equal, and this is mubaḥ (indifferent); or (2) it is not equal. And (in this latter case) if the not doing of it is preferable, then if the opposite (namely, the doing of it) is forbidden it is harâm, otherwise it is makrûh. And if the doing of it is preferable, then if the leaving it undone is forbidden, it is wâjib ; or if the leaving it undone is permissible it is mandûb (or mustaḥabb). (1) Doing and not doing equal: (a) Not doing preferable: (a) Doing it forbidden: mubah. harâm. (B) Doing it not forbidden: makrúḥ. (b) Doing of it preferable: (a) Leaving it undone forbidden: wajib. (mustaḥabb). (B) Leaving it undone permissible mandûb 114. Since this is explained, know that good and evil are used in three senses: (1) First, a thing's being a quality of perfection, such as our saying that knowledge is good; or a quality of imperfection, such as our saying that ignorance is evil. (2) Second, a thing's being agreeable to nature, as pleasures; or disagreeable to it, as pains. (3) Third, good is that the doing of which deserves praise in this world and reward in the world to come; and evil is that the doing of which deserves blame in this world and punishment in the world to come. 115. And there is no difference of opinion as to the first two senses being determined by reason. But the scholastic theologians have differed regarding the third sense. The Ash'arites say that there is nothing in reason which can guide to (a knowledge of) good and evil in this third sense, but law (must be the guide), and whatever it calls good is good, and whatever it calls evil is evil. And the Mu'tazilites and Imâmites say that there is that in reason which can guide to it, and that good is good in itself, and evil is evil in itself, whether the lawgiver pronounces it so or not.a And they reply to them (the Ash'arites) as follows: (1) First, we know of necessity that some actions are good, such as veracity which is profitable and fairness and doing good and returning a trust and rescuing one who is perishing and other such things, without needing law (to tell us so); and that others are evil, such as an injurious lie and injustice and doing harm to one who does not deserve it and other such things, without having any doubt at all about it. For this judgment is inherent (markûz) in human nature. For when we say to a person, "If you speak the truth you will get a dînâr," and he be unprejudiced, by reason alone he will recognize the truth and desire to speak it. 116. (2) Second, if that which recognizes (mudrik) good and evil were law and nothing else, it would follow that they could not be known apart from it. But this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And the explanation of this necessity is that it is impossible of necessity for a thing conditioned to be binding apart from the condition. And the explanation of the fallacy of the necessity is that those who do not believe in a law, like the Malâḥida and the philosophers of India, do affirm that some actions are good and others evil without hesitating in the matter. For if this (knowledge) consisted in what is learned from law then they would not have pronounced an opinion. 117. (3) Third, if rational good and evil be denied, then it becomes necessary that legal good and evil be denied also. But all agree that this necessity is false. Hence that which necessitates it is false also. And the reason for this necessity (for the denial of legal good and evil), is the denial, in this case, of the evil of a lie on the part of the lawgiver, when reason does not pronounce it evil, so that he gives the lie to himself. And when the evil of a lie in him is denied, then the trustworthiness of what he tells us regarding good and evil must be denied also. (That is, till reason teaches us that a lie is evil, we cannot trust the lawgiver-for perhaps he is lying to us.) 118. (2) SECOND, WE ARE FREE AGENTS (fâ'ilûna bi‘l-ikhtiyâr), AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THIS: (a) BECAUSE OF THE NECESSARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MAN'S FALLING FROM THE ROOF AND HIS GOING DOWN FROM IT BY A LADDER OTHERWISE OUR RESPONSIBILITY (taklîf) FOR A THING WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE NO SIN; (b) AND BECAUSE OF THE EVIL OF HIS CREATING AN ACT IN US AND THEN PUNISHING US FOR IT; (c) AND BECAUSE OF TRADITION. 119. The belief of Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'arî and those who follow him is that all actions take place by the Power of Allâh the Most High, and no action whatever belongs to the creature. And some of the Ash'arites say that the essence of the act is of Allâh, and the creature has kasb, which they explain as the action's being obedience or disobedience (that is, the moral quality of the act belongs to man, the act itself is Allâh's).a And some of them say that its meaning is that when the creature determines to undertake some thing, Allâh the Most High creates the act thereupon. And the Mu'tazilitesh and Zaydites and Imâmites say that actions which proceed from the creature, and their qualities, and the kasb which they spoke of, all take place by the power and choice of the creature; and he is not forced (majbûr) to act as he does, but he can act and he can refrain from acting, and this is the reality, for several reasons: (1) First, we find a necessary difference between the issuing from us of an action which results from purpose and motive, like the descent from the roof by a ladder, and the issuing of an action of another sort, like falling from the roof either by constraint or accidentally. For we have power to refrain from the first (action), but not from the second. And if actions were not ours, then they would all be of one uniform kind without any distinction. But a distinction is present. Hence actions are ours, and that is what we sought. 120. (2) Second, if the creature were not the bringer-intoexistence (mûjid) of his actions, then his taklif would be impossible, otherwise he would be responsible for what he is unable to perform. And we say this because in this case he would not have power to do that for which he is responsible. For if he were responsible, the responsibility would be for something which he was unable to perform, and this is false, by the agreement of all. And when he is not responsible (mukallaf), he is not disobedient ('âșî) when he opposes (God's will), but by the agreement of all he is disobedient. 121. (3) Third, if the creature were not a bringer-intoexistence of his actions, and did not have power over them, then Allâh would be the most unjust of unjust beings. For since the evil action proceeds from the Most High (not from man), it is impossible for the creature to be punished for it, for he has not performed it. But all agree that the Most High punishes. Then He would be unjust-but He is exalted above that! 122. (4) Fourth, the Mighty Book which is the Divider (furqân) between true and false teaches everywhere the relation (iḍâfa) of the action to the creature and its occurrence by his will, according to the word of the Most High, Woe to those who with their hands transcribe the Book corruptly, and then say, 'This is from Allâh,' that they may sell it for some mean price! Woe to them for that which their hands have written! and Woe to them for the gains which they have made!" (2:73) “... they follow but a conceit' (6: 116) .. So long as they change not what is in their hearts" (8:55)". . . He who doth evil shall be recompensed for it" (4: 122) Pledged to Allâh is every man for his actions and their desert" (52: 21). And all the verses of promise and threatening and blame and praise (prove this), and they are more than can be numbered. 66 123. (3) THIRD, REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVIL (qubḥ) IN HIM, BECAUSE HE HAS THAT WHICH DETERS HIM FROM IT, WHICH IS THE KNOWLEDGE ('ilm) OF EVIL; AND HE HAS NO MOTIVE FOR DOING EVIL, BECAUSE THE MOTIVE WOULD BE EITHER NEED, WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM, OR THE WISDOM (hikma) OF IT, WHICH IS EXCLUDED HERE; AND BECAUSE THE PROOF OF PROPHECY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR EVIL TO PROCEED FROM HIM. 124. It is impossible for the Most High to be the doer of evil. This is the belief of the Mu'tazilites. But to the Ash'arites He is the Doer of everything, be it good or evil. And the proof of what we have said is twofold: (1) First, that which would deter Him from evil exists, and the motive for doing evil does not exist, and whatever is thus cannot come |