83. CONCERNING

HIS

SECTION III

PRIVATIVE (salbiyya)

QUALITIES, WHICH ARE SEVEN. FIRST, THE MOST HIGH IS NOT COMPOUNDED (murakkab), OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE IN NEED OF MEMBERS, AND THAT WHICH IS IN NEED (muftaqir) IS POSSIBLE (existence).

84. When he finished the positive qualities he began on the privative ones. The first (the positive) are called the qualities of perfection (kamâl), and the second the qualities of glory (jalâl). And if you will, all the qualities may be qualities of glory. For the affirmation of His Power means the negation (salb) of impotence ('ajz) in Him, and the affirmation of knowledge means the negation of ignorance in Him, and likewise for the other qualities. And in truth what can be understood by our reason (al-maʼqûl lanâ) of His qualities is nothing but negation (sulûb) and relationships (iḍâfât). And the limit (kunh) of His essence and qualities is veiled from the consideration (nazar) of reason ('uqûl). And no one knows what He is but He Himself.

85. Now the author mentioned here seven qualities. The first is that He is not compounded. And a compounded thing is one which has parts. And the opposite of compounded is single (basît), and it is what does not have parts. And composition (tarkîb) is sometimes objective, as the composition in bodies of atoms (jawâhir) and accidents (a'râḍ); and sometimes it is mental (dhihnî), as the composition of quiddity (mâhiyya) and limits (hudûd), like the composition of genera (ajnâs) and species (fușûl). And a compounded thing in both senses is in need of its parts, because it is impossible for it, objectively or subjectively, to be realized and distinguished without its parts. And its parts are other than it, because the part can be separated from it. And the part is not called the whole. And that from which a thing can be separated is

distinct from it. Then a compounded thing is in need of something else, hence it is possible (existence). Therefore, if the Most Exalted Creator were compounded He would be possible (existence), and that cannot be.

86. SECOND, HE IS NOT A BODY (jism), NOR AN ACCIDENT (‘araḍ), NOR AN ATOM (jawhar), OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE NEED OF A PLACE (al-makân), BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR BODY TO BE SEPARATED FROM ORIGINATED THINGS. THEN HE WOULD BE AN ORIGINATED THING, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

87. The Most High Creator is not a body, contrary to the Anthropomorphists (mujassima). And BODY is that which has length and breadth and depth. And ACCIDENT is that which alights (al-ḥâll) in a body and has no existence without it. And the proof that the Most High is not an accident or a body is of two kinds: (1) First, if He were one of these two He would be possible existence. But this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And for the explanation of this necessity—we know of necessity (biḍ-ḍarûra) that every body needs a place, and every accident needs a locus (maḥall). And place and locus are other than body and accident. Hence they are in need of something other than themselves. And that which needs something else is the possible. Hence if the Most High Creator were a body or an accident He would be possible existence. (2) Second, if He were a body He would be an originated thing, and that is impossible. And in explanation of this, no body can be quit of originated things. And that which cannot be quit of originated things is itself an originated thing, as we have previously explained. Hence, if He were a body He would be an originated thing. But He is prior. Then contradictories would have to agree, and that is impossible.

88. AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT HE BE IN A PLACE (makân), FOR HE WOULD THEN HAVE NEED OF IT; NOR IN A DIRECTION, FOR HE WOULD THEN HAVE NEED OF IT.

89. And these two qualities are negative. (1) The first is that He is not in a place, contrary to the Christians and some of the Şûfîs. And what is understood by incarnation (ḥulûl

alighting) is the inhering (qiyâm) of one entity (mawjûd) in another entity in succession. And if they intend this meaning, then it is false. For then the Necessary would have to be in need, and that cannot be. And if they intend some other meaning, then first of all we would have to conceive it, and afterwards pass judgment on it, either rejecting it or affirming it.

90. (2) Second, He is not in a direction (jiha). And direction is the goal (maqṣad) of a moving object, and is connected with the world of sense. And the Karrâmites thought that

He was in the direction of heaven (fawqiyya), and they supposed this from the literal meaning of a text (naql), and that is false. Because, if He be in a direction, then either He does not need it, in which case He will not alight in it; or else He does need it, in which case He would be the possible. And the literal traditional meaning possesses interpretations (ta'wîlât) and bearings (mahâmil) which are mentioned in their proper place. For since corporeality (jismiyya) and what follows from it has on rational grounds been proved impossible for Him, then either (a) another interpretation is necessaryfor it is impossible to use both (tradition and reason), otherwise contradictories would have to agree; or (b) both must be rejected, in which case both of the contradictories would have to be removed (a logical impossibility); or (c) tradition must be used and reason rejected, in which case reason also would have to be rejected, because of the rejection of its foundation. (Reason is fundamental (aşl), tradition is consequent (far')if the former is rejected the latter is impossible.) So (d) the fourth possibility remains, namely, the use of reason and the interpretation of tradition.

91. AND PLEASURE (al-ladhdha) AND PAIN (al-alam) ARE NOT VALID FOR HIM, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE MOST HIGH

TO HAVE A PHYSICAL CONSTITUTION (mizâj).

92. Pain and pleasure are things that we perceive internally (wijdânî), hence they do not need explanation. And it has been said of them that pleasure is the perception of what is agreeable with regard to its being (min hayth) agreeable, and

pain is the perception of what is disagreeable (munâfî) with regard to its being disagreeable. And pleasure and pain may be either sensuous or mental. If the perception is by the senses they are sensuous, and if it is by the mind they are mental. Since this is determined, we say that pain is impossible for the Most High, as all reasonable beings agree, since He is subject to nothing that is disagreeable (munâfî—contrary to His nature). And pleasure, if it be sensuous, is likewise impossible for Him, because it results from having a physical constitution, and a physical constitution is impossible for Him, otherwise He would be a body. And if it be mental, the philosophers have affirmed it for Him, also the founder of the Ya'qûbigga (sect)1 from among us. For the Most High Creator is qualified by His perfection, which is worthy of Him, for it is impossible for Him to have any imperfection. Nevertheless, He perceives by His essence and His perfection. Hence He is the Most Glorious Perceiver and the Most Exalted Perceiver by the most complete perception, and by pleasure we mean nothing other than that.

93. But the scholastic theologians have restricted their statements to the denial of pleasure to Allâh, either because of their belief that mental pleasure (also is) denied to Allâh, or because of its not having been mentioned in the Majestic Law. For the qualities of Allâh and His names are restricted, and it is not permissible for any but Him to venture into them, except with His permission. And even if pleasure is possible for Allâh from the point of view of (human) reason, yet it is not polite (to attribute it to Him), because it may perhaps be impossible (for Him) for some reason or other which we do not know.

94. NOR DOES HE UNITE WITH OTHER THAN HIMSELF, BECAUSE UNION (al-ittiḥâd) IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM. 95. Union may be used in two senses, figurative and real. (1) Figurative union is one thing's becoming another thing in being (al-kawn) or in corruption (al-fasâd). (For an example

1 The translator had written "the author of 'Ya'qût,' have corrected by conjecture. R.A.N.

which I

of being-water becomes mist; of corruption-seed in the ground dies and becomes a new plant.) Either (a) there is no addition (iḍâfa) of another thing, as their saying that water becomes air and air becomes water; or (b) there is an addition of something else, as it is said that dirt becomes mud by the addition of water to it. (2) And real union is when two entities become one entity.

96. Since that is determined, know that the first is altogether impossible for the Most High, because created being (al-kawn) and corruption are impossible for Him. And as for the second, some Christians say that He has united with Christ, for they say that the divinity (lâhûtiyya) of the Creator has united with the humanity (nâsûtiya) of ‘Îsâ. And the Naṣriyya say that He has united with 'Alî. And some of the Sûfîs say that He has united with those who know God ('ârifîn). Now, if they mean something other than what we have mentioned it is first necessary to conceive it, then to pass judgment upon it. And if they mean what we have mentioned (namely, real union), then it is altogether false, because union is in itself impossible (there is no such thing as real union). Therefore it is impossible that it should be proved (to occur) in anything else. Now it is impossible, because if after the union of two entities they continue to exist, there is no union, because they are two, not one; and if they become non-existent together, this also is not union, but a third entity; and if one of them becomes non-existent and the other continues to exist, this also is not union, because non-existence cannot unite with existence.

97. THIRD, THE MOST HIGH IS NOT A LOCUS (maḥall) FOR ORIGINATED THINGS, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING ACTED UPON (infi'âl) BY ANYTHING ELSE, AND THE

IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPERFECTION IN HIM.

98. Know that there are two ways of considering (i'tibârân) the qualities of the Most High: (1) The first of these refers to the essential Power itself and the essential Knowledge itself and to the other qualities themselves. And (2) the second refers to the connection (taʻalluq) which these qualities have