of the four seasons are arranged, as is explained in the sciences; and the things on the earth, in which there appears the wisdom revealed in the three kingdoms (murakkabât-mineral, vegetable, and animal), and in the strange things which are embraced by them, and in the wonderful characteristics which they possess. And if there were nothing else besides the forming of man, certainly the wisdom deposited in his creation and the orderliness of his formation and his senses and the benefits which depend on them would be sufficient (to demonstrate the perfection of Allâh's acts), as is indicated in the word of Allâh, "Have they not considered within themselves that Allâh hath not created the Heavens and the Earth and all that is between them. . . ?” (30: 7). And among the wonders deposited in man's constitution is this, that every one of his members has four powers, that of attraction (jâdhiba), retention (mâsika), digestion (hâḍima), and excretion (dâfi'a). As for attraction, since the body is constantly undergoing dissolution it needs the power of attraction that it may attract that which will replace what has dissolved from it. And it needs the power of retention, because the food which is taken in is slippery (lazij), and the organ is also slippery. Hence it must have the power of retention that digestion may take place. And the power of digestion is needed, because it changes the food into what is fitted to become part of the body of the eater. And excretion is the throwing off of the food which was in excess of what was digested, which was prepared because of another member. And everyone who performs actions which are firm and perfect is knowing, for this is self-evident to one who understands these matters and considers them.

55. AND HIS KNOWLEDGE IS CONNECTED WITH EVERY KNOWN THING (maʼlûm), BECAUSE OF THE EQUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF ALL KNOWN THINGS TO HIM. FOR HE IS LIVING (ḥayy), AND IT IS PROPER THAT EVERY LIVING ONE SHOULD

KNOW EVERY KNOWN THING. HENCE THAT IS NECESSARY FOR HIM, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING IN NEED OF ANOTHER.

56. The Most High Creator knows everything that can properly be known, whether necessary or possible, prior or originated. This is contrary to the philosophers, in that they have denied that He has knowledge of parts (al-juzʼiyyât) as parts (He knows them as a whole, not as parts), because change in them would necessitate change in the knowledge which resides in His essence. We reply that what changes is the relative connection, not the essential knowledge. And the proof of our position is that it is proper for Him to know every known thing-therefore this (knowledge) is necessary for Him. And it is proper for Him to know every known thing because He is Living, and everyone that lives can properly know (a dead thing cannot know, knowledge being a property of life). And the relationship of this propriety (for him to know all things) to all that is apart from Him is an equal relationship (that is, it is equally proper that He know all things). Hence the relation of all known things to Him is also equal. And the proof that whenever a thing is proper for the Most High, it is also necessary for Him is this: His qualities belong to His essence (dhâtiyya), and when a quality which belongs to the essence is proper it is also necessary, otherwise He would have need of something else, in that His essence was qualified by something other than He. Then the Most High Creator, as regards His knowledge, would be in need of something else, and that is impossible. (In both man and God knowledge is proper (ṣaḥîḥ), but while in man it is possible (mumkin), in God it is necessary (wâjib), for belonging to His essence it cannot be possible.)

57. THIRD, THE MOST HIGH IS LIVING (ḥayy), BECAUSE HE IS

POWERFUL AND KNOWING HENCE OF NECESSITY HE IS LIVING.

58. Among His positive qualities is His being Living. And the philosophers and Abû'l-Hasan al-Başrî say that His life means the propriety (șiḥḥa) of His being qualified by power and knowledge. And the Ash'arites say that Life is a quality in excess (zâ'id) of His essence, as distinct from this propriety (as held by al-Başrî). And the first (the opinion of al-Başrî) is reality, for the root of the matter is its not being in excess.a

And it has been proved that the Most High Creator is Powerful and Knowing, hence of necessity He is Living, which is what we sought. (That is, Life is the essence itself, and so also are Knowledge and Power.)

59. FOURTH, THE MOST HIGH IS A WILLER (murîd) AND A DISLIKER (kârih), BECAUSE THE SPECIALIZING (takhṣîș) OF THE

PERFORMANCE OF ACTS TO ONE TIME AND NOT TO ANOTHER

REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A SPECIALIZER (mukhaṣṣiṣ), AND THAT IS WILL (al-irâda); AND BECAUSE THE MOST HIGH COMMANDS AND PROHIBITS, AND THESE THINGS REQUIRE OF NECESSITY WILL AND DISLIKE.

60. Now all Muslims are agreed that He has the quality Will, but they differ as to its meaning. Abû'l-Hasan al-Başrî said that it meant Allâh's knowing what advantage (maşlaḥa) is in an act, as a motive for its performance (that is, when Allâh knows that a certain act is advantageous, then that knowledge is will, and becomes the motive for its performance). And al-Bukhârî said that its meaning is that Allâh is not overcome (maghlûb) and is not forced (mukrah). This meaning here is negative, and the speaker (al-Bukhârî) has taken in place of Will that which makes Will necessary.

61. And al-Balkhî said that in Allâh's acts will means His knowledge of them, and in the acts of others it means His commanding them. Now we reply, if he means by will absolute knowledge, then that is not will, as shall appear later. And if he means knowledge which is confined to advantage (that is, the knowledge of those things which Allâh sees are advantageous), then that is like what al-Basri said. And His commanding it indeed requires will, but it is not will.

62. And the Ash'arites and Karrâmites and a group of Mu'tazilites say that Will is a quality in excess of the essence, which is separate from Power and Knowledge, and belongs especially to His act. But then they disagreed among themselves the Ash'arites say that this being in excess is a prior idea (ma'nâ); and the Muʻtazilites and Karrâmites say that it is an originated idea. And the Karrâmites say that it inheres (qâ'im) in His essence (as accidents inhere in a substance),

and the Muʻtazilites say it is not in a locus (maḥall), (that is, it does not so inhere, for Allâh's essence is not a place in which qualities can inhere). And the fallacy of this doctrine of excess will soon appear. And what al-Başrî said is reality, for two reasons.

63. (1) First, the specializing in the performance of acts at one time and not at another, and in one way and not in another, in spite of the equality of times and states in relation to the Doer and the recipient, necessarily requires a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ). And this specifier is either (a) the Power which resides in the essence, which is equally related to all things, and therefore cannot properly specialize-and, moreover, its function is moving (ta'thîr) and performing (îjâd), not preferring (tarjîḥ); (b) or else it is absolute knowledge—but that is consequent upon the appointment of the possible and the decree of its issuing. Hence it is not the specializer, otherwise it would certainly precede, and that is not possible. And it is clear that the remaining qualities cannot properly specialize. Hence the specializer is a special kind of knowledge (namely, knowledge of what is advantageous) which necessitates the appointment of the possible and the necessity of its issuing from Him. That is, it is knowledge that the possible contains an advantage which cannot be acquired except at that time and in that manner. And that specializer is Will.a

64. (2) Second, the Most High commanded in His word, “Establish the worship"; and He prohibited in His word, "Do not draw near to adultery." And command of a thing requires of necessity the willing of it, and prohibition of a thing requires of necessity the dislike for it. Hence the Most High Creator is a Willer and a Disliker, which is what we sought.

65. Now there are here two matters of importance: (1) First, His disliking is His knowledge that an act contains a cause of corruption (mafsada) which deters Him from performing it, just as will is His knowledge that the act contains advantage which is the motive (dâ'iya) for its performance. (2) Second, Will is not in excess of that which we mentioned (it is the essence itself, not in excess of the essence), otherwise it would

be either a prior idea (ma'nâ), as the Ash'arites say, in which case the plurality of prior things would be necessary; or else an originated thing. If the latter, then either (a) it would be a quality inhering in His essence, as the Karrâmites say, and He would be a locus for originated things—and that is false as shall appear later, if Allâh wills; or (b), it would be a quality of something else, and then it would be necessary for His command (hukm) to be referred to someone else, and not to Him. And Will is not in a place, as the Mu'tazilites say. For there are two errors in this: First, it necessitates an endless chain, because an originated thing is consequent upon the will of the originator. Then in that case Will would be an originated thing. Then if we move the discussion back a step it becomes a chain. Second, the impossibility of a quality's existing outside of a place.

66. FIFTH, THE MOST HIGH IS A PERCEIVER (mudrik), BECAUSE HE IS LIVING, AND IT IS THEREFORE PROPER FOR HIM TO PERCEIVE. AND THE KORAN HAS COME IN TO PROVE IT FOR HIM, HENCE IT IS INCUMBENT THAT IT BE CONFIRMED (ithbât) (by us by reason) TO BELONG TO HIM.

67. By traditional proofs it has been demonstrated that the Most High has Perception (idrâk). And Perception is (something) additional to Knowledge. For we find a difference between our knowledge of black and white and a terrifying sound and a pleasant one, and our perception of these things. And this addition is due to the impression (ta'thîr) of the However, rational proofs lead us to believe that senses and organs are impossible for the Most High, and therefore this addition is impossible for Him. Hence in this case His Perception is His Knowledge of objects of perception (mudrakât).a

68. And the proof that it is proper for Him to have the quality of Perception is the same as that by which we proved that He knows all known things, (namely), by His being Living (see par. 56).

69. SIXTH, THE MOST HIGH IS PRIOR (qadîm) AND FROM ETERNITY (azalî) AND ABIDING (bâqî) AND TO ETERNITY (abadî),