SECTION II

38. CONCERNING HIS POSITIVE QUALITIES (aş-şifâtu'ththubûtiyya), WHICH ARE EIGHT. FIRST, THE MOST HIGH IS POWERFUL (qâdir) AND FREE (mukhtâr). FOR THE WORLD IS AN ORIGINATED THING (muḥdath), FOR IT IS A BODY (jism). AND EVERY BODY IS INSEPARABLE FROM ORIGINATED THINGS, I MEAN MOTION AND REST, BOTH OF WHICH ARE ORIGINATED THINGS, FOR BOTH REQUIRE CONSEQUENCE (masbûqiyya) IN REFERENCE TO SOMETHING ELSE. AND THAT WHICH IS IN

SEPARABLE FROM ORIGINATED THINGS IS OF NECESSITY ITSELF

AN ORIGINATED THING. HENCE THERE IS A MOVER IN IT, NAMELY ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH, THE POWERFUL AND FREE. FOR IF THE CAUSE WERE A MECHANICAL CAUSE (mûjib) THEN OF NECESSITY ITS EFFECT (athar) WOULD NOT REMAIN BEHIND IT. THEN THAT WOULD REQUIRE EITHER THE PRIORITY (qidam) OF THE WORLD OR THE ORIGIN (ḥudûth) OF ALLÂH

THE MOST HIGH, BOTH OF WHICH ARE FALSE.

39. When he finished proving the essence (dhât) he began to prove the qualities (șifât). And he placed first the positive qualities, for they possess existence (wujûd), while the negative qualities possess non-existence ('adamiyya). And existence ranks above non-existence, and that which ranks highest should come first.

40. And he began with His being Powerful, because creation requires power (qudra). And here we will make some introductory remarks which will include the consideration of the elements of this discussion.

41. We say then that the Powerful and Free is He who if He wills to do anything does it, and if He wills to leave it, leaves it; and who acts with purpose (qaşd) and will (irâda). And a mechanical cause is the opposite. There are several differences between them-that is, between the free agent (mukhtâr) and the mechanical cause (mûjib): (1) First, the

free agent is able to act or cease from acting, while the mechanical cause is not. (2) Second, the act of the free agent is consequent upon knowledge and purpose and will, while the mechanical cause is not. (3) It is possible for the act of the free agent to follow it in time, while the act of a mechanical cause cannot be separated from it, as (for example) the sun's giving light and fire's burning.

42. And the world ('âlam) is all that exists besides Allâh the Most High. And an originated thing (muḥdath) is that which is consequent upon something else or upon non-existence ('adam). And a prior thing (qadîm) is the opposite of this. And body (jism) is that bounded thing (mutaḥayyiz) which receives division in three directions. And hayyiz and makân are one single thing, namely, an imaginary measure of space (farâgh) which bodies occupy by coming into it. And motion is the coming of a body into a place after being in another place. And rest is the second coming into one place.

43. Now that this has been explained, I say that since the world is a thing originated, there is in it a mover, namely, Allâh the Most High, the Powerful and Free. And (I have made) here two claims: (1) the first, that the world is an originated thing, and (2) the second, that its Creator must possess free will (ikhtiyâr). In explanation of the first claim, (I say that) by world (al-'âlam) the scholastic theologians mean the heavens and the earth and what is in them and what is between them; and that is either bodies (ajsâm) or accidents (a'râd), both of which are originated. (a) As for bodies, they cannot be quit of motion and rest, both of which are originated things, and all that cannot be quit of an originated thing is itself an originated thing. Now a body cannot be quit of motion and rest, because every body must necessarily have a place (makân). And since this is true, either the body remains in the place, which is rest; or it is removed from it, which is motion-for of necessity there is no middle ground between the two. But rest and motion are originated things, because they are consequent upon something else. And nothing prior is consequent upon something else. Then no motion or rest is prior. Hence both are originated things,

for there is no middle ground between a thing prior and a thing originated. And motion and rest are both consequent upon something else, because motion means the first coming (huşûl) into the second place, hence of necessity it is consequent upon a first place. And rest means the second coming into the first place, hence of necessity it is consequent upon a first coming. And all that which cannot be quit of originated things is itself an originated thing, for if it is not an originated thing then it is a prior thing. And in this case either it has with it in priority something that is originated, or it has not. If it has, then priority and origination would have to be united in one thing at the same time, and that cannot be. And if it has not, then that which has been known of necessity, namely, the impossibility of the separation of originated things from it, would have to be false, and that cannot be.

44. (b) And accidents are originated because they need bodies for their existence, and that which needs an originated thing is even more itself an originated thing.

45. (2) And in explanation of the second claim, (I say that) an originated thing, when its quiddity (mâhiyya) is qualified at one time by non-existence and later by existence, is possible existence. Then it needs a mover. If that (mover) be a free agent, then that was what we sought. And if it be a mechanical cause, then its effect (athar) cannot follow it in time. Hence its effect must be prior. But it had been proved that it is originated. Hence its mover must also be originated, for they are mutually necessary and both things are impossible. For it has been demonstrated that if Allâh the Most High be a mechanical cause, there follows of necessity either the priority of the world or the origin of Allâh the Most High, both of which are untrue. Hence it is proved that the Most High is Powerful and Free, which is what we sought.

46. AND HIS POWER IS CONNECTED (yataʻallaqu) WITHI ALL DETERMINED THINGS (al-maqdûrât). FOR THE CAUSE WHICH MAKES THEM NEED HIS POWER IS POSSIBILITY. AND

THE RELATION OF HIS ESSENCE TO ALL THINGS IS EQUAL. HENCE HIS POWER IS UNIVERSAL.

[Determined things are possible existence. The relation of His essence to all possible existence is equal. Therefore His power extends equally to all determined things—that is, it is universal.]

47. When he had proved briefly that the Most High is Powerful, he began to explain the universality of His Power. And the philosophers (ḥukamâ) have disputed about it, when they said that He is One (wâhid) and there proceeds from Him nothing but what is one. And the Thanawiyya thought that He did not have power to do evil (ash-sharr.) And anNazzâma held that He did not have power to do what was evil (al-qabîḥ). And al-Balkhî denied His power over things like those which are in our power. And the Jubbâ'iyya held it impossible for His power to extend to those very things which are in our power. And reality (al-haqq) is opposed to all of these.

48. And the proof for our contention is that every hindrance in relation to His essence and in relation to what is determined (maqdûr) has been removed. Hence the universal connection (taʻalluq) of His power is necessary. (That is, neither in Allâh nor in the thing determined is there any hindrance— hence His power extends to all.)

49. Now the exposition of the first statement (of the text) is that which necessitates His being Powerful in His essence. And the relationship (nisba) of His essence to all things is equal, because of its uniqueness (tajarrud). Hence that which is necessitated by it (namely, His Power) is also equally related, which is what we sought.

50. And the second statement is true, because that which necessitates a thing's being determined (maqdûr) is its possibility. And possibility partakes of everything (all creation is one in possessing possibility). Hence it is sound (şiḥḥa) for determination also to become a partaker in possible existences, which is what we sought. And when all hindrance in relation to the Powerful and in relation to what is deter

mined is removed, then its universal connection is necessary, which is what we sought.

[Allâh is Powerful (qâdir), and His power extends to all existence provided that neither in the qâdir nor in the maqdûr is there any hindrance. For instance, Allâh is able to create a partner, but in this case there is a hindrance, for a partner to Allâh is incapable of receiving existence.]

And know that the occurrence of everything connected with His Power is not necessary. Although He has power over everything, only some of the things over which He has power actually occur. And the Ash'arites agree with us in the universality of the connection (of His Power), but they claim that what He has power over always occurs, as will be explained later, if Allâh wills.

51. SECOND, THE MOST HIGH IS KNOWING (‘âlim). FOR HE PERFORMS ACTIONS WHICH ARE FIRM (muḥkam) AND PERFECT (mutqan), AND EVERYONE WHO DOES THAT IS OF NECESSITY

KNOWING.

52. Among the number of His positive qualities is His being Knowing. And The Knowing One is He to whom all things are clear in such a way that what is present to Him does not become absent.

53. And a FIRM AND PERFECT ACT is that which includes matters strange and wonderful and unites many characteristics.

54. And there are two proofs that He is knowing: (1) First, He is a free agent, and every free agent is knowing. The minor premise (that He is a free agent) was explained above. And as for the major premise, (know that) the act of a free agent follows his purpose, and to purpose a thing without having knowledge of it is impossible. (2) Second, He has performed firm and perfect acts, and everyone who does the like is knowing of necessity. Now that He performs such acts is manifest to whoever considers His creation: the heavenly bodies, on whose movements the characteristics