CHAPTER X.

Dismay produced at Madras by Lord Mornington's orders.-Mr. Webbe predicts that the Governor-General will be defeated, and impeached on his return to Europe.-General Harris alarmed.-Advises Lord Mornington to temporise with Tippoo Sultaun. -Memorandum of Mr. Webbe.-Weakness of the Madras Government.-Mr. Webbe trembles at the Prospect of an Invasion by Tippoo.-Recounts the Disasters, Dangers, Expenses, and Delays of the Wars with Hyder Ali and Tippoo.-Lord Mornington's Firmness.-Repeats his Orders.-Is supported by the Commander-in-Chief and the Council of Bengal.Prepares for the Contest.-Negotiations with the Nizam and the Mahrattas.-Accomplishes the Destruction of the French Force of the Nizam without shedding blood.-The Nizam receives a British subsidiary Force instead of the disbanded French Corps.-Effects of this stroke of policy all through British India.-Exultation of the Adherents of the British Government.-General Craig congratulates Lord Mornington on the Result.-Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Governor-General.

THE Governor-General's letters to General Harris, announcing that it was his positive resolution to assemble the army upon the coast of Coromandel, were received with anything but enthusiastic approbation at Madras. The bare idea of the possible renewal of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun filled the members of that Government with the most painful apprehensions. When Lord Mornington's orders were communicated to Mr. Webbe, the Secretary of the Government, by Mr. Lushington, the Private Secretary of General Harris, that gentleman gave expression to his disapprobation of

"Our

the projected operations in the strongest terms. unprepared state for war, in the absence of a large portion of our troops in the Eastern Islands;-our empty and bankrupt treasury at Madras;-all the horrors of Hyder's merciless invasion of the Carnatic,— of Tippoo's sanguinary destruction of Colonel Baillie's detachment,—Sir Hector Munro's disgraceful retreat to Madras, and the first failure of Lord Cornwallis against Seringapatam rushed at once into Mr. Webbe's mind, after reading Lord Mornington's letter, and he exclaimed with bitterness and grief, I can anticipate nothing but shocking disasters from a premature attack upon Tippoo in our present disabled condition, and the impeachment of Lord Mornington for his temerity.""* Even the Commander-in-Chief of the army of Coromandel shrunk at first sight from the enterprise which Lord Mornington proposed to him. "For my

own part," observes General Harris, in a letter dated 23rd of June, 1798, "I have no doubt (as matters now stand with the French) but Tippoo will explain away our just grounds of complaint, although I am convinced he has committed himself to the full extent of the proclamation. His inveteracy to us will only end with his life, and he will always seize any opportunity that offers to annoy us; but notwithstanding this, and that the political circumstances of India are now much in our favour, it perhaps still remains a matter of serious consideration whether, in our very great want of cash, and the effect our being engaged in war in this country may have on the affairs in Europe, it would not be better that he should be allowed to make the

* Lushington's Life of Lord Harris.

amende honorable if he be so inclined, than that we should avail ourselves of the error he has run into, and endeavour to punish him for his insolence." Having made this observation, General Harris, as an old soldier, adds, "On my part, your Lordship may depend on my following your instructions implicitly." In a subsequent letter, the General communicated to Lord Mornington a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Webbe, earnestly protesting against the orders of the supreme Government. After reviewing the position of the allies, Mr. Webbe observes, "In respect to ourselves, a very large proportion of the coast army is detached, our means of resource curtailed by the war in Europe, and our credit in this country-at least, upon this coastbankrupt. If, therefore, with all the advantages we possessed in the year 1790, with the hearty and effectual co-operation of the Mahrattas, and with the friendship of the Nizam, our operations against Tippoo were not made successful without the greatest difficulty, I am fearful that under the general change of circumstances which I have mentioned, and which I believe to be correct, an attack upon him now is more likely to end in discomfiture than victory." Mr. Webbe goes on to recount the various reasons which induced him to entertain these gloomy apprehensions: "With the war well advanced, with our preparations and arrangements on foot for twelve months before, and with such a combined alliance as may be now despaired of, it still cost Lord Cornwallis two campaigns before he could besiege Seringapatam." "I doubt," he says, "that it is practicable to obtain the assistance of the Mahrattas. In respect to both the Mahrattas and the

Nizam, I think there is no reasonable ground to expect effectual assistance from either until we should strike some signal blow. Neither of thein were hearty in the cause during the last war before the fall of Bangalore." Having dwelt upon the issue of the campaign in 1790, under General Meadows, and described the various physical and political difficulties that presented themselves to thwart Lord Mornington's designs, Mr. Webbe declares his belief that any hostile preparations on the part of the British Government would produce an immediate invasion by Tippoo Sultaun :-"Meanwhile, the movement of our troops and military preparations could not escape the vigilance of Tippoo: his resources are always more prompt than our own; and as great part of his army is said to be in a state of field equipment, our attempt to strike a blow at him is likely to produce an invasion of the Carnatic, before we are in a situation to resist him." He sums up his forebodings in the following words :-" But, seeing that our resources have, by the mere operation of the war in Europe, been reduced to a state of the greatest embarrassment, and having no hope of effectual relief but in peace, I can anticipate none but the most baneful consequences from a war with Tippoo. If war is inevitable, and the present are judged the most advantageous circumstances under which it can commence, I fear our situation is bad beyond the hope of remedy."

Upon a man of less decision of character than Lord Mornington, this array of obstacles and startling difficulties would have produced some effect. To his capacious understanding and undaunted soul the arguments of the members of the Madras Council only sug

gested new motives for energy, and additional resolution to encounter, or, if practicable, to prevent the dangers which were exhibited in such magnitude in the correspondence of the Madras Government. The authorities at Fort St. George had yet to learn how great an influence one commanding mind and resolute spirit, invested with the unfettered direction of affairs, can exercise upon the fortunes of war; and how the ardour, patriotic zeal, inflexible resolution, and resistless daring of a great man exercising the functions of government, can be conveyed by a hidden chain of electric communication to the hearts of every officer and soldier in the army, and to every member of the civil service under him. The Wellesley character was not yet understood; for, at the period of which we are writing, the Governor-General had been but a few weeks at the head of the Bengal Government. Mr. Webbe's faithful expostulations supplied his Excellency with fresh incentives to action; they pointed out more clearly than ever, the dangers that impended over the British nation in India, by exhibiting correctly the actual position of the public enemy. Without entering into all the details of the discussions between the Governor-General and the Government of Madras, which are developed in a voluminous correspondence, it will be sufficient to quote the following passage in explanation of the line of conduct pursued in this emergency by Lord Mornington :-" If we thought it proper to enter with you into any discussion of the policy of our late orders, we might refer you to the records of your own Government, which

* MSS. Wellesley Collection.